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I. INTRODUCTION
Politics constrains the federal taxing power, of course: a
candidate’s promise to raise taxes across the board is generally
thought to be political suicide, as is breaching a promise not to raise
taxes. The conventional wisdom, however, is that the Constitution
imposes no significant legal limitations on the taxing power.1 If
Congress is willing to take the political flack, it can do what it wants,
or so it is assumed. Similarly, in construing what Congress has done
on a tax issue, a court can usually proceed without meaningful
references to the Constitution.
1 The Constitution imposes real restrictions in special situations. For example, the Export
Clause provides that “No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State,” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5, and that Clause has been enforced. See United States v. U.S. Shoe
Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 366–70 (1998) (holding that the Harbor Maintenance Tax, which obligates
exporters to pay a percentage of the value of cargo shipped, was a tax on exports and therefore
unconstitutional); United States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 861–62 (1996)
(holding that the Export Clause categorically bars Congress from imposing any tax on exports);
see also Erik M. Jensen, The Export Clause, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (2003) (detailing the historical
importance of the Export Clause and observing that, although the Export Clause is enforced by
modern courts, its effect is largely invisible in the lives of ordinary Americans).

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1539031

2/11/2010 11:19:39 PM

2010]

MURPHY V. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

753

In the widely noted case of Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service,2
a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit ultimately reached a result consistent with
conventional wisdom, concluding that a whistleblower’s recovery for
emotional distress was properly includable in the income-tax base.3
But the court followed a torturous path to get there, and Murphy
provides an opportunity to revisit some basics of taxation. At bottom
one of the questions in Murphy was “What is income?” and you
cannot get more basic than that.
A. Murphy I and the Hyperventilating Blogosphere
Chief Judge Douglas Ginsburg’s opinion on Murphy’s first
go-round in August 2006 (Murphy I), which unanimously concluded
that the emotional-distress recovery was not income within the
meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment and, as a result, could not be
reached by the federal income tax,4 characterized the government’s
arguments as resting on a “breathtakingly expansive claim of
congressional power.”5 Although the panel must have known that
striking down an exercise of the taxing power would be noteworthy, it
apparently did not realize how controversial its conclusion would be.
Murphy I did not have a long shelf life; the negative reaction was
immediate—the decision “shocked the tax community”6—and
effective. Tax professors generally were appalled (some refusing to
read the opinion, or so they said, because the result was so bizarre),
and cries were heard that the decision was not only dumb but also
catastrophic.7 If an emotional-distress recovery were not income,
then logically, it was argued, wages were not either. Remove
compensation for services from the income-tax base, and the base
would be gutted.
493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1004 (2008).
Id. at 171.
4 Murphy v. IRS (Murphy I), 60 F.3d 79 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, No. 05-5139, 2006 WL
4005276 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2006). The panel included two Republican appointees and one
Democratic. If this decision had partisan political overtones, they were not obvious.
5 Id. at 87. The breathtaking claim was that any receipt of value could be reached: “The
Sixteenth Amendment simply does not authorize the Congress to tax as ‘incomes’ every sort of
revenue a taxpayer may receive. As the Supreme Court noted long ago, the ‘Congress cannot
make a thing income which is not so in fact.’” Id. (quoting Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass’n v.
Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110, 114 (1925)).
6 Joseph M. Dodge, Murphy and the Sixteenth Amendment in Relation to the Taxation of
Non-Excludable Personal Injury Awards, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 369, 370 (2007) [hereinafter Dodge,
Murphy and the Sixteenth Amendment].
7 See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, Full Court May Weigh Taxation of Damages, NAT’L L.J., Oct.
30, 2006, at 1 (quoting officials and commentators, one of whom called Murphy I
“outrageous”).
2
3
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Obviously embarrassed by the reaction—according to Professor
Paul Caron, the court was “prodded by the tax blogosphere”8—the
panel on its own motion vacated its judgment in December 2006.9
New briefs were filed, the case was reargued, and in June 2007 the
same panel unanimously held, on the basis of an issue “belatedly
raised” and “newly argued”—the court was covering its backside—
that the recovery had been properly taxed.10
The panel’s abrupt turnaround left rubber on the road. With the
decision in Murphy II, most of the tax professoriate and the tax bar
gave a sigh of relief. And when the Supreme Court denied certiorari
in April 2008,11 the Republic appeared safe.
Or maybe not. Not all critics were mollified. For example,
Professor Caron has written that “the panel could not unring the bell
and undo much of the damage caused by its original decision.”12 By
ignoring the Supreme Court’s good sense in Commissioner v.
Glenshaw Glass Co.13—which, half a century earlier, had “appeared
to establish the term ‘gross income’ as a catch-all phrase reaching all
accessions to wealth, regardless of source”14—the panel “turned what
should have been a run of the mill tax dispute . . . into a threat to the
very survival of the income tax.”15 Strong stuff. Murphy I might have
no legal effect, but Caron and others worried that it encouraged tax
protesters.16 Moreover, since the opinion had been printed in the
8 Paul L. Caron, The Story of Murphy: A New Front in the War on the Income Tax, in
TAX STORIES 55, 91 (Paul L. Caron ed., 2d ed. 2009). Caron presents instant analysis from the
post-Murphy I period, see id. at 70–71, and makes the case for blogs’ centrality in modern tax
policy. See id. at 90–91.
9 See Murphy v. IRS, No. 05-5139, 2006 WL 4005276, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2006).
A petition for rehearing en banc had been filed. The panel vacated the judgment before the
petition was acted upon, but the panel relied in part on the argument in the petition. See Murphy
v. IRS (Murphy II), 493 F.3d 170, 173 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1004 (2008).
10 Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 173.
11 Murphy v. IRS, 553 U.S. 1004 (2008). Had the panel reaffirmed its original decision
and had the full court accepted that conclusion, the Supreme Court might have granted cert. As
it was, the result was mundane.
12 Caron, supra note 8, at 56.
13 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
14 Caron, supra note 8, at 55. In fact, Glenshaw Glass did not say a personal injury
recovery is an “accession to wealth.” The Court distinguished taxable punitives, which “cannot
be considered a restoration of capital for taxation purposes,” from “[d]amages for personal
injury [which] are . . . compensatory only.” Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 432 n.8. By implying
that such recoveries might be nontaxable, the Court contributed to the confusion Caron blamed
on Murphy I. See infra notes 68–79 and accompanying text.
15 Caron, supra note 8, at 91.
16 I have been accused of that too, because of an article that antedated Murphy. See Joseph
M. Dodge, Letter to the Editor, Jensen’s Missiles Don’t Get Off the Ground, 107 TAX NOTES
131, 132 (2005) [hereinafter Dodge, Jensen’s Missiles] (accusing me of taking “dangerous”
positions and evidencing “sympathy with tax protesters” in arguing that not all recoveries for
nonphysical personal injuries are taxable).
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Federal Reporter, it can cause mischief for eternity.17
Phooey. I agree with James Reardon that “[t]he scholars and
commentators should lighten up a bit.”18 Although Murphy I
contained an amazing number of howlers, and deserved criticism,
the result was defensible. It was not clearly right, but it was not
clearly wrong either, particularly if the purposes behind the
Sixteenth Amendment matter. It is hard to prove what was in peoples’
minds in the early twentieth century, but I have no doubt that
Amendment proponents would have been horrified to think an
emotional-distress recovery might be “income.”19 Most people
outside the academy would be horrified at that idea today.20
Indeed, I will go further than the panel did: all or part of the
recovery, which was assumed to have no replacement-of-earnings
component,21 might not even have been “gross income” within the
17 Even if not printed—hard copy no longer guarantees availability for eternity—the
opinion would have survived electronically. The vacated opinion is available on the D.C.
Circuit’s Web site. See Murphy v. IRS (Murphy I), No. 05-5139 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 22, 2006),
available at http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200608/05-5139a.pdf.
18 James D. Reardon, Marrita Murphy: The Flip Side of the Economic Substance
Doctrine, 112 TAX NOTES 1167, 1170 (2006); see also Robert W. Wood, Letter to the Editor,
Wood Looks at the Flip Side of Murphy v. IRS, 113 TAX NOTES 188, 188 (2006) (“I am tired of
endless potshots at Murphy . . . .”). A student or two supported Murphy I, see, e.g., Russell F.
Romond, Note, Income, Taxes and the Constitution: Why the D.C. Court of Appeals Got It Right
in Murphy, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 587 (2007), but what do they know?
19 Cf. Merchs.’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 519 (1921) (“In
determining the definition of . . . ‘income’ . . . this court has . . . refused to enter into the
refinements of lexicographers or economists and has approved, . . . what it believed to be the
commonly understood meaning of the term which must have been in the minds of the people
when they adopted the Sixteenth Amendment . . . .”). For additional discussion of this point, see
Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of “Incomes,”
33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057 (2001) [hereinafter Jensen, Meaning of Incomes] (discussing the
Amendment in enough detail to cause emotional distress).
20 Cf. Philip Mullock, The Constitutional Problem of Taxing Gifts as Income, 53 MINN. L.
REV. 247, 254 (1968) (questioning whether gifts could be included in income-tax base); Steven
T. O’Hara, Thinking Outside the Code, 116 TAX NOTES 679 (2007) (discussing the different
meanings of “income” and urging consideration of such issues). The physical-nonphysical
distinction of income has been challenged on policy grounds. See, e.g., Laura Sager & Stephen
Cohen, Discrimination Against Damages for Unlawful Discrimination: The Supreme Court,
Congress, and the Income Tax, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 447 (1998); Vivian Berger, End the
Inequity, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 17, 2007, at 23. Although he signed the Small Business Job
Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755, President Clinton disapproved of
taxing personal injury recoveries, which “are designed to make victims whole, not enrich them.”
Statement on Signing the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1317,
1318 (Aug. 20, 1996). Professor Hubbard has challenged the distinction on constitutional
grounds. See F. Patrick Hubbard, Making People Whole Again: The Constitutionality of Taxing
Compensatory Tort Damages for Mental Distress, 49 FLA. L. REV. 725 (1997). But see Douglas
A. Kahn, The Constitutionality of Taxing Compensatory Damages for Mental Distress When
There Was No Accompanying Physical Injury, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 128, 129 (1999) (arguing this
distinction raises no constitutional problem).
21 Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 81 (noting that “compensation for a non-physical personal injury
is not income under the Sixteenth Amendment if, as here, it is unrelated to lost wages or
earnings”).
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meaning of section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Most important, I shall argue that, if Murphy I had survived, it
would not have done irreparable damage to the income tax or the tax
system as a whole. The narrow issue—taxation of emotional-distress
recoveries—has no significant revenue effects.22 The decision would
have stood only for the proposition that ratifiers of the Sixteenth
Amendment did not think Congress can characterize anything as
income (and maybe also that Congress, in defining “gross income,”
did not intend to pick up all receipts of value). Concluding that
“income” is not an empty vessel into which any content can be
poured is not revolutionary; it takes language seriously.23
The idea that tax protesters gained traction from Murphy I was
especially overdone in the commentary. Protesters need no
encouragement to see systemic flaws. And, if encouragement to
frivolousness developed, it came more from critics than from the
Murphy I opinion.24 It was the critics who said Murphy I might mean
that wages (and other clearly taxable items) are not income.25 Wages
and emotional-distress recoveries are not the same,26 and, in any
event, no one can seriously argue that wages are off-limits in the
income tax.27 Murphy I might have been problematic, but hyperbole
22 Cf. Caron, supra note 8, at 91 (“Although questions about the taxation of damage
recoveries will not bring down the income tax, the willingness of so many to shake its
foundations may ultimately prove its undoing.”).
23 In criticizing Murphy I, Professor Theodore Seto argued that “[t]he single most
problematic aspect of constitutionalizing the definition of income is that doing so threatens to
deprive Congress of the flexibility needed to make a tax system work.” Theodore Seto, Bank of
America as an Alternative to Originalism in Murphy, http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/
2006/08/seto_bank_of_am.html (Aug. 28, 2006), quoted in Caron, supra note 8, at 71.
Constitutions are supposed to limit flexibility, and I am bewildered that we should not
“constitutionalize” a term in the Constitution.
24 Vacated opinions give no penalty protection. Cf. Suder v. Comm’r, No. 3245-06S, T.C.
Summ. Op. 2008–97, at 1–2 (Aug. 7, 2008), available at http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/InOp
Historic/suder.sum.WPD.pdf (“Pursuant to [Internal Revenue Code] section 7463(b), the
decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion shall not be treated
as precedent for any other case.”).
25 See, e.g., Caron, supra note 8, at 78–79 (recapitulating a number of critics’ concerns
that Murphy I would lead to the end of the income tax). The notion that a protester would
connect emotional-distress recoveries and wages is far-fetched. He would need help: “Hey, Bud,
did you see what that Big State tax prof said? A new case says Uncle Sam can’t tax our salaries.
Sounds right to me.”
26 See infra Part VI.E.
27 “Compensation for services” is listed in Code section 61(a)(1). See I.R.C. § 61(a)(1)
(2006). The Sixteenth Amendment was not directed at wage-earners, but compensation was
understood to be part of the tax base. See Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 27, 28
Stat. 509, 553 (reaching “gains, profits or income” above $4,000, “whether said gains, profits, or
income be derived from any kind of property, rents, interest, dividends, or salaries, or from any
profession, trade, employment, or vocation . . . or from any other source”); Revenue Act of
1862, ch. 119, §§ 89–93, 12 Stat. 432, 473–75 (imposing a 3% tax on “annual gains, profits, or
income of every person residing in the United States” above $600, with a 5% rate applicable to
amounts over $10,000); see also Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1881) (approving
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seems to overwhelm common sense in discussions like this.28
Finally, I shall argue, Murphy II contained its own complement of
questionable propositions—questionable partly because they are
inconsistent with prior authority. For one thing, the D.C. Circuit
advanced a conception of the relationship between the meaning of
“incomes” in the Sixteenth Amendment and the meaning of “income”
in the Internal Revenue Code that was contrary to decades of
Supreme Court authority.
As a matter of first principle, it is not absurd to think that the
statutory definition of “income” can include items that are not income
under the Amendment as long as other constitutional authority
supports taxation.29 But the Court has many times said the two
documents should be interpreted consistently.30 (Indeed, Judge
Ginsburg in Murphy I noted that “[t]he Supreme Court has held that
the word ‘incomes’ in the Amendment and the phrase ‘gross income’
in § 61(a) of the IRC are coextensive.”31) In Murphy II, however, the
D.C. Circuit concluded that the whistleblower’s recovery could
constitutionally be reached by section 61 regardless of whether it was
“income” under the Amendment.32 In addition, the panel concluded
the recovery could be taxed even though it might not have been

unapportioned 1862 income tax). But see Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429,
158 U.S. 601 (1895) (striking down unapportioned 1894 income tax).
28 Responding to an article in which I argued that recoveries for nonphysical injuries are
not automatically taxable, a critic accused me of “giving aid and comfort to tax protestors who
claim that wages are not income under section 61.” Joseph M. Dodge, Letter to the Editor, Of
Course Recoveries for Nonphysical Injuries are Taxable!, 106 TAX NOTES 986, 987 (2005)
[hereinafter Dodge, Recoveries for Nonphysical Injuries] (responding to Erik M. Jensen, Are
Recoveries for Nonphysical Injuries Automatically Taxable?, 105 TAX NOTES 1439 (2004)
[hereinafter Jensen, Automatically Taxable?]).
29 See Gregory L. Germain, Taxing Emotional Injury Recoveries: A Critical Analysis of
Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service, 60 ARK. L. REV. 185, 191 (2007) (“It is . . . possible for
Ms. Murphy’s award to constitute ‘income’ under the I.R.C., but not . . . under the Sixteenth
Amendment, for the I.R.C. has an evolving meaning changeable by Congress . . . .”).
30 It had always been understood that Congress might exercise less than full power, by
exempting items that could be taxed. In that respect, the statutory definition of “gross income”
could be narrower than the constitutional meaning of “incomes.” The possibility that the
statutory definition might be broader had been hypothesized, but, until Murphy II, it had not
been accepted. See Dodge, Murphy and the Sixteenth Amendment, supra note 6, at 376 (“[N]o
court (including the Murphy [I] panel decision) has . . . taken such a view, and so it must be
viewed as being only a remote theoretical possibility.”). The remote possibility soon became
real.
31 Murphy I, 460 F.3d 79, 85 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, No. 05-5139, 2006 WL 4005276 (D.C.
Cir. Dec. 22, 2006) (citing, inter alia, Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940)).
Moreover, the term generally should be understood in a nontechnical way. See United States v.
Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co., 297 U.S. 88, 99 (1936) (“Income within the meaning of the
Sixteenth Amendment is[,] . . . [w]ith few exceptions, if any, . . . income as the word is known
in the common speech of men.”).
32 Murphy II, 493 F.3d 170, 179 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1004 (2008).
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considered “gross income” historically and even though Congress had
not explicitly amended section 61 to expand its scope.33
Taxation is hard enough to understand without the meaning of
“income” shifting from one setting to another, and, if the cash
received by Ms. Murphy was not “income” under the Sixteenth
Amendment—Murphy II did not repudiate that part of Murphy I—
what was the effect of imposing a tax on the recovery? The Murphy II
panel said the levy was an “excise,”34 but it looks a lot like a tax on
wealth. If so, to be constitutional, it should have been subject to the
onerous direct-tax apportionment rule.35 Never before had a court
hinted that an unapportioned national tax on wealth, if packaged in
the right way, might meet constitutional requirements. In its haste to
correct mistakes in Murphy I—and to be applauded by the legal
academy—the panel in Murphy II took positions that are harder to
defend than Murphy I.
B. The Plan of Attack
The Murphy litigation is done, but the issues should not go away.
They are important, interesting, and even fun. In making the case for
their significance, I shall proceed as follows. Part II sets out the facts
and procedural posture of Murphy I, and, to help us feel superior to
the D.C. Circuit, Part III describes some of the howlers in that
decision.
The next two parts of the Article examine the issues that made
Murphy a more difficult case than most commentators think and that
made the result, if not the reasoning, of Murphy I defensible. Part IV
discusses the constitutional structure—the direct-tax clauses and the
Sixteenth Amendment—and explains why the constitutional issues in
Murphy were serious. Part V considers the role of section 104(a)(2) in
analyzing recoveries for nonphysical personal injuries, concluding
that not all such recoveries are fully taxable.
Part VI argues that treating recoveries in a personal setting like
Murphy differently from receipts of value in a business or investment
context is not silly. Finally, Part VII considers Murphy II’s change of
direction, questions the desirability of having the meaning of “gross
Id. at 180.
Id. at 186. An excise must satisfy only the uniformity rule, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1
(“[A]ll Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”); see also
Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 184–86 (stating that an excise tax does not need to satisfy the more
stringent apportionment rule).
35 See Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 184–86 (noting that the apportionment rule is applicable to a
direct tax that is not a tax on incomes); see also infra Part IV (discussing taxation of
nonphysical personal injuries).
33

34

2/11/2010 11:19:39 PM

2010]

MURPHY V. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

759

income” unmoored from the constitutional meaning of “incomes,”
and explains why the case bizarrely supports an unapportioned tax on
wealth.
II. MURPHY I: THE BASICS
In 1994, Marrita Murphy complained to the United States
Department of Labor that a former employer, the New York Air
National Guard, had violated whistleblower statutes by blacklisting
her and providing unfavorable references after she had alerted
environmental authorities to some of the Guard’s suspect activities.36
The Labor Department determined that unlawful retaliation had in
fact occurred, and an administrative law judge concluded that Murphy
had suffered $70,000 in damages—$45,000 attributable to “emotional
distress or mental anguish” and $25,000 to “injury to professional
reputation”—which she received in 2000.37
Although one might think that “injury to professional reputation”
relates to future earning power, the D.C. Circuit specifically stated
that “[n]one of the award was for lost wages or diminished earning
capacity.”38 If the injury was nonphysical and the recovery was only
for lost earnings, no authority would have supported excluding the
recovery from gross income. But the litigation proceeded with a
different assumption about the reasons for Murphy’s compensation.39
Murphy initially paid federal income taxes on the recovery, but she
later filed an amended return, taking the position that, under Internal
Revenue Code section 104(a)(2), the $70,000 was not taxable.40 That
section had historically provided an exclusion from gross income for
a recovery “received on account of personal injuries or sickness,”41
but, in 1996, Congress amended the section to limit the exclusion to
recoveries for “personal physical injuries or physical sickness” and to
provide that “emotional distress shall not be treated as a physical
injury or physical sickness.”42 The amended version of section
104(a)(2) applied to Murphy’s award.43
36 At the time her name was Leveille, but, like the D.C. Circuit, I will refer to her as
“Murphy” throughout the Article. See Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 81.
37 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
38 Id.
39 I am not sure the district court would have agreed with the D.C. Circuit’s
characterization of the award, but the district court’s resolution of the case made that point
irrelevant. See Murphy v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 2d 206 (D.D.C. 2005), rev’d, 460 F.3d 79 (D.C.
Cir. 2006), aff’d on reh’g, 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert.denied, 553 U.S. 1004 (2008).
40 See Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 81.
41 I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994).
42 Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-88, §§ 1605(a), 1605(b),
110 Stat. 1755, 1838 (amending I.R.C. §§ 104(a)(2) and 104(a)).
43 See Murphy II, 493 F.3d 170, 171 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1004 (2008);
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Once the dispute reached litigation, Murphy argued in the
alternative that she had suffered a physical injury (“bruxism” or teeth
grinding) from the harassment or, if her injury was not physical, that
her recovery was not income within the meaning of the Sixteenth
Amendment.44 The district court granted the government’s motion for
summary judgment on both issues.45
The determination that Murphy’s injury was not physical for
purposes of the statutory exclusion—affirmed by the D.C. Circuit46—
itself raises interesting questions,47 but I shall focus only on the
alternative claim.48 The D.C. Circuit panel determined that the
recovery, although for a nonphysical injury and thus not excluded by
section 104(a)(2), was not “income” as a matter of constitutional
law.49 Applying the “in lieu of” test—what did the recovery
replace?—the panel concluded that no part of the recovery
compensated for anything that would have been taxable, like lost
wages.50 Had the recovery been “in lieu of” otherwise taxable
income, it would have been “income” under the Sixteenth
Amendment.51 But the panel concluded that was not the case.52

Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 81. Murphy settled her claim against the New York Air National Guard in
1999. See Leveille v. N.Y. Air Nat’l Guard, No. 98-079, 1999 DOL Ad. Rev. Bd. LEXIS 105
(Dep’t of Labor Admin. Review Bd. Oct. 25, 1999). She included the $70,000 as income in her
income tax return in 2000. Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 171; Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 81.
44
Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 80–81.
45
See Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service, 362 F. Supp. 2d 206 (D.D.C. 2005), rev’d,
460 F.3d 79 (D.C. Cir. 2006), aff’d on reh’g, 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553
U.S. 1004 (2008).
46 Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 83–84.
47 The required connection between a physical injury and a recovery has yet to be fleshed
out. The Service has provided limited guidance. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-41-022
(Oct. 13, 2000) (concluding that recovery on a sexual harassment claim was governed by
section 104(a)(2) when unwanted contact led to “observable bodily harms such as bruises, cuts,
swelling, and bleeding”); I.R.S. Off. Mem. (CCA) 2008-09-001 (Nov. 27, 2007) (concluding
that an adult’s recovery for sexual abuse suffered as child was excludable although physical
effects were no longer apparent). The Tax Court’s guidance has been similarly limited. See, e.g.,
Domeny v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1047, 1049 (2010) (holding that recovery for a hostile
work environment that exacerbated symptoms of multiple sclerosis was “on account of” a
personal sickness, but more was needed). Legal scholars have identified the need for guidance.
See, e.g., William H. Volz & Vahe Tazian, The Tax Treatment of Sexual Harassment Awards:
Clarifying the Threshold for Exclusion, 30 J. LEGIS. 275 (2004) (urging regulations). Robert
Wood has pondered whether false imprisonment is a physical injury, see Robert W. Wood, Are
False Imprisonment Recoveries Taxable?, 119 TAX NOTES 279 (2008) [hereinafter Wood, False
Imprisonment], and has objected to the Tax Court’s negative conclusion on a related issue. See
Robert W. Wood, Why False Imprisonment Recoveries Should Not Be Taxable, 123 TAX NOTES
1217 (2009) [hereinafter Wood, False Imprisonment] (discussing Stadnyk v. Comm’r, 96
T.C.M. (CCH) 475 (2008)).
48 I shall also not discuss whether the Internal Revenue Service was an appropriate party.
49 Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 88–92.
50 Id.
51 See id. at 88 (citing Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Comm’r, 144 F.2d 110, 113 (1st Cir.

2/11/2010 11:19:39 PM

2010]

MURPHY V. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

761

As a result, if Congress intended to make such a recovery taxable
when it limited the exclusion from gross income to recoveries for
personal physical injuries or sickness, the panel determined it had
acted unconstitutionally: “[W]e hold § 104(a)(2) unconstitutional
insofar as it permits the taxation of an award of damages for mental
distress and loss of reputation.”53 A recovery for emotional distress is
not “incomes” within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment, and,
if the tax was not on incomes, the rule requiring that direct taxes be
apportioned should have applied. Because Congress had not
apportioned the tax, it was invalid.54
“Direct taxes”? “Apportionment”? Those constitutional terms
require explication if the issues in Murphy are to be understood. I
undertake that project in Part IV, after I first describe some of the
howlers in Murphy I. The howlers are important; Murphy I was, in
some respects, an embarrassment. But I shall go on to argue that the
D.C. Circuit panel overreacted in Murphy II by jettisoning almost all
that it had concluded the first time around.
III. THE HOWLERS IN MURPHY I
The Murphy I panel did a poor job, but the embarrassing aspects of
Chief Judge Ginsburg’s opinion were not entirely the court’s fault.
We cannot expect generalist judges to be experts on every statutory
regime. They rely on lawyers to get the foundation right, and the
government, presumably because it had no idea that a bombshell
might come from an apparently routine case, did not help with the
basics.
I here outline a few egregious mistakes Judge Ginsburg advanced
on behalf of the panel. Some were trivial. A judge should not refer to
Eisner v. Macomber55 as Eisner,56 but that sort of thing happens.57
Referring to an “IRS” opinion from 1922 was equally harmless,58
albeit historically challenged.59 Other howlers, however, illustrated a
1944)).
See id. at 88–92.
Id. at 92.
54 Id.
55 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
56 Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 85. Eisner was a Collector of Internal Revenue. Calling the case
Eisner is like referring to Commissioner v. Popeye as Commissioner.
57 See, e.g., Comm’r v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 94 (1977) (referring to “Eisner’s definition
of income”). The government did not help. See Brief for the Appellees at 21, Murphy I, 460
F.3d 79 (No. 05-5139), 2005 WL 3598532 (referring to Macomber as “Eisner”).
58 Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 91 (citing Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C.B. 92, 93 (1922)).
59 Originally the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the agency did not become the Internal
Revenue Service until 1953, see T.D. 6038, 1953-2 C.B. 443, although the modern term was
52
53
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striking unfamiliarity with basics of the federal tax system.
Misunderstanding constitutional authority to enact an income tax.
Judge Ginsburg focused on the meaning of the term “income”
because, in the panel’s view, “[t]he constitutional power of the
Congress to tax income is provided in the Sixteenth Amendment,
ratified in 1913.”60 As I discuss in Part IV, that statement is as wrong
as it can be. The power to tax income derives from the Taxing Clause
in Article I, Section 8: “The Congress shall have Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises . . . .”61 The Amendment
simply provides that a “tax on incomes” is not subject to the
apportionment rule for direct taxes.62 In that respect the Amendment
made the modern income tax possible—an apportioned income tax
would be a travesty—but authority to enact an income tax has been in
the Constitution since its inception.
Failing to look for other constitutional authority for the tax.
Focused as it was on the Sixteenth Amendment, the court did not
consider whether the tax on the emotional-distress recovery might
have been constitutional anyway, without regard to the Amendment.
After all, most federal taxes are not “taxes on incomes,” but their
constitutionality is taken for granted.63
Jumping to constitutional analysis without looking at the statute
first. The Murphy I panel violated a basic interpretive rule that applies
whenever the constitutionality of a statute is at issue: see if the
constitutional issue can be avoided. If the panel had looked to the
meaning of “gross income” under section 61, and had understood
how section 104(a)(2) affects that definition, it might not have had to
reach constitutional issues. Indeed, since Judge Ginsburg had stated
that “[t]he Supreme Court has held that the word ‘incomes’ in the
Amendment and the phrase ‘gross income’ in § 61(a) of the IRC are
coextensive,”64 one might have expected the panel to wonder whether
used earlier on some tax forms. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, FORM 1040:
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN (1918), available at http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/1040
forms.nsf/WebByYear/1918/$file/1040_1918.pdf.
60 Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 84.
61 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. But see Brief for the Appellees, supra note 57, at 28
(“Congress’s power to tax ‘income’ under the Sixteenth Amendment extends to the receipt of
anything of value, measured in money (i.e., ‘accessions to wealth’), over which the taxpayer has
dominion and control.” (emphasis omitted)).
62 See infra Part IV.
63 In Murphy II, the panel wound up concluding that the tax on the emotional-distress
recovery was properly characterized as an excise, making the Sixteenth Amendment irrelevant.
See Murphy II, 493 F.3d 170, 186 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1004 (2008); see also
infra Part VII.
64 See Murphy I, 460 F.3d 79, 85 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, No. 05-5139, 2006 WL 4005276
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2006).
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a recovery that was not income for constitutional purposes might also
not have been gross income. Even if statutory interpretation was not
decisive in Murphy I, the statute was the place to begin. It is always
the place to begin.
Holding that section 104(a)(2) as applied to Murphy’s facts
was unconstitutional. The Murphy I court concluded that amended
section 104(a)(2) is unconstitutional.65 That conclusion reflects a
misunderstanding of the statutory structure. As I discuss in Part V,
section 104(a)(2) is an exclusion from gross income, the definition of
which is found in section 61. When Congress amended section
104(a)(2) to limit its application to recoveries for personal physical
injuries, it was narrowing an exclusion from gross income, not
expanding the definition in section 61.66 If Murphy’s recovery fit
within the terms of section 61, but the application of the tax to the
recovery was impermissible, it was section 61 that must have been
unconstitutional.
Misunderstanding returns of capital and returns of basis. Perhaps
the greatest problem in Murphy I was the panel’s botching of the
analysis of basis.67 The panel said it has long been recognized that
mere restoration of capital is not income, either statutorily or
constitutionally,68 and Murphy characterized her award as a return of
human capital. She argued she was merely made whole by the
compensation—a $70,000 loss was replaced by a $70,000 recovery—
and therefore had no income.69
The government made the obvious response: recovery of basis is
not taxable,70 but individuals have no basis in human capital. Dispose
Id. at 92.
More is treated as income when an exclusion is narrowed, but section 61’s boundaries
were not expanded by amending section 104(a)(2). See Suder v. Comm’r, No. 3245-06S, T.C.
Summ. Op. 2008–97, at 4 (Aug. 7, 2008) (admonishing a couple who, relying on Murphy I, had
argued that a settlement payment was not income and that, if section 104(a)(2) made it income,
that section was invalid: “If the settlement proceeds were not includable in gross income under
section 61, then the constitutionality of section 104(a)(2) would be irrelevant.”).
67 I am not certain the panel misunderstood as much as many have suggested, but, at best,
the panel did a poor job of explanation.
68 Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 85.
69 Id.
70 In fact, the government conceded that basis recovery may not be taxed as a matter of
constitutional law. See id. at 87. I agree with the concession, but not everyone does. See, e.g.,
Dodge, Murphy and the Sixteenth Amendment, supra note 6, at 394–97. Rejecting the idea that a
“netting principle” is constitutionally required, Professor Dodge sees no difference between
Congress’s limiting deductions—no one believes it must permit every conceivable deduction—
and its power to “disallow basis or basis recovery.” Joseph M. Dodge, The Netting of Costs
Against Income Receipts (Including Damage Recoveries) Produced by Such Costs, Without
Barring Congress from Disallowing Such Costs, 27 VA. TAX REV. 297, 370 (2007) [hereinafter
Dodge, Netting of Costs]. Congress needs leeway, but disallowing all deductions (or basis
recovery) is inconsistent with a “tax on incomes.”
65
66
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of an item of capital with a zero basis, and all proceeds will be gain.71
I will return to the consideration of human capital later.72 Suffice it
to say for present purposes that the panel in Murphy I did not meet
the government’s argument head-on,73 a failure that caused scholarly
dismay. Moreover, passages in the opinion could be interpreted to
suggest the judges did not understand basis and gain. The court said a
recovery that merely makes a taxpayer whole—for example, $70,000
to replace a $70,000 item of converted property—cannot be income.74
Wrong.75 The appropriate comparison is not between value received
and value given up, which should be equal in an arm’s-length
transaction, but between value received and basis of property
surrendered.76
On the misunderstanding that gave rise to this howler, the
government had not been helpful. In its brief, the government
advanced an argument indicating that it too misunderstood the
concept of “gain.”77 It said compensatory damages like those
in Murphy “plainly constitute economic gain, for the taxpayer
unquestionably has more money after receiving the damages than she
had prior to receipt of the award.”78 The idea that more money
71
Gain is the difference between amount realized and basis. See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2006).
If no basis exists, gain will equal amount realized—what the government said the Murphy result
should have been.
72 I am unconvinced that what might be called human capital necessarily has no basis or
that it is necessarily true that compensation for involuntary losses of human capital were
intended to be reached by the income tax. See infra Part V.B.3.
73 See Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 88 (“The question in this case is not . . . about a return of
capital . . . ; the question is whether the compensation she received for her injuries is income.”).
74 See id.
75 Authority on which critics of Murphy I rely did no better, which is why Murphy’s
lawyers thought she had a shot. The Glenshaw Glass Court distinguished the “long history of
departmental rulings holding personal injury recoveries nontaxable on the theory that they
roughly correspond to a return of capital” from the situation with punitive damages, which
“cannot be considered a restoration of capital.” Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426,
432 n.8 (1955). That distinction was repeated in O’Gilvie v. United States. 519 U.S. 79, 84
(1996) (citing cases holding “restoration of capital was not income”); see also id. at 86
(suggesting damages “that aim to substitute for a victim’s physical or personal well-being” are
not taxable).
76 The definitive article is Deborah A. Geier, Murphy and the Evolution of ‘Basis,’ 113
TAX NOTES 576 (2006). Professor Geier argues that the Murphy I panel got hung up on rulings
from the early years of the income tax, before the modern concept of basis had been developed.
See id. at 576–77 (“[T]he panel opinion appears to hold that our understanding of the core
concept of tax basis (or capital) must be frozen as of 1913 . . . .”). What we would call basis was
often considered to be fair market value at acquisition. Id. at 580–81. Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S.
470 (1929), which upheld an argument under the Revenue Act of 1921 that a donee’s basis in
appreciated property should be the donor’s, moved the system away from 1913 concepts. Geier,
supra, at 581; see also Taft, 278 U.S. at 484 (“[N]othing in the Constitution . . . lends support to
the theory that gain . . . can be treated as taxable income in the hands of the recipient only so far
as the increase occurred while he owned the property.”).
77
See Brief for the Appellees, supra note 57, at 28.
78 Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 86 (quoting Brief for the Appellees, supra note 57, at 28).
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necessarily means economic gain is absurd—and demonstrates why
the Murphy I panel was able to characterize the government’s
position as “breathtakingly expansive.”79 The sale of a widget with
basis of $70,000 for $70,000 in cash gives rise to no income. The
nature of the assets has changed, but there has been no accession to
wealth.80 The fact that you have new cash in your hand does not mean
the transaction is taxable.
The two sets of lawyers took diametric positions, but both seemed
to misunderstand basis. The position of Murphy’s advisors, largely
accepted by the panel in Murphy I, was this: Pay no attention to basis.
Compensation for conversion of capital is tax-free in its entirety
regardless of basis. The government’s position was also unfounded:
Pay no attention to basis. If cash is received, the amount of the cash is
income. We all ought to be able to do better than this.
IV. DIRECT TAXES AND THE SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT
It is finally time to get into the merits of the dispute in Murphy. I
look first, in this part of the Article, at the constitutional structure that
was involved in the Murphy litigation. In Part V, I then turn to the
relevant statutory structure. The panel in Murphy I thought the
Sixteenth Amendment was decisive: Murphy’s recovery for
emotional distress was not “incomes” and therefore could not be
reached by the income tax. What does the Amendment do, and when
is it relevant?
A. The Constitutional Structure
The Sixteenth Amendment, ratified in 1913, provides that
“Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several
States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.”81 People
often say the Amendment authorized an income tax—Judge Ginsburg
stated this in Murphy I82—but that assumption is wrong. The Taxing
Clause, granting Congress the “Power To lay and collect Taxes,

79 See id. at 87; see also supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s
reaction to the government’s position). The IRS brief said things like “Congress’s power to tax
‘income’ is broad-sweeping and extends to the receipt of anything of value, measurable in
money (i.e., ‘accessions to wealth’), over which the taxpayer has dominion and control.” Brief
for the Appellees, supra note 57, at 15.
80 Even those who take an expansive view of amended section 104(a)(2) concede that a
recovery of cash is not taxable if it reflects recovery of basis. See infra Part V.B.1.
81 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
82 See supra text accompanying note 60.
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Duties, Imposts and Excises,” did that on its own.83 The Amendment
made possible an unapportioned income tax like we have today.
An income tax was a problem before the Amendment because of
the requirement (noted twice in the direct-tax clauses of Article I) that
a direct tax must be apportioned among the states on the basis of
population.84 In 1895, in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.,85 the
Supreme Court had held that the 1894 income tax was invalid because
it was direct and Congress had not satisfied the apportionment
requirement.86
A response to Pollock, the Sixteenth Amendment exempted “taxes
on incomes” from apportionment.87 That was critical because the
apportionment requirement, when it does apply, is a real pain.
Residents of a state with one-twentieth of the national population, for
example, must in the aggregate pay one-twentieth of the total liability
for any direct tax, regardless of how the tax base (real-estate value,
say) is distributed across the country.
Because incomes vary from state to state, an apportioned income
tax could not be based on ability to pay. If an income tax had to be
apportioned, the numbers could be made to work, but doing so would
not be easy.88 Some mechanism would have to ensure that each state
pays the requisite percentage of the national tax liability—probably
meaning that tax rates would be higher in a poor state than in a rich
one.89 Even if some other method were used, the bottom line is that a
higher percentage of a poor state’s income would be taken in federal
income taxes—a counterintuitive system, to put it mildly. Indeed,
as the Supreme Court said in Springer v. United States,90 the 1881
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned
among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective
Numbers . . . .”); U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (“No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid,
unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.”).
85 157 U.S. 429, modified on reh’g, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
86 158 U.S. at 637.
87 See Jensen, Meaning of Incomes, supra note 19, at 1114–23.
88 Congress did apportion a number of antebellum taxes on real estate. Apportionment can
be done, clunky though it is. See Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, § 13, 12 Stat. 292, 297; Act of
Mar. 5, 1816, ch. 24, § 6, 3 Stat. 255, 256; Act of Feb. 27, 1815, ch. 60, § 1, 3 Stat. 216, 216;
Act of Jan. 9, 1815, ch. 21, § 5, 3 Stat. 164, 166; Act of Aug. 2, 1813, ch. 37, § 3, 3 Stat. 53, 71;
Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 75, § 2, 1 Stat. 597, 598.
89 Suppose state A has two citizens, each of whom earns $100,000 per year. State B also
has two citizens, each of whom earns $10,000 per year. An apportioned income tax would have
to collect the same amount of revenue from each state. If the figure is $2,000 per state, the
income of each state A citizen would have to be taxed at a one percent rate, while the rate in
state B would have to be ten percent And the targets would be moving. As national income and
population shift geographically, the rate structures would have to be adjusted, after each census,
to satisfy the apportionment requirement.
90 102 U.S. 586 (1881).
83
84
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decision upholding an unapportioned Civil War income tax, “Where
the population is large and the incomes are few and small,
[apportionment] would be intolerably oppressive.”91
Counterintuitive, oppressive, and even stupid? Well,
apportionment would seem stupid if Congress were actually to try to
apportion an income tax or any other tax, the base of which is not
distributed proportionately to population. If income and population
were distributed in a more or less proportionate way—if each state
had about the same percentage of national population and income—
apportioning an income tax would be easy (and pointless92). But
proportionality of that sort did not exist in 1789, it does not exist
today, and it is hard to imagine it ever would exist. In the real world,
an apportioned income tax would be crazy, an object of ridicule.93
Apportionment is not so bizarre, however, if understood as a
limitation on congressional power. One hopes that Congress would
ordinarily not want to appear ridiculous,94 and apportionment
provides a disincentive to enact a tax with decidedly sectional
effects.95 Requiring apportionment when the tax base and
population are not distributed proportionately—when, if there were
no apportionment rule, representatives of poorer states might try
to gang up on those from richer ones96—would mean, as a
practical matter, that Congress would be unlikely to enact the direct
tax.97 That is the point.
Id. at 600.
Professor Johnson has argued that apportionment should apply only to taxes the bases
of which are distributed proportionately to population. See Calvin H. Johnson, Fixing the
Constitutional Absurdity of the Apportionment of Direct Tax, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 295,
297–98, 314–18 (2004) [hereinafter Johnson, Constitutional Absurdity]. That would make the
direct-tax clauses superfluous.
93 See id. at 296.
94 One would expect an apportioned tax to be used only when revenue needs trump
everything else. See Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of “Direct Taxes”: Are Consumption
Taxes Constitutional?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334, 2382–83 (1997) [hereinafter Jensen,
Consumption Taxes]. When Congress enacted apportioned property taxes between 1798 and
1861, it did so because of war or anticipation of war. See supra note 88 (listing specific acts of
Congress creating apportioned property taxes).
95 Although apportionment has far broader application, southern proponents clearly had
slavery in mind. If northerners had sought to tax slaves, their own states would have borne a
share of the national tax liability. Who would have voted for such a tax? (Slaves were in fact
reached by early taxes on real estate but the theory was that slaves were inextricably linked to
real property.)
96 The uniformity rule has been interpreted to require only that a duty, impost, or excise
apply in the same way across the country, regardless of whether the tax base is distributed
uniformly. A tariff is geographically uniform if it applies similarly in all ports even though
many states have no ports. See Erik M. Jensen, THE TAXING POWER: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 77–88 (Jack Stark ed., 2005) [hereinafter JENSEN, THE
TAXING POWER]. The uniformity rule thus provides no protection against a tax that is uniform in
this respect but that has geographically discriminatory effects.
97 I have made this argument several times. See, e.g., Erik M. Jensen, Interpreting the
91
92
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With the Sixteenth Amendment on the books, we are so used to an
unapportioned income tax that thinking in these terms seems peculiar.
Concerns about sectional taxes, however, were not remote when the
Constitution was ratified in 1789, or in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, when debates about an income tax were
vitriolic.98 The 1894 income tax was a reaction to consumption taxes,
particularly tariffs, which had become the primary revenue source for
the national government, but were thought to hit low-income persons
unfairly.99 The income tax was structured to reach only the wealthy,
and the wealthy were concentrated in the industrial Northeast. There
was a decidedly sectional aspect to the tax.100
Because of the 1796 Supreme Court decision in Hylton v. United
States,101 which had concluded that the direct-tax clauses apply to
very little,102 and the 1881 decision in Springer, which upheld the
unapportioned Civil War income tax,103 most commentators at the
time thought the 1894 tax would easily pass constitutional muster.
But in Pollock, decided only fourteen years after Springer, a divided
Court (5–4) held that the 1894 income tax was direct and, because not
apportioned, constitutionally invalid.104 In some respects, Pollock
turned the world upside-down, but the majority actually did a nice job
of connecting with Hylton.
The Founders said nothing about an income tax, a concept that was
at best rudimentarily understood in the late eighteenth century. In
debates, they provided only two examples of direct taxes that had to
be apportioned—capitation taxes (specifically mentioned in the
Constitution)105 and real-estate taxes. In dicta in Hylton, which upheld
an unapportioned federal tax on carriages, three of the four Justices
intimated that no other tax could be direct,106 and two said also that

Sixteenth Amendment (By Way of the Direct-Tax Clauses), 21 CONST. COMMENT. 355 (2004)
[hereinafter Jensen, Interpreting the Sixteenth Amendment].
98 See Jensen, Meaning of Incomes, supra note 19, at 1100–07.
99 The income tax had populist support, but its appeal was much broader. There was a
widespread feeling that tariffs were unfair in their application. See id. at 1095–96.
100 See id. at 1096–97. An apportioned income tax could not be based on ability to pay:
rates would have to be higher in poor states than in rich ones. See supra notes 87–90 and
accompanying text.
101 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
102 See id. (Chase, Iredell & Paterson, JJ., seriatim).
103 Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 602 (1881).
104 See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, modified on reh’g, 158 U.S.
601 (1895).
105 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
106 See Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 183 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“In regard to other articles,
there may possibly be considerable doubt.”); id. at 177 (opinion of Paterson, J.) (“I never
entertained a doubt, that the principal, I will not say, the only, objects, that the framers of the
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apportionment should be required only when it is easy to do—when,
that is, population and the tax base are distributed proportionately.107
The Hylton dicta were repeated in many nineteenth-century cases,
including Springer,108 as if they were unquestionably correct and as if
an income tax could not possibly be a problem as long as it satisfied
the Uniformity Clause. The Supreme Court in 1796 was made up of
Founders, and who better, it was argued, to understand the original
meaning of the Constitution?
But the dicta should always have been viewed skeptically. For
one thing, although the Hylton Justices were Founders, they were
also Federalists, with every incentive to support the Federalist
government.109 If apportionment were to be required only when it is
easy, the direct-tax clauses would be meaningless. Furthermore, the
dicta were inconsistent with each other110 and with constitutional
language. If the Founders intended apportionment for only capitation
taxes and real-estate taxes, it would have been easy to draft the rule
accordingly. Instead, they used the phrase “Capitation, or other direct,
Tax,”111 suggesting a broader application for the clauses.
Even more important, the implicit assumption in Hylton was that
the Founders intended to constrain only those taxes with which they
were familiar. Those today who treat Hylton as gospel make the same
assumption: any levy not envisioned by tax theoreticians in 1789
must be exempt from apportionment. That is a strange way to

Constitution contemplated as falling within the rule of apportionment, were a capitation tax and
a tax on land.”); id. at 175 (opinion of Chase, J.) (stating that direct taxes “contemplated by the
Constitution, are only two, to wit, a capitation, or poll tax, [s]imply, without regard to property,
profession, or any other circumstance; and a tax on LAND.”).
107 See id. at 181 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“As all direct taxes must be apportioned, it is
evident that the Constitution contemplated none as direct, but such as could be apportioned. If
this cannot be apportioned, it is, therefore, not a direct tax in the sense of the Constitution.”); id.
at 174 (opinion of Chase, J.) (“The Constitution evidently contemplated no taxes as direct taxes,
but only such as Congress could lay in proportion to the census. The rule of apportionment is
only to be adopted in such cases, where it can reasonably apply; and the subject taxed, must
ever determine the application of the rule.”).
108 See, e.g., Springer, 102 U.S. at 602 (“[D]irect taxes, within the meaning of the
Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real estate .
. . .”); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 543 (1869) (“[P]ersonal property, contracts,
occupations, and the like, have never been regarded by Congress as proper subjects of direct
tax.”).
109 The Court did not see itself as a check on other branches. See Jensen, Consumption
Taxes, supra note 94, at 2361.
110 Although a tax on real estate could be apportioned—Congress did that several times
between 1798 and 1861, see supra note 88—it was not easy. There was no reason to think
population and real-estate value (or any other measure that might be used to tax real estate) were
distributed proportionately.
111 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
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interpret a constitutional limitation;112 indeed, it is a dumb way.113 It
is as if we should interpret the Fourth Amendment as having no effect
on electronic surveillance because even Benjamin Franklin could not
have imagined twenty-first century electronics.114
The result in Pollock was unpopular; a tax structured to reach the
wealthy was favored by the vast majority not subject to the tax. And,
it was said with reason, Pollock was contrary to Supreme Court
authority going back to Hylton. (Although the Hylton statements were
technically dicta, they had metamorphosed in the minds of many into
“authority.”) But the Pollock majority made an effort to tie its
conclusion to Hylton, using the following syllogism: (1) The Hylton
Court had said a tax on real property is direct. (2) Taxing income
from real property is constitutionally indistinguishable from taxing
the property itself, since either tax diminishes the value of the
property. (3) Because no distinction of constitutional dimension
would justify treating income from personal property differently
from income from real property, a tax on any income from property
is direct. (4) Finally, because the unapportioned income tax was
overwhelmingly directed at income from property (the income of the
wealthy), the entire statute had to fall.115
Whatever Pollock’s merits—even if it was so clearly wrong that it
should have had no legal weight, as many thought—it was on the
books,116 and it became apparent there would be no income tax
without a constitutional amendment.117 It is in that respect that the
112 I cannot prove what a Founder would have thought about a new tax. But I am sure that,
if he had been asked if such a tax would automatically be exempt from apportionment, the
answer would have been no. Otherwise, the Constitution would not have been ratified. See Erik
M. Jensen, Taxation and the Constitution: How to Read the Direct-Tax Clauses, 15 J.L. & POL.
687, 689 (1999) [hereinafter Jensen, How to Read]; see also Erik M. Jensen, The Constitution
Matters in Taxation, 100 TAX NOTES 821, 826–27 (2003).
113 Many who see a limited role for the direct-tax apportionment rule show disdain for the
effort to understand original meaning—except when something, like the Hylton dicta, supports
their predilections.
114 Cf. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001) (“It would be foolish to contend
that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely
unaffected by the advance of technology.”); Brian C. Anderson & Adam D. Thierer, Killing
Talk Radio, NEW CRITERION, Sept. 2008, at 18, 20 (quoting former FCC Commissioner Dennis
Patrick that the Fairness Doctrine is “unconstitutional on its face”: “[t]o suggest otherwise is to
suggest the framers of our constitution intended to protect from federal coercion only those who
used the technology of the day—a proposition absurd on its face” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
115 See Jensen, Consumption Taxes, supra note 94, at 2369–70. A further benefit of this
analysis was that, by focusing on income from property, the Pollock Court did not have to
overrule Springer. See infra Part IV.C.2.
116 I do not defend all of Pollock’s anti-revolutionary bombast, but I defend the result: an
income tax is direct. See infra Part IV.C.1; see also Jensen, Consumption Taxes, supra note 94,
at 2372–85; Jensen, Meaning of Incomes, supra note 19, at 1071–73.
117 Some income-tax proponents argued that Congress should simply enact a new income
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Sixteenth Amendment, by providing that the apportionment rule
would not apply to “taxes on incomes,” made possible the modern
income tax—an unapportioned income tax.118
Some congressmen wanted to go further and repeal the direct-tax
clauses, so that apportionment would never again be an issue for
any tax, but the Amendment’s sponsor, Senator Norris Brown of
Nebraska, rejected language that would have done that.119 (Perhaps
Brown thought a narrow provision—exempting only taxes on
incomes—made ratification easier.) Although the Amendment limited
the direct-tax clauses, they remain in the Constitution.120
B. Does Any of This Matter Anymore?
The Sixteenth Amendment did not do away with the direct-tax
clauses, suggesting that some forms of taxation might still be subject
to apportionment.121 But maybe I have devoted too much effort to
parsing constitutional text and not enough to understanding reality.
Perhaps none of this matters anymore—Professor Caron thinks we
should not have to examine “entrails” of Founding-era debates to
understand the taxing power122—and maybe constitutional issues
were not worth discussing in Murphy I.
The Supreme Court has had no recent occasion to consider the
meaning of the direct-tax clauses and the Sixteenth Amendment, but
the general scholarly understanding points toward their irrelevance.
The conventional wisdom is that the Taxing Clause gives Congress

tax and give the Court the opportunity to ditch Pollock. But this strategy was resisted: doing that
could offend the Court, and there was no guarantee it would overrule Pollock. Furthermore, a
reaffirmation of Pollock might have delayed enactment of an income tax indefinitely. See
Jensen, Meaning of Incomes, supra note 19, at 1109–14.
118 An unapportioned income tax would have none of the stupid effects that would come
from an apportioned income tax (if such a tax could ever have been enacted). But doing away
with apportionment also meant that Congress could impose a tax with sectional effects: the
burdens of an unapportioned income tax are disproportionately borne by the wealthier parts of
the country.
119 See Jensen, Meaning of Incomes, supra note 19, at 1116.
120 See id. at 1114–23. Although aimed at Pollock, the Amendment was in form agnostic
about the case’s merits. If Pollock was wrong, the Amendment was legal surplusage. If Pollock
was right, the Amendment changed the law. Either way, an income tax need not be apportioned.
121 What that should mean, as a practical matter, is that, if Congress were aware of the
problem, it would not enact a direct tax.
122 Caron, supra note 8, at 87 (“Examining the entrails of the constitutional compromise
between Northern and Southern states over slavery sheds little light on modern day disputes
over the Government’s power to tax its citizens.”). The form of the apportionment rule might
have been due to slavery, see supra note 95, but the Constitution would not have been ratified
without limitations on the taxing power. If apportionment had not been used, something else
would have been. Should we be able to say, “We do not like this particular mechanism, so we
will enforce no limits”?
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nearly unlimited power in taxation; that Pollock was so clearly wrong
that it can be ignored; and that, if Pollock was wrong, the Amendment
was unnecessary and, in any event, should not constrain taxation. As
Professor Caron has put it, “[T]he constitutional limitations on the
taxing power do not serve the needs of the twenty-first century
American economy and society.”123
But Pollock is still on the books and is unlikely to be overturned in
its entirety.124 And the Sixteenth Amendment did not repeal the
direct-tax clauses; it merely exempted “taxes on incomes” from
apportionment. To deal with these inconvenient propositions, which
suggest that a direct tax that is not on incomes must still be
apportioned (if enacted at all), proponents of a strong taxing power
often take another tack to conclude that Congress can do what it
wants: If Congress says a tax is on income, the Amendment controls,
and apportionment is not required.125
The argument effectively is that Congress has the power to
avoid constitutional restrictions by labeling an enactment in the
right way.126 If Congress hides an unapportioned direct tax in the
income-tax provisions of the Code, but characterizes the tax as one on
income, that characterization generally should end the discussion.127
123 Caron,

supra note 8, at 87.
of Pollock was overturned in South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988)
(holding that the Constitution does not forbid taxing interest on bonds issued by states), and
other parts have been chipped away. See Jensen, Consumption Taxes, supra note 94, at
2375–77. But the core of Pollock is unlikely to disappear. It is hard to imagine a dispute that
would present the question cleanly; apportionment is not required for a “tax on incomes”
whether or not Pollock was correct. Had the panel not reversed direction, Murphy I would have
given the Court an opportunity to reconsider Pollock, but Murphy II effectively mooted the
issue.
125 As one commentator argues:
124 Part

[T]he Sixteenth Amendment must give Congress a fully vested power to tax all
income, however Congress defines it, without worrying about fine distinctions. Such
an interpretation yields a meaning of income that is broad and evolutionary.
Income’s meaning is to be determined by Congress, not the Court, and that meaning
changes over time as congressional conceptions of income change and become more
sophisticated.
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income Taxation of
Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1, 24 (1992); see also Jensen, Meaning of Incomes, supra note 19, at
1087–91, 1133–47.
126 In Murphy II, the panel took a slightly different tack: mislabeling does not matter if the
levy would not be subject to the apportionment rule anyway. See infra text accompanying note
510.
127 Could Congress say an ad valorem property tax is on income and avoid apportionment?
I think not. The Hylton Court thought a real-estate tax was direct, see supra note 106, and early
Congresses apportioned such taxes. See supra note 88 (citing congressional enactments of
apportioned real-estate taxes). Nothing in the Sixteenth Amendment’s history suggests its
drafters intended to affect real-estate taxes. See Germain, supra note 29, at 240 (“[U]nder the
consistent rulings of the Supreme Court, Congress would still not be able to impose a traditional
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Professor F. Patrick Hubbard has rightly criticized this
“constitutional desuetude”—the idea that “taxation is so important
and complex that the Supreme Court should simply allow Congress to
make policy choices without interference because, in the modern
context, constitutional limits on Congress’s power to tax are so
outmoded, arbitrary, and inapplicable that the proper approach is
simply to ignore or reject them.”128 Maybe “constitutional desuetude”
describes what goes on in the real world, and, yes, apportionment is
cumbersome. But Congress should not have the power, by an artful
choice of labels, to sidestep constitutional requirements.
Constitutional desuetude was not the prevailing view after
ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment. Several Supreme Court
decisions from that era held that, for an unapportioned direct tax to be
protected by the Amendment, it really must be on income. The best
known example is Eisner v. Macomber,129 where the Court in 1920
struck down an unapportioned income tax as it applied to stock
dividends that did not change recipients’ percentage interests in
the distributing corporation.130 In effect, the Court concluded, the
Amendment presupposes a realization principle: accessions to wealth
must be “realized” before they may be reached by an unapportioned
“tax on incomes.” And what had happened in Macomber—slicing
the corporate pie into more pieces, but with each person’s share
unchanged—was not a realization event. Although the unapportioned
income tax as a whole was valid, the stock dividends were not income
to Macomber.131 The tax as it applied to those dividends thus
remained direct—Pollock survived to that extent—but it was not
protected by the Amendment.132
Through the 1920s, the Court stressed that Congress could not
circumvent apportionment simply by labeling a levy an income tax, or
hiding a non-income tax within the income-tax statute. Although most
commentators think those cases are no longer good law, they have not
been overruled. In two cases decided shortly after Macomber, the
Court held the Sixteenth Amendment had controlling effect.133

ad valorem real property tax without apportionment.”).
128 Hubbard, supra note 20, at 755.
129 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
130 Id. at 219.
131 See id.
132 Id.
133 See Edwards v. Cuba R.R. Co., 268 U.S. 628, 633 (1925) (concluding that cash subsidy
payments made by the Cuban government to facilitate railroad construction “were not made for
services rendered or to be rendered. They were not profits or gains from the use or operation of
the railroad, and do not constitute income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment.”);
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In many other cases, it was taken for granted that “taxes on
incomes” means something. The Court usually made that point
when a statute was deemed to meet constitutional standards anyway,
and the point was therefore dictum in those cases. But the Court
nevertheless felt it necessary to emphasize that constitutional
language was being taken seriously. For example, in Burk-Waggoner
Oil Association v. Hopkins,134 Justice Brandeis, who had dissented in
Macomber,135 conceded that “Congress cannot make a thing income
which is not so in fact.”136
To be sure, the meaning of “incomes” matters, as the panel in
Murphy I thought it does, only if the term “direct tax” has content.
We need not care about carving “taxes on incomes” out of the
apportionment rule if the rule applies to little or nothing anyway.
Professor Calvin Johnson has argued that the Supreme Court got it
right in Hylton, recognizing that apportionment was absurd and
effectively limiting the rule only to taxes that can be easily
apportioned.137 And Johnson applauds the other Hylton dictum that
“direct taxes” includes at most capitation and real-estate taxes.138

Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242 (1924) (extending Macomber’s principles to corporate
reorganizations in which a shareholder maintained a stock interest in a new corporation formed
under the laws of the same state). The Cuba Railroad Court stressed that “[t]he Sixteenth
Amendment, like other laws authorizing or imposing taxes, is to be taken as written and is not to
be extended beyond the meaning clearly indicated by the language used.” Cuba R.R., 268 U.S.
at 631.
134 269 U.S. 110 (1925) (holding Congress may impose a corporate income tax on earnings
of an unincorporated joint stock company denominated a partnership under state law).
135 See Macomber, 252 U.S. at 220–38 (Brandeis & Clarke, JJ., dissenting).
136 Burk-Waggoner, 269 U.S. at 114; see also Helvering v. Indep. Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S.
371, 379 (1934) (“The rental value of the building used by the owner does not constitute income
within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment.”); Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470, 481 (1929)
(“[T]he settled doctrine is that the Sixteenth Amendment confers no power upon Congress to
define and tax as income without apportionment something which theretofore could not
have been properly regarded as income.”); Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 174
(1926) (“It was not the purpose or effect of [the Sixteenth] Amendment to bring any new subject
within the taxing power.”); Merchs.’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 519 (1921)
(“In determining the definition of . . . ‘income’ . . . this court has . . . approved . . . what it
believed to be the commonly understood meaning of the term which must have been in the
minds of the people when they adopted the Sixteenth Amendment . . . .”). In James v. United
States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961), Justice Whittaker (joined by Justices Black and Douglas)
concluded in dissent that embezzled funds were not income. Id. at 249 (Whittaker, Black &
Douglas, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The majority relied on the broad taxing
power, id. at 218 (majority opinion), but Justice Whittaker disagreed: “Equally well settled is
the principle that the Sixteenth Amendment ‘is to be taken as written and is not to be extended
beyond the meaning clearly indicated by the language used.’” Id. at 249 (Whittaker, Black &
Douglas, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Cuba R.R., 268 U.S. at 631). But
see Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 138–39 (1952) (“We think the power of Congress to
tax these [illegal] receipts as income under the Sixteenth Amendment is unquestionable.”).
137 See Johnson, Constitutional Absurdity, supra note 92, at 324–27, 333–36.
138 Johnson goes further, arguing that the logic of the Founders’ position should also
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Advocating a tax on wealth, Professor Bruce Ackerman has argued
that, because the direct-tax clauses were part of a reprehensible
compromise with slavery, the apportionment rule should apply, at
most, to capitation taxes.139 If so, the rule is not even a potential
constraint on the taxing power.140
Johnson and Ackerman are influential people, but their
pronouncements are not the law. Their articulation of the term “direct
tax” is inconsistent with the original understanding of the direct-tax
clauses and the Sixteenth Amendment.141 The Amendment accepted
the existence of a body of taxes subject to the clauses—at a minimum
including a tax on real estate—and excepted only “taxes on incomes”
from apportionment.142 And the idea that apportionment should be
required only when easy would gut the clauses.143
So how should one evaluate the constitutional validity of an
unapportioned tax? Determine first whether the tax is direct. If the
answer is yes, the unapportioned tax is invalid, unless it is a tax on
incomes protected by the Sixteenth Amendment. If, however, the
answer is no—if, that is, the tax is “indirect” (a duty, excise, or
impost)—then apportionment is not required. For an indirect tax, the
only constitutional question is whether the uniformity requirement
has been satisfied.144 Uniformity is not a problem if a particular item

exempt real-estate taxes, which were understood to be direct but which require dexterity to
apportion, from the rule. See Calvin H. Johnson, Purging Out Pollock: The Constitutionality of
Federal Wealth or Sales Taxes, 97 TAX NOTES 1723 (2002). The Founders’ understanding that
a real-estate tax is direct is clear from Founding debates and Hylton. If the Hylton Justices,
disinclined to see limitations on the taxing power, saw real-estate taxes as direct, we should
pay attention. Moreover, beginning in 1798, Congress enacted several such taxes that were
apportioned. See supra note 88 (citing congressional enactments of apportioned real estate
taxes).
139 See Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 58 (1999).
140 It is not a constraint if “capitation tax” means a lump-sum head tax. Putting aside
questions about who gets counted and how—a slave counted as three-fifths of a person for this
purpose and for representation—a lump-sum tax is by its very nature apportioned. See Jensen,
Consumption Taxes, supra note 94, at 2390–93.
141 Although Professor Ackerman calls what happened a compromise with slavery,
counting slaves at all in the direct-tax apportionment process was detrimental to slave states.
The larger the population count, the greater the state’s tax liability. Southern states wanted
slaves to be counted as full persons for purposes of representation, but not at all for tax
purposes.
142 Many thought Pollock was wrong and, as a legal matter, the Amendment was
unnecessary. But that is not to say the concept of “direct tax” was without content. At a
minimum, taxes considered direct historically—real-estate and capitation taxes—should have
been unaffected by the Amendment.
143 The government in Murphy II nevertheless argued (unsuccessfully) that the clauses
should be interpreted in this way. See Murphy II, 493 F.3d 170, 182 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 553 U.S. 1004 (2008).
144 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The apportionment and uniformity rules are mutually
exclusive. Except in unusual circumstances, a tax that is apportioned will not be uniform, and, if
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is taxed consistently across the country.145
That sets the stage for the constitutional analysis in Murphy—why
the definition of “incomes” in the Sixteenth Amendment might
matter. If an unapportioned tax levied on an emotional-distress
recovery is direct, it is valid only if it is a tax on incomes.146
C. What Is a Direct Tax?
What other than a capitation tax and a tax on property might be a
direct tax? Might that category include a levy on an emotionaldistress recovery? Those questions obviously have no clear answers,
but the uncertainty is not as great as many think. I shall argue that,
under the constitutional structure, an income tax is direct (as the
Court concluded in Pollock), and a subset of that tax—a levy on an
emotional-distress recovery—is direct as well. The Murphy I panel
was correct that, if the constitutional issues had to be reached—if the
Internal Revenue Code reached the recovery147—the unapportioned
tax on Ms. Murphy was valid only if it was “on incomes.”
1. Direct Taxes Are (Would You Believe It?) Not Indirect Taxes
In several articles, I have argued that the universe of direct taxes is
far broader than suggested in Hylton v. United States.148 It cannot
be that the only taxes subject to a limitation are those known in 1789
and for which apportionment provides no constraint. Certain
principles were understood to distinguish direct taxes, subject to the
apportionment rule, from other levies, the so-called indirect taxes
(“Duties, Imposts and Excises”149), which need to satisfy only the
uniformity requirement. Those principles should be applied to
determine whether a modern tax of a sort unknown to the Founders
is direct or not.
In introducing what became the direct-tax clauses, Gouverneur
Morris distinguished between direct and indirect taxes,150 limiting

a tax is uniform, it would almost certainly violate the apportionment rule. See Jensen,
Consumption Taxes, supra note 94, at 2341–42.
145 See JENSEN, THE TAXING POWER, supra note 96, at 77–88.
146 If the tax is not direct, however, these issues go away (which is what the D.C. Circuit
ultimately concluded in Murphy II). See infra Part VII.
147 See infra Part V.
148 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). The endless series of articles includes Jensen, Consumption
Taxes, supra note 94; Jensen, How to Read, supra note 112; Jensen, Interpreting the Sixteenth
Amendment, supra note 97; Jensen, Meaning of Incomes, supra note 19.
149 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
150 Morris came to regret the clauses, but he was responsible for them. See Jensen,
Consumption Taxes, supra note 94, at 2386–89.
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apportionment “to direct taxation. With regard to indirect taxes,
on exports & imports & on consumption, the rule would be
inapplicable.”151
In 1876, Judge Cooley drew a distinction that, for the most part,
Gouverneur Morris would have understood. Taxes are
Direct, under which designation would be included those
which are assessed upon the property, person, business,
income, etc., of those who are to pay them; and
Indirect, or those which are levied on commodities before
they reach the consumer, and are paid by those upon whom
they ultimately fall, not as taxes, but as part of the market
price of the commodity. Under the second head may be
classed the duties upon imports, and the excise and stamp
duties levied upon manufactures.152
The “indirect taxes” are generally those the Constitution denominated
“duties, imposts, and excises,” and in general are taxes imposed on
articles of consumption.
Cooley did not say his distinction was constitutionally mandated,
but I suspect he would have had Hylton not been on the
books.153 The distinction occurs throughout the Founding debates.
For example, in Federalist 36, Alexander Hamilton wrote that by
“indirect taxes” “must be understood duties and excises on articles of
consumption.”154 Direct taxes are everything else.155
Indirect taxes may wind up affecting the price, and therefore the
consumption, of the products to which they relate. In Federalist 21,
151 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 592 (Max Farrand ed., rev.
ed. 1937) (1911) (July 12, 1787). While serving on the Supreme Court, Justice Joseph Story
wrote: “[Taxes] are usually divided into two great classes, those, which are direct, and those,
which are indirect. Under the former denomination are included taxes on land, or real property,
and under the latter, taxes on articles of consumption.” JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 472, at 337–38 (Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak
eds., Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833); see also id. § 473, at 339 (“It is evident, that
‘duties, imposts, and excises’ are indirect taxes in the sense of the constitution.”).
152 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TAXATION 5 (1876).
153 In a footnote, Cooley wrote, “The term ‘direct taxes’ is employed in a peculiar sense in
the federal constitution in the provision requiring such taxes to be apportioned according to
representation, and they are, perhaps, limited to capitation and land taxes.” Id. at 5 n.2 (citing,
inter alia, Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796)). I interpret the “perhaps” as
acknowledging precedent, but questioning its merits.
154 THE FEDERALIST NO. 36, at 219 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
155 Some have wondered whether levies might exist that are neither direct (governed by the
apportionment rule) nor indirect (subject to uniformity requirements). See, e.g., STORY, supra
note 151, § 473, at 339. No such levy has been identified, however. See Jensen, Consumption
Taxes, supra note 94, at 2341–42.
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Hamilton noted that “[i]mposts, excises, and, in general, all duties
upon articles of consumption, may be compared to a fluid, which will
in time find its level with the means of paying them.”156 Consumers
will adjust their behavior to the cost of the products, including the
taxes—the “imperceptible agency of taxes on consumption.”157 The
assumption of most Founders was that regardless of the party on
whom an indirect tax was in form laid—an importer, perhaps, or a
seller—the burden was shifted to the ultimate consumer.158 That
person could decide, in making his purchasing decision, whether to be
subject to the tax.
Because the consumer can avoid an indirect tax by not buying the
taxed product, the market itself prevents governmental overreaching.
The government needs revenue, and it has no incentive to raise taxes
to levels so oppressive that revenue would actually decrease. If a
taxpayer thinks an impost on imported silk is too high, he can buy
some other, untaxed product instead, and the government gets
nothing. Importers and sellers adjust as well. As Anti-Federalist
Brutus explained, “[I]f [imposts] are laid higher than trade will bear,
the merchants will cease importing, or smuggle their goods. We have
therefore sufficient security, arising from the nature of the thing,
against burdensome and intolerable impositions from this kind of
tax.”159
Self-policing as they are, indirect taxes required no constitutional
limitations beyond the uniformity rule, as Brutus noted. That is why
Gouverneur Morris limited the apportionment rule to direct taxes,
which have no similar built-in protection. In general, direct taxes are
imposed on individuals (as contrasted with a tax on sale, importation,
or transfer of a product) in a way that prevents shifting the burden to
someone else. At an abstract level, any tax can be avoided, but one
cannot avoid a capitation tax or a tax on real estate as easily as one
can an indirect tax.
It was because government can more easily abuse direct taxes that
many Founders wanted explicit restraint on their use. The concern
156 THE

FEDERALIST NO. 21 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 154, at 142.
FEDERALIST NO. 12 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 154, at 93.
158 It is not necessarily true that the burden of an indirect tax can be passed on: “It is not
always possible to raise the price of a commodity in exact proportion to every additional
imposition laid upon it. The merchant . . . is often under a necessity of keeping prices down in
order to make a more expeditious sale.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 35 (Alexander Hamilton), supra
note 154, at 212. But, as Hamilton observed, “[t]he maxim that the consumer is the payer is so
much oftener true than the reverse of the proposition.” Id.
159 Essays of Brutus, No. 5 (Dec. 13, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST 388, 392–93 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). Smuggling is not a permissible form of
tax avoidance, see Lawrence Zelenak, Essay, Radical Tax Reform, the Constitution, and the
Conscientious Legislator, 99 COLUM L. REV. 833, 839 (1999), but ceasing importation is.
157 THE
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with direct taxes was partly that individuals could be harmed by an
overzealous national government. But it was also that direct taxation
could soak up so much revenue that little would be left to fund state
needs.160 That danger had not existed with the requisitions used, often
unsuccessfully, to raise revenue under the Articles of Confederation.
When the national government, such as it was, requisitioned revenue
from the states, the states served as filters of national power and
protectors of their own interests—and thus protectors of their
residents. Direct taxes, which would reach individuals directly, were
different.161
Is the individual income tax a direct tax, so understood?
Absolutely. The tax is imposed on individuals, in a way that is as
different from requisitions as can be, and the tax is not avoidable in
the same manner as an indirect tax.162 An income tax has the dangers
that apportionment was intended to protect against, and it should
matter not a whit that the Founders did not explicitly characterize an
income tax as a direct tax. One should not push counterfactuals too
hard, but I cannot imagine that the Constitution would have been
ratified if there had been a sense in 1789 that something like the
modern income tax could be imposed without protections against
abuse.163
If an income tax is direct, a levy that is part of an unapportioned
income tax must, in fact, be a “tax on incomes” if it is to be exempt
from apportionment by the Sixteenth Amendment. This is why the
constitutional issues in Murphy were potentially significant.
But even if an income tax is generally direct, perhaps there is
something special about an income tax as it applies to certain types of
income—earned income in particular—that would keep the tax from
being classified as direct. To that possibility I now turn.
2. Pollock and a Tax on Earned Income Only
I have concluded that an income tax would have been understood
by the Founders as direct, if they had been in an intellectual position
160 See, e.g., Essays of Brutus, No. 1 (Oct. 18, 1787), reprinted in COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 159, at 363, 366 (“[W]hen the [federal] government begins to
exercise the right of taxation in all its parts, the legislatures of the several states will find it
impossible to raise monies to support their governments.”).
161 But see Joseph M. Dodge, What Federal Taxes Are Subject to the Rule of
Apportionment Under the Constitution?, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 839 (2009) (arguing that,
together with capitation taxes and taxes on tangible property, requisitions are direct taxes).
162 Of course, an individual can avoid an income tax by having no income, or a capitation
tax by committing suicide. But avoiding these taxes requires discombobulating one’s life much
more than avoiding an indirect tax would.
163 See Jensen, How to Read, supra note 112, at 689.
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to think about an income tax in the first place. I therefore have also
implicitly concluded that Pollock was rightly decided. If a tax would
be considered direct under Pollock, it could be enacted today in an
unapportioned form only if it is a “tax on incomes,” which is why
there was a potentially serious constitutional issue in Murphy.
But Pollock contains language hinting—more than hinting, with
Springer v. United States164 on the books—that a tax which reaches
only earned income would be an excise, not a direct tax. An excise
would not have to be apportioned even in a world with no Sixteenth
Amendment. If earned income is fundamentally different from
income from property, perhaps a tax on an emotional-distress
recovery, likened by many to a tax on wages,165 would not be direct
either. If so, we need not consider whether the levy on Ms. Murphy’s
recovery is a “tax on incomes.”
In Springer, the Supreme Court upheld the Civil War income tax
against a challenge that it was an unapportioned direct tax: “[D]irect
taxes, within the meaning of the Constitution, are only capitation
taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real estate . . . .”166
And, said the Court, the income tax was “within the category of an
excise or duty.”167
That the tax as it applied to Springer himself was heavily on
earned income apparently played no role in the Court’s decision; the
Hylton dictum was decisive. But the Pollock Court examined the
Springer record to conclude that, although the tax could have reached
income from property, little or none of Springer’s income had come
from that source.168 And that fact might have justified treating the tax
as it applied to Springer as an excise.169
We ought to be skeptical when a court characterizes a decision as
164 102

U.S. 586 (1881).
infra Part VI.E.
166 Springer, 102 U.S. at 602.
167 Id. (citations omitted).
168 The Court stated:
165 See

The . . . record discloses that [Springer’s] income was not derived in any degree from
real estate but was in part professional as attorney-at-law and the rest interest on
United States bonds. It would seem probable that the court did not feel called upon to
advert to the distinction between the latter and the former source of income, as the
validity of the tax as to either would sustain the action.
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock I), 157 U.S. 429, 578–79, modified on reh’g,
158 U.S. 601 (1895). The Court also noted that “a tax on professional receipts might be treated
as an excise or duty, and therefore indirect, when a tax on the income of personalty might be
held to be direct.” Id. at 579.
169 If the aggrieved taxpayer had substantial income from property, the Springer Court
therefore might have invalidated the Civil War income tax—or so the Court implied in 1895.
See id.
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standing for something it clearly did not. But treating Springer as
involving a tax on earned income provided a way for the Pollock
Court to overturn the 1894 tax without repudiating precedent.170
If a levy on income from “professions, trades, employments, or
vocations” was an excise,171 the only issue in Pollock was whether
a tax on income from property could be imposed without
apportionment: “[I]n the case before us there is no question as to the
validity of this act, except [the] sections . . . which relate to the
subject which has been under discussion,” taxing income from
property.172
Applying the syllogism outlined earlier, the Pollock Court
concluded that a tax on income from property was direct. With a little
extrapolation to treat income from personal property the same as
income from real property, the Court came to a result consistent with
Hylton173:
We have considered the act only in respect of the tax on
income derived from real estate, and from invested personal
property, and have not commented on so much of it as bears
on gains or profits from business, privileges, or employments,
in view of the instances in which taxation on business,
privileges, or employments has assumed the guise of an
excise tax and been sustained as such.174
Taxing income from property was the point of the unapportioned
1894 tax. For the high-income folks at whom the tax was directed,
earned income was also part of the base, however, and the Court
concluded it was impossible to sever the tax on earned income from
the critically important levy on income from property. If the whole
statute did not fall, “what was intended as a tax on capital” would
have been turned into “in substance a tax on occupations and
labor.”175
id. at 578–79.
II, 158 U.S. at 637.
172 Id. at 635; see also 1 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 1.2.2, at 1–19 (3d ed. 1999) (noting intimation “that a tax on
salaries, wages, and business profits would not be a direct tax”).
173 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
174 Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 635.
175 Id. at 637. The Court further stated:
170 See

171 Pollock

[I]t is evident that the income from realty formed a vital part of the scheme for
taxation embodied therein. If that be stricken out, and also the income from all
invested personal property, bonds, stocks, investments of all kinds, it is obvious that
by far the largest part of the anticipated revenue would be eliminated, and this would
leave the burden of the tax to be borne by professions, trades, employments, or
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For most purposes today, it does not matter whether a tax on
earned income is direct or not. As long as it is “on incomes,” a tax
does not need to be apportioned, whatever the source of the income.
But if Ms. Murphy’s emotional-distress recovery was properly
included in gross income under section 61 of the Internal Revenue
Code, the subject of the next part of this Article, the status of this
particular levy—whether it was “on incomes” or not—continues to
matter.
As I discussed earlier, I have no doubt that a tax on an
emotional-distress recovery is direct, and that it would be permissible
in unapportioned form only if the recovery is “incomes” within the
meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment. I shall discuss later why an
emotional-distress recovery is not the equivalent of wages and why,
therefore, any special treatment for earned income that might be
found in Pollock should not extend to such a recovery.176 (The D.C.
Circuit ultimately concluded in Murphy II that the levy was an excise,
noting that the Pollock Court had said “a tax upon income from
employment” is an excise.177)
More important, however, I am doubtful that the passages in
Pollock dealing with a tax on earned income should be given weight.
Supreme Court dicta are important, and these dicta are cited regularly
in commentary on Pollock. But there are at least two reasons to
be skeptical about their continuing significance. First, let us not
forget that the Court struck down the tax as it applied to earned
income. The entire tax was invalidated, and “not comment[ing] on”
the treatment of earned income (language from Pollock) is not a
ringing endorsement of Springer.178 Second, given the distinction
between direct and indirect taxes outlined earlier,179 I see no reason to
characterize income from property and income from services
differently. A tax on either is direct—on individuals, not easily
avoidable, unlike requisitions, and so on.
Springer was the result of unthinkingly applying one Hylton
dictum: the Founders did not say an income tax is direct, and
therefore it is not direct. What the Pollock Court did was rethink the

vocations; and in that way what was intended as a tax on capital would remain in
substance a tax on occupations and labor.
Id. at 636–37.
176 See infra Part VI.E.
177 Murphy II, 493 F.3d 170, 184 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 635),
cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1004 (2008).
178 See supra text accompanying note 174.
179 See supra Part IV.C.1.
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original meaning of “direct tax.” In doing so, it cut the heart out of
Springer, while leaving to others preparation of the death certificate.
I hypothesize that members of the Pollock majority were thinking
as follows: Pollock was going to be a noteworthy, unpopular
decision.180 If the majority could tie its conclusion to precedent,
damage might be contained. Focusing on income from property
provided the link to Hylton,181 and suggesting that a tax on earned
income might be treated differently obviated any need to overturn
Springer—as that case had been reinterpreted—while still striking
down the tax. The result was seen by the public as radical, but in
form the Court adhered to precedent. In addition, with no political
inclination at the time to enact a tax on earned income only—the
point of the income tax was to reach the wealthy’s income from
property182—the treatment of earned income in Pollock really did not
seem important. Why sweat the small stuff?
My conclusion is that a tax on earned income is as direct as a tax
on income from property. But even if I am wrong about this, I see
no reason why a tax on a recovery for emotional distress should
be characterized as indirect. It is not a shiftable tax; it cannot be
easily avoided by the taxpayer (except by not seeking damages to
begin with). And, as I shall argue later, wages and emotional-distress
recoveries need not be seen as functional equivalents.
D. The Constitution Matters in Murphy—and in Taxation Generally
No reader needs to agree with a significant percentage of the
points made above to agree with my conclusion: there are serious
constitutional issues in Murphy that commentators ignored in the rush
to condemn the result in Murphy I. The tax on the emotional-distress
recovery might well have been direct, and, if so, it was critical for the
tax to be treated as one “on incomes.” Before returning to the
constitutional issues, however, I turn to the Internal Revenue Code,
and what it says—or does not say—about emotional-distress
recoveries.
V. SECTION 104(A)(2) AND NONPHYSICAL PERSONAL INJURIES
Murphy was not just a constitutional case. In this part of the
Article, I address the workings of section 104(a)(2) of the Internal
180 One prominent critic noted that Pollock had been characterized as the “the Dred Scott
decision of government revenue.” See EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX 589 (2d ed.
1914) (1911).
181 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
182 See Jensen, Meaning of Incomes, supra note 19, at 1091–1107.
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Revenue Code, which was initially struck down on constitutional
grounds in Murphy I.183 The issues for present purposes are these:
How did the 1996 amendment of section 104(a)(2) change the way
we should think about whether a recovery for personal injuries is
taxable or not? Is it unquestionably the case that, as many have
argued, a recovery for a nonphysical personal injury is taxable in full
to the recipient?
The constitutional issues considered in Murphy need to be
addressed only if a recovery is taxable under the statutory scheme.
I submit that the conventional wisdom—that a recovery for a
nonphysical personal injury is automatically taxable184—is not right.
It cannot be right, and that should cause us to examine Murphy-like
recoveries carefully.
A. The 1996 Amendment to Section 104(a)(2)
In 1996, Congress amended section 104(a)(2), which had provided
an exclusion for recoveries received on account of any personal
injuries or sickness, to limit the exclusion to recoveries for physical
personal injuries or sickness and to provide that “emotional distress
shall not be treated as a physical injury or physical sickness.”185 The
conventional wisdom is that, after the amendment, a recovery for a
nonphysical personal injury is taxable, period, unless it can be tied to
a physical injury.186 (If the recovery is deemed to be “on account of” a
physical injury, however, the entire amount, with a couple of
exceptions, is excluded from gross income.187) If that is right, once
183 460 F.3d 79, 81 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, No. 05-5139, 2006 WL 4005276 (D.C. Cir. Dec.
22, 2006).
184 See, e.g., Gregg D. Polsky & Brant J. Hellwig, Taxing Structured Settlements, 51 B.C.
L. REV. 39, 74 (2010) (“As a result [of the statutory change], damages received on account of a
non-physical injury now are fully taxable.”).
185 Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605(b), 110 Stat.
1755, 1838 (1996) (codified at I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2006)).
186 See, e.g., Germain, supra note 29, at 208 (“If emotional injury recoveries were
not included in ‘income,’ the amendment to I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) would be substantially
superfluous.”). But the amendment made it clear only that a lost-profits or lost-wages
component of any recovery would be taxable. That was not a superfluous change, regardless of
how any additional recovery might be treated.
187 The exclusion has never applied to a recovery of medical expenses that had already
been paid and deducted. See I.R.C. § 104(a). Application of the exclusion to punitive damages
associated with a personal injury (i.e., amounts not even arguably compensatory) used to be a
matter of doubt, but, after the 1996 amendments, it is clear that punitives are taxable regardless
of the nature of the underlying claim. See I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (creating an exclusion for damages
“other than punitive damages”). Indeed, it should have been clear under prior law. See O’Gilvie
v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 81 (1996) (holding that punitives were not received “on account
of” personal injury under a prior version of section 104(a)(2)). But see id. at 94 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the “any damages” language included punitives). The exception for
punitives is easy to apply when a verdict specifies a particular amount. With a settlement,
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Ms. Murphy’s recovery was determined not to have been due to a
physical injury, section 104(a)(2) was inapplicable, and she was left
with only her argument under the Sixteenth Amendment.
Indeed, the conference committee report on the 1996 amendment
contains headings that seem to instruct individuals to “[i]nclude in
income damage recoveries for nonphysical injuries,” as if that were
the result of the statutory changes.188 Courts have assumed that to be
the case. In recent litigation, the Tax Court has routinely concluded
that, if no physical injury is involved, a recovery is fully taxable.189
District courts, including Judge Lamberth in Murphy, have made
the same assumption,190 and appellate courts have agreed.191 Indeed,
however, one can imagine negotiators taking the possibility of punitives into account. If the
settlement amount for a physical injury is bumped up, should part of it be includable in gross
income? The conceptually right answer is yes, and the Service has taken that position. See, e.g.,
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2009-03-073 (Oct. 9, 2008) (specifying that section 104(a)(2) exclusion
would be inapplicable to the portion of a settlement attributable to punitives). As a practical
matter, however, it is hard to see how this issue can be policed. (One justification for the broad
exclusion for physical injury recoveries is the difficulty of breaking a recovery into components,
some perhaps taxable without section 104(a)(2), some not.)
188 H.R. REP. NO. 104-737, at 301 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996-3 C.B. 741,
1041.
189 See, e.g., Hennessey v. Comm’r, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) 1089 (2009). Hennessey involved
a class action settlement paid to Air Force officers who were involuntarily separated due to a
reduction in force. Id. at 1090 & n.3. Hennessey argued his recovery was, at least in part, not
income because there was no accession to wealth (e.g., compensation for the stigma of
involuntary separation), id. at 1091, but the court rejected the argument summarily, citing
Murphy II to the effect that “taxation of awards received for personal, nonphysical injuries was
within the power of Congress.” Id. at 1091–92 (citing Murphy II, 493 F.3d 170, 173 (D.C. Cir.
2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1004 (2008)). The Tax Court in Venable v. Commissioner, 86
T.C.M. (CCH) 254 (2003), aff’d, 110 F. App’x 421 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam), also held that
the recovery was fully taxable. Venable involved a recovery for malicious prosecution,
including amounts for lost earning capacity, mental anguish, and loss to reputation. Id. at 255.
The narrow issue was whether the change in section 104(a)(2) applied to a 1998 recovery in a
suit begun in 1994. The Tax Court answered this question in the affirmative, but did not
consider whether part of the recovery might have been tax-free anyway. Id. at 259; see also
Pettit v. Comm’r, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1341, 1344 (2008) (holding recovery in an employment
dispute taxable because it does not qualify for the 104(a)(2) exclusion); Seidel v. Comm’r, 93
T.C.M. (CCH) 938, 940 (2007) (holding that the settlement agreement in an unemployment
dispute was taxable because it did not fall under the 104(a)(2) exclusion). In Phelps v.
Commissioner, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1336 (2008), the Tax Court concluded that a recovery under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was “not received on account of tort-like personal
injuries, let alone tort-like personal physical injuries” and was therefore taxable. Id. at 1341.
190 Judge Lambreth wrote, “[T]he revised language of § 104(a)(2) indicates that only
physical injuries and physical sickness [sic] are exempted from the definition of ‘income.’
Therefore, anything falling outside this definition is considered income, and is therefore
taxable.” Murphy v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 2d 206, 218 (D.D.C. 2005) (emphases added) (citing
United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 248 (1992), which stated that “exclusions from income
must be narrowly construed”), aff’d, 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1004
(2008); see also id. at 215 (“Because plaintiff’s $25,000 of compensatory damages was based
on damage to Murphy’s professional reputation, this award is not specifically exempted by
statute, and thus falls within the broader definition of gross income.” (emphasis added)).
191 See, e.g., Allum v. Comm’r, 2007–1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) ¶ 50,489, ¶ 50,490 (9th Cir.)
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the Murphy II panel ultimately concluded that the recovery was
taxable even if Ms. Murphy had realized no accession to wealth.192
I question those assumptions. I shall argue that, whatever Congress
might have been thinking when it amended section 104(a)(2), it
cannot possibly be the case that all recoveries for nonphysical
personal injuries are taxable. Most yes, but not all. At a minimum, the
interpretive questions are more difficult than the conventional
wisdom suggests, and that fact should have relevance to how we think
about cases like Murphy.
When Congress changed the rules governing nonphysical personal
injuries, it was responding to widely publicized Supreme Court cases
where the question had been whether recoveries for a nonphysical
injury, such as one under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
or one for sex discrimination, should have been treated as “received
on account of [a] personal injury” and thus excludable under the
old version of section 104(a)(2).193 With no physical-nonphysical
distinction built into the statute, the arguments for exclusion were not
baseless. Longstanding regulations, still on the books, had defined a
personal injury recovery as arising from “tort or tort type rights,”194
and many torts lead to no physical damage.
Nevertheless, if a recovery simply replaces something that would
have been taxable anyway, like lost wages, full exclusion did
not seem to be the right result. And the Supreme Court concluded
the recoveries in the discrimination cases should be taxable. (That
situation seemed no different from recovery in a breach-of-contract
case.195) Putting aside litigation costs (that is, assuming away the real
world, as we do in law review articles); assuming that the amount

(unpublished) (concluding that “[t]he tax court properly determined that the settlement . . . was
not excludable from [taxpayer’s] taxable income because it was received as settlement for
violation of his civil rights, not physical injury or sickness”), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 926 (2007).
192 Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 179–80; see also infra Part VII.
193 Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 332 (1995) (holding ADEA recoveries taxable
because “not ‘received ‘on account of personal injury [sic] or sickness’” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 241 (1992) (holding Title VII recoveries
taxable for the same reason).
194 Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (2009). A regulation proposed in September 2009 will, if
finalized, remove the reference to “tort or tort type rights.” The proposal is intended to expand
the scope of the exclusion, but it would leave us with no definition of “personal injury.” See
Damages Received on Account of Personal Physical Injuries or Physical Sickness, 74 Fed.
Reg. 47,152 (Sept. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (promulgating Prop. Reg. §
1.104-1(c)); Erik M. Jensen, Parsing the Meaning of “Personal Injuries” Under Section
104(a)(2), J. TAX’N INV., Winter 2010, at 92.
195
Whether or not it is the right result conceptually, Congress did provide for full
exclusion for a recovery on account of personal physical injuries, which is why section
104(a)(2) is significant.
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of any recovery is unaffected by taxability;196 and assuming full
compensation is received for lost wages, a personal injury plaintiff
would be better off with a tax-free recovery than if no injury had
occurred to begin with. Replacing a taxable salary of $100,000 with a
tax-free recovery of $100,000 seems too good to be true.197 If that is
the law, volunteering to be a personal injury victim might be a good
tax-planning device.198
Hence the statutory change, which was intended to deal with
the recovery-of-lost-profits situation involved in the high-profile
discrimination cases. The conference committee report on the 1996
legislation notes the concern Congress was addressing:
Courts have interpreted the exclusion from gross income of
damages received on account of personal injury or sickness
broadly in some cases to cover awards for personal injury
that do not relate to a physical injury or sickness. For
example, some courts have held that the exclusion applies to
damages in cases involving certain forms of employment
discrimination and injury to reputation where there is no
physical injury or sickness. The damages received in these
cases generally consist of back pay and other awards intended
to compensate the claimant for lost wages or lost profits.199
The goal is to make the injured party whole, not to make her more
than whole. If all that is involved is compensation for lost wages or
196 Continue to assume away the real world. One might question whether jurors are aware
of the tax consequences of recoveries, see Mark W. Cochran, Should Personal Injury Damage
Awards Be Taxed?, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 43, 55–64 (1987), but plaintiffs and defendants
consider taxation in settlement talks. See Eshelman v. Agere Sys., Inc., 554 F.3d 426, 442 (3d
Cir. 2009) (affirming a decision that, to make plaintiff whole, had granted an additional award
to take into account the negative result of being paid a lump sum). Professor Dodge notes that,
with a full-fledged exclusion, “a compensation regime that ignores the effect of taxes has the
effect of overcompensating plaintiffs, while taking taxes into account converts a potential
plaintiff windfall into a reduction in the amount that the defendant must pay.” Joseph M. Dodge,
Taxes and Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 143, 146 n.20 (1992) [hereinafter Dodge, Taxes and
Torts]. State tort law—should the compensatory amount take into account taxability?—and
federal tax law are inextricably linked.
197 Cf. O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 86 (1996) (“[T]he provision can make the
compensated taxpayer better off from a tax perspective than had the personal injury not taken
place.”).
198 I am kidding, sort of, although favorable tax treatment would generate more
discrimination litigation. Cf. Alan Gunn, Matching of Costs and Revenues as a Goal of Tax
Accounting, 4 VA. TAX REV. 1, 26 (1984) (arguing with tongue in cheek that, if accrual-basis
taxpayers may deduct an undiscounted amount of future liabilities, “well-advised
accrual-method businesses should cancel their liability insurance and run down pedestrians at
the rate of at least one a year”).
199 H.R. REP. NO. 104-737, at 300 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996-3 C.B. 741,
1040.
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lost profits, the recovery ought to be taxable.
At one level the change was unnecessary. The Supreme Court had
concluded that no “tort or tort type right” was involved when only a
recovery for lost wages or profits was available: “one of the hallmarks
of traditional tort liability is the availability of a broad range of
damages to compensate the plaintiff.”200 With no “personal injury,”
section 104(a)(2), even in its pre-1996 Act form, was not implicated.
But the statutory change presumably made characterization issues
easier—making physical versus nonphysical injuries the generally
decisive distinction, rather than having to differentiate between torts
and other sorts of wrongs.201
After the 1996 Act, two things are clear: nonphysical personal
injury recoveries that compensate only for lost wages or profits are
taxable,202 as are awards that, like punitive damages, are merely
windfalls.203 But it is not so obvious that a recovery for a
nonphysical personal injury necessarily compensates only for
otherwise taxable items or is just a windfall. That might generally
be the case, but it is not necessarily so.204 If something other than
lost profits is involved, there might be an argument for excluding all
or part of a recovery—using a rationale independent of section
104(a)(2).
Whatever the staff was thinking in drafting reports about the 1996
Act, automatic taxability is mandated by neither the statute nor
common sense. We should interpret changes to section 104(a)(2) in
light of Congress’s concerns—awards of lost wages or lost profits—
and not cram all nonphysical recoveries into a conceptual system
designed for a more limited purpose.

200 United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 234–35 (1992). A proposed regulation would do
away with the idea that section 104(a)(2) is inapplicable unless a broad range of remedies is
available. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c)(2), 74 Fed. Reg. 47,152, 47,153–54 (Sept. 15,
2009).
201 With a recovery for lost profits, it is unnecessary to determine whether the injury is
“personal” if the injury is nonphysical. No exclusion applies, and the recovery is taxable.
202 See I.R.C. § 104(a) (2006). Recoveries for physical injuries are likely to have a
lost-income component too, but the probability is higher that other elements will be included.
Exclusion obviates the need to break recoveries into taxable and nontaxable parts. Professor
Dodge argues that difficulty of characterization points toward full taxation. See Dodge, Taxes
and Torts, supra note 196, at 150. I disagree. See infra Part V.B (explaining that automatic
inclusion of recoveries for nonphysical injuries is bizarre).
203 See I.R.C. § 104(a).
204 Indeed, the Supreme Court intimated that, if the only remedy is recovery of lost profits
or wages, the injury is not personal. See Burke, 504 U.S. at 234–35; supra text accompanying
note 200.
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B. Why Automatic Taxability Makes No Sense
Congress might have assumed it was making nonphysical
recoveries taxable, but the assumption was not the result of careful
thought. Congress could not have meant, in its institutional heart of
hearts, to make all such recoveries taxable, and the amended statutory
structure does not mandate that result.
1. Basis-Recovery Cases
At a minimum, the amendment to section 104(a)(2) cannot have
been intended to make taxable a personal injury award that is merely
the recovery of basis—at least not if we are talking about an income
tax. In such a case, there is no income to tax.205
Sometimes people (read law students) assume that, if a person
receives cash, he must pay income tax on that receipt. But, if we think
about the matter for a nanosecond, we know that assumption is much
too broad. For example, if someone sells a widget for $100 that he
purchased for $100, he has no gain and therefore no income. (Taxing
that $100 would effectively turn the tax into one on gross receipts.206)
If no gain results, despite what the government argued in Murphy I, it
does not matter that the taxpayer converted his property into cash.207
This point—that what are in effect basis-recovery situations should
not be taxable under an income tax—might seem obvious. Indeed, it
is obvious, which is why the general understanding of the effect of the
amendment to section 104(a)(2) is so obviously wrong: a recovery for
a nonphysical personal injury that constitutes nothing but recovery of
basis does not become taxable just because Congress narrowed the
exclusion in section 104(a)(2).
Consider the widely-noted 1939 decision in Clark v.
Commissioner,208 where a tax lawyer reimbursed a couple because
the lawyer had made a mistake and, as a result, the couple had paid
about $20,000 too much in federal income taxes. The Board of Tax
Appeals concluded the recovery was not taxable to the Clarks, and the
Commissioner later acquiesced in Clark.
205 Professor Dodge disagrees that netting is required to have an income tax, but he accepts
the idea that recoveries representing recovery of basis should be tax free. See Dodge, Netting of
Costs, supra note 70.
206 Cf. SELIGMAN, supra note 180, at 19 (noting that “[i]ncome is . . . to be distinguished
from mere receipts or gross revenue. . . . By income is always meant net income, as opposed to
gross income.”). The goal of the Sixteenth Amendment was to reach higher-income, not
no-income, persons.
207 See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text (criticizing contrary position taken by
the government in Murphy I).
208
40 B.T.A. 333 (1939), acq., 1957-1 C.B. 4.
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In support of its conclusion, the Board stated,
It has been held that payments in settlement of an action for
breach of promise to marry are not income. Lyde McDonald,
9 B.T.A. 1340. Compromise payments in settlement of an
action for damages against a bank on account of conduct
impairing the taxpayer’s good will by injuring its reputation
are also not taxable. Farmers & Merchants Bank of
Catlettsburg, Ky. v. Commissioner, 59 Fed. (2d) 912. The
same result follows in the case of payments in settlement
for injuries caused by libel and slander. C. A. Hawkins, 6
B.T.A. 1023. Damages for personal injury are likewise not
income. Theodate Pope Riddle, 27 B.T.A. 1339.209
That string of citations illustrates that, in the early years of the income
tax, many folks assumed that certain recoveries for losses did not
constitute income—at least statutorily—and that judicial and
regulatory authority supported that assumption.
I will return to the question of the continuing vitality of those
old cases,210 but even if they have fallen by the wayside—the
understanding of income in Clark was narrower than that set out by
the Supreme Court in 1955 in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass
Co.211—the result in Clark made sense. The couple was compensated
for a loss that generated no tax benefit: the Clarks could not have
deducted the extra federal income taxes they had paid.212 After taking
the effect of taxes into account, the Clarks had lost the full $20,000. If
they were to be made whole, untaxed dollars had to replace the
$20,000 of nondeductible dollars paid out earlier. When the dust had
settled, the tax results should have been the same as if no injury had

at 335.
infra Parts V.B.2 to V.B.3.
211 348 U.S. 426 (1955) (holding that antitrust treble damages and punitive damages are
includable in “gross income”). The Board in Clark had said that the theory behind cases holding
that personal injury (and related) recoveries were not taxable was
209 Id.

210 See

that recoupment on account of such losses is not income since it is not “derived from
capital, from labor or from both combined.” And the fact that the payment of the
compensation for such loss was voluntary, as here, does not change its exempt status.
It was, in fact, compensation for a loss which impaired petitioner’s capital.
Clark, 40 B.T.A. at 335 (citations omitted). But the Court in Glenshaw Glass concluded that
“income” includes “undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the
taxpayers have complete dominion”—even if not derived from labor or capital. Glenshaw
Glass, 348 U.S. at 431.
212 Cf. I.R.C. § 275(a) (2006) (setting out the principle today that federal taxes are not
deductible).
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occurred.213 As the Board noted, this was “compensation for a loss
which impaired petitioner’s capital”;214 the reimbursement from the
lawyer was equivalent to a recovery of basis.215
For that reason, regardless of whether the old cases cited by
the Board remain valid today, most commentators think Clark was
rightly decided. There was, to use the language of Glenshaw Glass,
no “accession to wealth.”216 And Clark became the law, accepted
(albeit grudgingly, eighteen years later) by the Internal Revenue
Service.
Let us think about how the changes to section 104(a)(2) would
affect the Clark analysis today. The Clarks did not have to sue the
tax lawyer—as a member of a noble profession, he voluntarily
compensated the Clarks for his mistake—but suppose the Clarks had
sued for malpractice and recovered $20,000. In many jurisdictions,
legal malpractice sounds in tort, which probably means it is a
personal injury—based on a “tort or tort type right”—for purposes of
section 104(a)(2).217 But surely legal malpractice is not a physical
injury—at least not if the claim that gave rise to the malpractice had
no physical component to it, as was true in Clark. Would such a
recovery, resulting from a lawsuit or a settlement in lieu of a
lawsuit,218 therefore have to be taxable in a post-1996 world, with
amended section 104(a)(2) on the books?
That cannot be the right result. Clark is not the sort of situation
213 Or it is as if, after the mistake was discovered, the Clarks had been able to file an
amended return and had received a refund of the $20,000. Such a refund would not be taxable.
See IRS, PUBLICATION 525: TAXABLE AND NONTAXABLE INCOME (2009), available at
http://www.irs.gov/publications/p525/ar02.html (“Refunds of federal income taxes are not
included in your income because they are never allowed as a deduction from income.”).
214 Clark, 40 B.T.A. at 335.
215 It is presumably important that compensation for the loss came from the responsible
party (or an insurer). If Clark’s employer had covered the loss caused by the lawyer, we would
be talking about compensation for services. Cf. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716,
729, 731 (1929) (holding that an employer’s payment of an employee’s income taxes
constituted taxable income in addition to the employee’s regular compensation). The Service
explained Clark as follows: “Payments by the one causing a loss that do no more than restore a
taxpayer to the position he or she was in before the loss was incurred are not includable in gross
income because there is no economic gain.” Rev. Rul. 81-277, 1981-2 C.B. 14, 15 (emphasis
added).
216 Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 431.
217 See Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 1956) (stating that “damages received” for
purposes of section 104(a)(2) means “an amount received . . . through prosecution of a legal suit
or action based upon tort or tort type rights”). If finalized, Proposed Regulation § 1.104-1(c)
would expand “personal injury” beyond tort type rights, see Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c)(2),
74 Fed. Reg. 47,152, 47,153–54 (Sept. 15, 2009), but legal malpractice should remain a
personal injury.
218 Whether a lawsuit was actually filed makes no difference in characterizing a recovery.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c). If the malpractice was a tort, the settlement is for a personal
injury.
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Congress was focusing on in amending section 104(a)(2). Moreover,
a change in the Clark result would be inconsistent with statutory
structure. Narrowing the exclusion under section 104(a)(2) becomes
an issue only if a recovery would otherwise constitute gross income
under section 61. If the recovery was not gross income in Clark—if
it was in effect a recovery of basis, not “income from whatever
source derived”—it does not become gross income simply because
the boundaries of an exclusion were narrowed.219 Even though a
nonphysical personal injury is involved, a Clark-type recovery
remains excludable from gross income under today’s law.220 And
that should be true whether or not Eisner v. Macomber221 is still
good law,222 and regardless of what Glenshaw Glass did to old
rulings about personal injury recoveries. No accession to wealth, no
income.
From the trivial proposition that not every receipt of value is
income, a lot follows. To the extent a recovery is not income, a
change in the language of section 104(a)(2) should make no
difference in the tax treatment. If Congress meant to broaden
the outer boundaries of “gross income,” the place to do that
was section 61.223 Instead, when Congress amended section
219 Cf. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 248 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) (“[The]
default rule of statutory interpretation [is] that exclusions from income must be narrowly
construed.” (citing, inter alia, United States v. Centennial Sav. Bank FSB, 499 U.S. 573, 583–84
(1991)). What I am discussing is whether something would be gross income to begin with, not
an exclusion, but narrow construal is still probably appropriate. That is not to say, however, that
all receipts of value are taxable.
220 Section 104(a)(2) must exclude some legal-malpractice recoveries. Suppose a lawyer
misses the statute of limitations for filing a physical-injury claim and is sued. The recovery is
“on account of” a physical injury, even though the malpractice was not physical. To get that
result, we would apply the origin-of-the-claim test, or something similar. See Robert W. Wood,
Tax Treatment of Legal Malpractice Recoveries, 114 TAX NOTES 665 (2007) (arguing for that
result without clear authority); cf. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2009-03-073 (Oct. 9, 2008) (applying the
“origin of claim” or “in lieu of” test to determine the extent to which amounts received from an
insurer pursuant to a bad-faith claim, which had been assigned by the insured to the taxpayer
who suffered physical injury, would be excludable as “on account of personal physical
injur[y]”). The assumption that nonphysical-injury recoveries are taxable again oversimplifies
the world. See Robert W. Wood, IRS Rules Insurance Bad-Faith Recovery Is Tax-Free, 122
TAX NOTES 1229 (2009) (asking for further guidance on “on account of”).
221 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
222 See supra notes 129–36 and accompanying text. Of course Macomber is still good law!
See Jensen, Meaning of Incomes, supra note 19, at 1133–46; Henry Ordower, Revisiting
Realization: Accretion Taxation, the Constitution, Macomber, and Mark to Market, 13 VA.
TAX. REV. 1, 56 (1993) (noting that the realization “principle has required refinement . . . [, but]
each clarification left the foundation of the principle intact”).
223 If Congress was not inclined to change the language of section 61, but wanted to make
nonphysical personal injury recoveries taxable, it should have added something to Subtitle A,
Chapter 1, Subchapter B, Part II of the Code (titled “Items Specifically Included in Gross
Income”)—i.e., sections 71–90. But section 104(a)(2) is in Part III, titled “Items Specifically
Excluded from Gross Income.”
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104(a)(2), it merely narrowed an exclusion from gross income.224
A tax professional should not have to look at section 104(a)(2) to
determine the consequences of a Clark-like recovery.225
2. Cash Recoveries Outside the Clear Recovery-of-Basis Context
At a minimum, the basis-recovery situation should not be affected
by the change in section 104(a)(2), and that by itself is an important
point. But it is also true that other nonphysical recoveries were
historically understood not to be taxable, whether or not they could
be shoehorned into the basis-recovery category. I will use the
time-dishonored alienation-of-affections tort to begin making my
point.
a. Alienation of Affections and Similar (Silly?) Torts
Robert Wood has written that, as a result of the change in section
104(a)(2), “recoveries for alienation of affections are generally fully
taxable under section 61(a).”226 He might be right, but a long time
ago, first in 1922227 and then in Revenue Ruling 74–77,228 the
tax authorities concluded that such a recovery is tax-free. If your
formerly significant other’s affections were alienated, and you were
compensated for the reduced affection, Revenue Ruling 74–77 helped
dry your tears. The 1974 ruling is worth quoting in its entirety:
An individual taxpayer received certain amounts in settlement
of his suit for damages on account of alienation of affections
and in consideration for the surrender of the custody of his
minor child. These items relate to personal or family rights,
not property rights, and may be treated together. None of
the amounts received constituted exemplary or punitive
damages.
Held, amounts received by the taxpayer as damages for
224 Because “gross income” under section 61 is what is left after exclusions have been
taken into account, narrowing an exclusion does increase the scope of “gross income” as so
defined.
225 A tax professional should be able to rely on statutory structure in doing research. When
a new issue arises, she should not have to examine the entire Code—impossible anyway—or the
full U.S. Code—really impossible!—to see whether Congress might have put relevant language
where it does not belong. Congress may have the power to hide the ball, but the rule of law is
strained when that happens.
226 Robert W. Wood, Post-1996 Act Section 104 Cases: Where Are We Eight Years Later?,
105 TAX NOTES 68, 70 (2004). I think Wood’s use of “generally” was intended to pick up a
situation in which alienation of affections is linked to a physical injury claim.
227 Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C.B. 92 (1922).
228 Rev. Rul. 74-77, 1974-1 C.B. 33.
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alienation of affections or for the surrender of the custody of
his child, whether under agreement of the parties or pursuant
to judgment of the court, are not income.
Sol. Op. 132, I-1 C.B. 92 (1922), is hereby superseded since
the position stated therein is set forth under the current statute
and regulations in this Revenue Ruling.229
“Not income”! What was striking about the ruling was that,
although it was catalogued under section 104 in the bulletin published
by the Internal Revenue Service and only cross-referenced under
section 61 (the definition of “gross income”), the result did not seem
to depend on the old version of section 104(a)(2). The ruling made no
mention of that section, nor did it quote or paraphrase language from
it.230 A recovery for alienation of affections, said the Service, was for
“personal or family rights”—not the same as a recovery for a
“personal injury”231—and “under the current statute and regulations”
simply not income.
And that conclusion was not surprising. It was consistent with
other rulings that the Service had issued in the 1950s and 1960s
involving compensation for loss of personal rights in situations where
section 104(a)(2) was inapplicable.232
The understanding about recoveries for losses of personal rights
was one of long standing. The 1922 Solicitor’s Opinion had come
to the same conclusion, for the causes of action described in
Revenue Ruling 74–77 and also for slander or libel of a personal
character:
If an individual is possessed of a personal right that is not
assignable and not susceptible of any appraisal in relation to
market values, and thereafter receives either damages or
payment in compromise for an invasion of that right, it can
not be held that he thereby derives any gain or profit. It is
229 Id.
230 When I first wrote about this issue, I failed to note that, although the ruling did not cite
section 104(a)(2), or even section 104(a), it was cataloged in the Cumulative Bulletin under
“Section 104.—Compensation for Injuries or Sickness.” See Jensen, Automatically Taxable?,
supra note 28. Professor Dodge properly noted my omission, see Dodge, Recoveries for
Nonphysical Injuries, supra note 28, at 986, but then got a lot wrong. He said that “[t]he ruling
is listed . . . as being ‘under’ section 104 (not section 61), and the caption refers to 26 CFR
1-104-1 (not any of the section 61 regulations).” Id. But right after the citation to section
1.104-1 are cites to sections 61 and 1.61-1. See Rev. Rul. 74-77, 1974-1 C.B. at 33. And the
ruling is listed under section 61. Id. at 22.
231 Cf. infra note 250 (noting that “personal or family rights” was unrelated to section
104(a)(2)).
232 I shall discuss those rulings presently. See infra Part V.B.2.b.
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clear, therefore, that the Government can not tax him on any
portion of the sum received.233
The 1922 opinion reversed an earlier Solicitor’s Memorandum that
alienation-of-affections recoveries were taxable under the Revenue
Act of 1918.234 The earlier memorandum had concluded that taxation
was required because no statutory exception applied,235 but then, in
1920, the Supreme Court decided Macomber,236 making it clear that a
“fundamental” question remained “whether such damages are within
the legal definition of income.”237
Few today like Macomber, where the Court held that receipt of a
proportionate stock dividend was not the receipt of “incomes” under
the Sixteenth Amendment.238 But my argument does not depend on
the ultimate rightness of Macomber. My point is more limited: it is
only that not every receipt of value is income, and that is so even if
cash is received.
The Service came to the no-income result in the 1974 ruling
nineteen years after the Supreme Court had decided, in Commissioner
v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,239 that “accessions to wealth, clearly realized,
and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion” are taxable
(unless Congress says otherwise).240 That language, broadening an
earlier definition of income that looked to value derived from labor or
capital,241 encompassed windfalls like punitives. But a recovery for
alienation of affections was still not income.242
Of course, hardly anyone cares about alienation of affections
anymore, unless it happens to you,243 but I am using the ruling as
233 Sol.

Op. 132, 1-1 C.B. 92, 93 (1922).
Mem. 1384, 2 C.B. 71 (1920).
235 Id. at 72. It said the statutory reference to recoveries for “personal injuries” was
probably intended to be limited to physical injuries. Id. at 71.
236 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
237
Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C.B. at 93. The opinion also clarified that there was a difference
between a purely personal recovery and a recovery for libel that affected business income. The
opinion modified Sol. Mem. 957, 1 C.B. 65 (1919), which—pre-Macomber—had ruled that any
libel recovery is taxable. See Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C.B. at 93–94.
238 See Jensen, Meaning of Incomes, supra note 19, at 1133–38; supra notes 129–36 and
accompanying text.
239 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
240 Id. at 431.
241 See, e.g., Macomber, 252 U.S. at 207 (“Income may be defined as the gain derived from
capital, from labor, or from both combined . . . .” (quoting Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert,
231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913), and Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918))).
242 Although Glenshaw Glass has been interpreted in far-reaching ways, the Court did not
question that a personal-injury recovery which restores “capital” is not taxable. See supra note
75.
243 But the tort is still recognized in seven states and, on average, 245 suits were filed
annually in North Carolina in the 2000–2005 period. See Posting of Eugene Volokh to The
Volokh Conspiracy, My Torts Class, and Alienation of Affections, http://volokh.com/posts/1249
234 Sol.
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an example.244 And the 1974 ruling did not stand alone. Many other
decisions had come to the same conclusion: no income, not because
of a statutory exclusion, just no income.245
On the narrow alienation-of-affections point, I must note that the
Service declared Revenue Ruling 74–77 obsolete in 1998.246 A new
ruling provided a long list of prior rulings that
are no longer considered determinative because: (1) the
applicable statutory provisions or regulations have been
changed or repealed; (2) the ruling position is specifically
covered by a statute, regulation, or subsequent published
position; or (3) the facts set forth no longer exist or are not
sufficiently described to permit clear application of the
current statute and regulations.247
That is the extent of the explanation, but from the timing one
might infer that the Service had concluded Revenue Ruling 74–77
ought to be discarded because of the 1996 change in section
104(a)(2). If that is what the Service was thinking, however, the
Service was wrong. The controlling statutory provision in the 1974
ruling was section 61, which, in all relevant respects, was the same in
1998 as in 1974.248 If Revenue Ruling 74–77 required change, it was
not because of a statutory amendment, and the purpose underlying the
change to section 104(a)(2)—to reach recoveries of lost profits—was
not implicated here.249

502730.shtml (Aug. 5, 2009, 16:05 EST). The tort has received some publicity recently because
of a threatened suit by Elizabeth Edwards against a political aide of her estranged spouse,
former North Carolina Senator and Democratic vice-presidential nominee John Edwards. See
Joanna L. Grossman & Lawrence M. Friedman, Elizabeth Edwards v. Andrew Young: Can He
Be Held Liable for Contributing to the Failure of the Edwardses’ Marriage?, FINDLAW, Feb.
19, 2010, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20100219.html.
244 I am sure that Congress was not thinking of alienation of affections when it amended
section 104(a)(2). The focus was on discrimination cases. See supra notes 193–201 and
accompanying text.
245 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 209 (quoting Clark v. Comm’r, 40 B.T.A. 333,
335 (1939), acq., 1957-1 C.B. 4). The Clark decision cited to a number of tax cases where the
determination was made that no income existed. Clark, 40 B.T.A. at 335.
246 Rev. Rul. 98-37, 1998-2 C.B. 133.
247 Id. at 133.
248 Revenue Ruling 74–77 had relied on Sol. Op. 132, see supra text accompanying note
229, and the Service issued that opinion because of Macomber, which few now take seriously.
But Macomber was just as disfavored in 1974 as in 1998.
249 I can see only one other justification for rendering the 1974 ruling obsolete: affections
are now so routinely alienated that the tort has disappeared in most jurisdictions. But see supra
note 243 (noting that the tort is still recognized in seven states).
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b. More Tax-Free Recoveries for Losses of “Personal Rights”
The Internal Revenue Service did revoke the alienation-ofaffections ruling after section 104(a)(2) was amended. But what is not
widely known is that the Service for several years left on the books
other rulings concluding, without clear statutory authority, that certain
recoveries of cash were not income—because, as with an alienationof-affections recovery, they were reimbursements for the loss of
“personal rights.”250
i. Recoveries by Victims of Persecution
A 1955 ruling, published in a bulletin that also reprinted Glenshaw
Glass251—exquisite timing!—concluded that payments under the War
Claims Act of 1948252 to a prisoner of war “are in the nature of
reimbursement for the loss of personal rights and are not includible
in the gross income of such individual.”253 A 1956 ruling came to
the same conclusion, for the same reasons, with regard to payments
made to Korean War prisoners.254 In neither case had Congress said
anything about taxability of the reimbursements.
In 1956, the Service ruled that payments by the German
government to former German citizens who “were persecuted because
of anti-Nazi persuasion or for reasons of race, faith, or philosophy of
life, by the National Socialist (Nazi) regime and thereby suffered
damage to life, body, health, liberty, rights of property ownership, or
to professional or economic advancement” were “in the nature of
reimbursement for the deprivation of civil or personal rights and [did]
not constitute taxable income.”255 Indeed, with respect to loss of
250
In trying to tie Revenue Ruling 74–77 to section 104(a)(2), see supra note 230,
Professor Dodge wrote, “The text of the ruling states that the damages were for the violation of
a ‘personal’ right, and were compensatory in nature,” and “[t]hat characterization of the facts
brings them directly within the then-applicable version of section 104(a)(2).” Dodge, Recoveries
for Nonphysical Injuries, supra note 28, at 986. But the ruling said the damages “relate to
personal or family rights, not property rights,” Rev. Ruling 74-77, 1974-1 C.B. 33, and that
distinction was not key under regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 1956)
(defining personal injury in terms of “tort or tort type rights”).
251 348 U.S. 426 (1955), reprinted in 1955-1 C.B. 207.
252 Pub. L. No. 80-896, 62 Stat. 1240.
253
Rev. Rul. 55-132, 1955-1 C.B. 213.
254 Rev. Rul. 56-462, 1956-2 C.B. 20.
255 Rev. Rul. 56-518, 1956-2 C.B. 25, clarified by Rev. Rul. 57-505, 1957-2 C.B. 50
(specifying German statutes to which the ruling applies and stating that taxability of payments
under other statutes “will be decided on the basis of the facts and circumstances involved in
each case”) and amplified by Rev. Rul. 58-500, 1958-2 C.B. 21 (discussing the effect of
amendments to German statutes). Revenue Ruling 71-477, 1971-2 C.B. 479, noted that these
rulings had been rendered moot after 1964 by the United States-Federal Republic Germany
Income Tax Convention, 1966-1 C.B. 360 which made such payments to U.S. citizens or
residents nontaxable anyway.
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property, the ruling concluded, without reference to section 1033,256
that amounts received in excess of basis are not necessarily
taxable; taxability “will be determined on the basis of the facts and
circumstances of each case.”257 A 1958 ruling came to the same
conclusion, for the same reasons, for payments made by the Austrian
government.258
Finally, in 1969, the Service ruled that payments of a widow’s
pension under Austria’s General Social Insurance Law—as a result of
the restoration of benefits of former citizens “if such benefits were
placed in jeopardy during the period between March 4, 1933, and
May 9, 1945, for political reasons (except for national socialistic
acts) or for reasons of religion or race”—“are in the nature of
reimbursement for the deprivation of civil or personal rights and do
not constitute taxable income.”259
Several things are worth noting. First, none of these rulings
was aberrational. This was a series of rulings, over a fifteen-year
period after Glenshaw Glass, which consistently concluded that
certain cash recoveries for the loss of “personal rights” were not
taxable because they were not income. Furthermore, none relied on,
mentioned, or was catalogued under section 104(a)(2), as it then
existed. Indeed, none of them would have fit within the language of
that section, if the statutory term “personal injuries” is understood to
refer to tort-like rights. Instead, all were issued under section 61 or
regulations interpreting the meaning of “gross income,”260 and all
concluded that recoveries for “personal rights” were not taxable.
None had anything to do with recovery of basis, and none fit within
the “general welfare exception”—the long-time administrative
practice of the Internal Revenue Service not to treat receipts from
256 In any event, the requirements of that section were unlikely to have been satisfied. In
general, section 1033 permits a taxpayer to defer gain associated with proceeds from the
involuntary conversion of property if, within a prescribed period, he reinvests an amount equal
to or greater than the amount of proceeds in property “similar or related in service or use.”
I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2) (2006). The goal is to prevent gain recognition at an inopportune time to the
extent the taxpayer does not cash out. Gain not recognized is reflected in a lower basis in the
replacement property. I.R.C. § 1033(b)(2).
257 Rev. Rul. 56-518, 1956-2 C.B. 25. Even if recoveries above basis were to be taxed, the
Service later effectively permitted affected taxpayers to use the open transaction method to
report gain and to treat interest payments as recovery of basis as well: “Whether or not the
receipt of an award payment is designated as a recovery of principal or of interest, no part of the
payment is taxable gain until the taxpayer’s basis is recovered.” I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-18-017
(Jan. 28, 1983).
258
See Rev. Rul. 58-370, 1958-2 C.B. 14.
259 Rev. Rul. 69-212, 1969-1 C.B. 34.
260 The first ruling was issued under regulations interpreting the 1939 Code, when the
definition of “gross income” had a different section number. Regulations under the 1954 Code
had yet to be issued.
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“governmental social benefit programs for the promotion of the
general welfare” as income.”261 Finally, none seemed to depend on
administrative difficulties—some receipts of value, while technically
income, cannot be policed by the Service in an economically
reasonable way262—rather than principle.263
These rulings were still on the books when Murphy I was decided,
and they were obviously embarrassing to the Service given its
litigation posture.264 Shortly before the Murphy II decision was
handed down, the Service withdrew the rulings, supposedly as part of
its
continuing . . . program of reviewing guidance . . . to identify
items that are obsolete because (1) the applicable statutory
provisions have been changed or repealed; (2) the matter
is specifically covered by statute, regulations, or subsequent
published position; or (3) the facts on which the position
is based no longer occur or are not sufficiently described

261 Rev. Rul. 2009-19, 2009-28 I.R.B. 111, 111 (holding that pay-for-performance-success
payments made to benefit homeowners under the Home Affordable Modification Program are
not income); see also Rev. Rul. 98-19, 1998-1 C.B. 840 (ruling that relocation payments made
under the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 to individuals moving from a
flood-damaged residence to another residence are not includable in the individual’s gross
income); Rev. Rul. 74-205, 1974-1 C.B. 21 (ruling that replacement housing payments made for
the purpose of aiding individuals and families displaced from their homes, businesses, or farms
are not taxable as gross income); Wood, False Imprisonment, supra note 47, at 287; Robert W.
Wood & Richard C. Morris, The General Welfare Exception to Gross Income, 109 TAX NOTES
203 (2005). For the exception to apply, the Service generally requires that payments be made
from a governmental welfare fund, be based on need, and not be compensation for services. See
Wood, False Imprisonment, supra note 47, at 287; I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2000-21-036 (Feb.
15, 2000), reprinted in Adoption Assistance Payments Excludable, TAX NOTES TODAY, May 30,
2000, 2000 TNT 104-74 (LEXIS) (concluding that adoption assistance payments are not
includable in gross income).
262 If the Service averts its eyes, then, as a practical matter, a receipt of value is not income.
For example, after a millisecond’s worth of effort to the contrary, the Service decided not to
treat receipt and retention of unsolicited samples as income, even though such items are clearly
“accessions to wealth” and would not be treated as “gifts” under section 102. See Rev. Rul.
70-498, 1970-2 C.B. 6 (holding that a reviewer who donated unsolicited books to charity must
include value in income if he claims a charitable deduction), superseding Rev. Rul. 70-330,
1970-1 C.B. 14 (holding that retention of unsolicited books was enough for inclusion). The
Service had “apparently made an administrative decision to be concerned with the taxation of
unsolicited samples only when failure to tax those samples would provide taxpayers with double
tax benefits.” Haverly v. United States, 513 F.2d 224, 227 (7th Cir. 1975).
263 That might be said about the general welfare exception as well. Taxing welfare benefits
is doable, although the Service would be criticized if it acted unilaterally. Congress understands
what the practice has been, has not tried to change that practice, and, if it approves, has no
reason to do anything.
264 Lewis J. Fernandez, Associate Chief Counsel, Income Tax & Accounting, Internal
Revenue Serv., Remarks Before the Committee on Tax Accounting, American Bar Association
Section of Taxation (Oct. 20, 2006) (calling attention to the rulings, noting how embarrassing
they were, and stating that the Service had alerted the Solicitor General to their existence).
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to permit clear application of the current statute and
regulations.265
The Service made no claim that statutory changes required this
decision. It could not reasonably have done so. Indeed, it did not
mention section 104(a)(2) in this connection, and it was clear in
context that the silence was not inadvertent.266 The official reason for
withdrawal of the old rulings must have been that “the facts on which
the position[s] [are] based no longer occur,” as if withdrawal were
part of a routine housekeeping process.267 The timing of the
revocation was obviously dictated by Murphy, however, and the
revocation should not have hidden a basic fact: the relevant law had
not changed.
I have heard it said that those rulings were historical artifacts,
which had lacked any significance for decades. But the Service itself
issued a private letter ruling in 1998 that relied entirely on the
published rulings.268 The significance of those rulings extended far
beyond the factual situations they described, and beyond 1996, when
section 104(a)(2) was amended.269
The private ruling concluded that one-time payments made from a
fund established by an unidentified country and funded by a national
bank, private banks, and other companies would not be taxable to
recipients who met certain criteria270: in general, they had to have
lived under an oppressive regime; had to be citizens or permanent
residents of the United States; and had to declare themselves to be in
need.271 If the criteria were satisfied, a payment was “in the nature of
reimbursement for the deprivation of personal or civil rights as
described in the revenue rulings. Accordingly, the payment is not
includible in your [gross] income.”272
The 1998 private ruling was not aberrational either. The Service
had issued other letter rulings to the same effect—one in 1996 to a
265 Rev. Rul. 2007-14, 2007-1 C.B. 747. The Service also declared Revenue Ruling 71-477
obsolete. See supra note 255. It had become irrelevant if the other rulings were obsolete.
266 After declaring the various rulings obsolete, with no mention of section 104(a)(2), the
Service explicitly relied on section 104(a)(2) in withdrawing its acquiescence in two Board of
Tax Appeals decisions. See infra text accompanying note 279.
267 Rev. Rul. 2007-14, 2007-1 C.B. 747.
268 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-06-004 (Oct. 27, 1998).
269 The level of review for private rulings is not as stringent as for published rulings, and
private rulings are not supposed to be treated as authority for many purposes. My point is only
that reports of the demise of the published rulings were greatly exaggerated.
270 Identifying information is redacted when private rulings are made available under the
Freedom of Information Act.
271 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-06-004 (Oct. 27, 1998).
272 Id. Given the need requirement, this situation might have fit under the general-welfare
doctrine, but the conclusion was based on the published rulings.
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recipient of payments from the Dutch government associated with
“persecution and physical and psychological injuries” during the Nazi
occupation of the Netherlands;273 one in 1993 to an Aleut who
received distributions from a trust created to reimburse U.S. citizens
wrongly relocated to internment camps during the Second World
War;274 and one in 1992 to a former citizen of Holland who received
payments from the Dutch government under a special pension act to
compensate for injuries incurred in resisting the Nazi occupation.275
All concluded that taxpayers had no income because they had merely
been “reimburse[d] for the deprivation of civil or personal rights.”276
None of this is ancient history. It was not so long ago that the
Internal Revenue Service itself assumed that not all recoveries of
cash, even when no basis offset was involved, were automatically
taxable.277 If those recoveries were not income in the 1950s, 1960s,
and 1990s, with Glenshaw Glass already on the books, nothing
had happened statutorily in the meantime to change the result.
Conceptions of income might have changed in the academy, but
those changed conceptions were not reflected in any congressional
enactment or judicial reinterpretation.278
ii. Revocation of Acquiescences in Old Cases
When the Service declared the rulings discussed above obsolete, it
also withdrew embarrassing acquiescences to two Board of Tax
Appeals decisions involving nonphysical injury recoveries. The
Service gave section 104(a)(2) as the reason for the withdrawal:
[I]n light of the amendments to § 104(a)(2)[,] certain
acquiescences to decisions are obsolete. These amendments
273 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-29-017 (Apr. 22, 1996) (concluding that the payments “are in
the nature of reimbursement for the deprivation of civil or personal rights and do not constitute
income”).
274 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-06-011 (Nov. 9, 1993) (holding that the distributions were
“in the nature of reimbursement for the deprivation of . . . civil or personal rights” and not
includable in gross income).
275 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-23-046 (Mar. 10, 1992) (holding that the payments “are in the
nature of reimbursement for the deprivation of civil or personal rights” and are therefore not
taxable).
276 See supra notes 273–75.
277 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-27-040 (Apr. 10, 2001) (citing Revenue Ruling 56-518,
1956-2 C.B. 25, as still valid on an issue ultimately governed by treaty language). It was thus
not correct to say in 2005 that “there is no doctrinal support for the notion that cash received as
the result of an involuntary occurrence is excludable apart from statutory exclusions and deferral
provisions.” Dodge, Jensen’s Missiles, supra note 16, at 132.
278 For example, Professor Caron described Murphy I as undoing a half century of tax
jurisprudence, see supra text accompanying note 14, but authority still supported a restrictive
conception of income in 2007.
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make clear that Congress intended “that the exclusion from
gross income [under § 104(a)(2)] only applies to damages
received on account of a personal physical injury or physical
sickness,” and thus damages received on account of personal
nonphysical injuries or nonphysical sickness generally would
be required to be included in gross income.279
Note the “generally,” however, a word to which I will return.
In Hawkins v. Commissioner,280 decided in 1927—cited in Clark281
and Murphy I282—the Board had concluded that a recovery for libel,
when the compensation was only for damage to personal reputation,
was not income absent express congressional indication to the
contrary.283 Twenty-eight years before Glenshaw Glass, the Board
suggested that the implication in cases like Eisner v. Macomber284—
that income can arise only from capital or labor—was not necessarily
right.285 No matter. This recovery was “wholly personal and
nonpecuniary,”286 and “[s]uch compensation as general damages adds
nothing to the individual, for the very concept which sanctions it
prohibits that it shall include a profit. It is an attempt to make the
plaintiff whole as before the injury.”287 The recovery would have been
taxable if Congress had made “express provision”288 to that effect—
this was not a constitutional case—but Congress had not done so.
In McDonald v. Commissioner,289 decided in 1928 and also cited
in Clark,290 the Board had come to the same result for a recovery of
damages for breach of a promise to marry—damages that could have
related, depending on the jury’s determination, to “mortification and
279 Rev. Rul. 2007-14, 2007-1 C.B. 747 (alteration in original) (citing H.R. R EP . N O .
104-737, at 301 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996-3 C.B. 741, 1041).
280 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927), acq., 7-1 C.B. 1, 14 (1928).
281 40 B.T.A. 333, 335 (1939), acq., 1957-1 C.B. 4; see also supra text accompanying note
209.
282 460 F.3d 79, 91 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, No. 05-5139, 2006 WL 4005276 (D.C. Cir. Dec.
22, 2006).
283 See Hawkins, 6 B.T.A. at 1024–25.
284 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
285 The Hawkins court noted:

[I]t is conceivable that since the income tax is primarily an application of the idea of
measuring taxes by financial ability to pay, as indicated by the net accretions to one’s
economic wealth during the year, there may be cases in which taxable income will be
judicially found although outside the precise scope of the description already given.
Hawkins, 6 B.T.A. at 1024.
286 Id. at 1024–25.
287 Id. at 1025.
288 Id.
289 9 B.T.A. 1340 (1928), acq., 7-2 C.B. 1, 26 (1928).
290
40 B.T.A. 333, 335 (1939), acq., 1957-1 C.B. 4.
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pain or distress of mind . . . ; loss of social standing . . . ; injury
to future prospects of marriage . . . ”;291 and so on.292 The result in
McDonald was dependent on the result in Hawkins,293 and if the
Service would no longer follow Hawkins, it would also no longer
follow McDonald.
In support of withdrawing the acquiescences, the Service cited to
the conference committee report on the 1996 legislation, and a
comment on the legislative history is in order. As I noted earlier,
the conference committee report used the heading “[i]nclude in
income damage recoveries for nonphysical injuries” as if receipt of
compensation for a nonphysical injury were automatically taxable.294
But the text of the report simply says that, as a result of the statutory
change, only a recovery for a physical injury is covered by section
104(a)(2).295 That is true, but not very interesting. The headings
overstate the conclusion of the text.
And the Service’s bottom-line conclusion contains that intriguing
“generally”: “damages received on account of personal nonphysical
injuries or nonphysical sickness generally would be required to
be included in gross income.”296 Although this suggests that the
proposition is not always true, one searches in vain for guidance
about the exceptional cases.
Maybe the “generally” had something to do with recoveries that,
because of transition rules, are not governed by the statutory change,
or to the possibility that a nonphysical injury might be closely enough
tied to a physical injury to implicate section 104(a)(2).297 If the
drafters had these situations in mind, however, the point could have
been made straightforwardly.
Another possibility is that the “generally” was inadvertent.
Lawyers drop “generallys,” “usuallys,” and “ordinarilys” into
everyday discourse. (If you do not know whether an exception
exists, cover yourself: “The sun generally rises in the east.”)
9 B.T.A. at 1341.
would have thought that a jury might include something to reimburse an aggrieved
party for nondeductible amounts spent in anticipation of marriage. See infra Part V.B.3.
293 See McDonald, 9 B.T.A. at 1342.
294 See H.R. R EP . N O . 104-737, at 301 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996-3 C.B. 741,
1041; see also supra notes 188–91 and accompanying text.
295 See H.R. R EP . N O . 104-737, at 301.
296
Rev. Rul. 2007-14, 2007-1 C.B. 747 (emphasis added) (citing H.R. R EP. NO .
104-737).
297 See supra Part V.B.1. The report discussed two situations: If emotional distress
arises as part of a personal physical injury, the portion of the recovery attributable to the
distress would continue to be excludable, while that would not necessarily be true with
an emotional-distress component of a recovery for a nonphysical injury. See H.R. R EP. NO .
104-737, at 301; see also supra note 226.
291 McDonald,
292 I
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Habituated to “generallys,” lawyers can forget that some propositions
are always true, and that a “generally” can be misleading.
But this “generally” appeared in a written document subject to
substantial review; it must have been intentional. Did Service
personnel come to realize that, even as they were reviewing old
authority to take account of amended section 104(a)(2), a blanket
requirement that a nonphysical personal injury recovery must be
taxed in its entirety would be wrong?
3. How Common Is Recovery of Basis?
Whatever commentators think about the rulings discussed in the
preceding section, I know of no one who thinks the amendments to
section 104(a)(2) were intended to make taxable a recovery of basis
arising from a nonphysical personal injury—at least not if the
compensation comes from the tortfeasor or an insurance company.298
If by basis recovery we mean recovery of previously
nondeductible outlays, as in Clark, the scope of the basis-recovery
doctrine is potentially quite broad. I am not sure how damages are
determined in an alienation-of-affections or breach-of-promise-tomarry lawsuit, and I hope never to find out, but I can imagine a jury
or parties negotiating a settlement trying to figure how much a poor
spouse had spent trying to save a failing marriage, or how much a
spurned fiancée had spent gearing up for a wedding—dollars that
were not deductible when paid. Might the analysis of the tax effects
of a recovery in such a situation be analogous (or more than
analogous) to a basis-recovery situation? If not, why not?299 If the
goal was to make someone financially whole by making the
responsible party compensate for out-of-pocket costs, and the
compensation amount was determined on the assumption that the
award would not be taxable, exclusion of the recovery would be
appropriate.300 That is the Clark case, in different garb.
Of course, a taxpayer has the obligation to demonstrate basis or its
equivalent if he is claiming an offset to an amount realized. But even
if we might question the amount of basis claimed in a particular case,
298 If the victim’s employer, say, compensates the victim for a nondeductible loss unrelated
to employment, there would be income. We would not be talking about recovery of basis in that
case.
299 To the extent of punitives, the recovery would be taxable. See Rev. Rul. 74–77, 1974-1
C.B. 33 (positing that “[n]one of the amounts received constituted exemplary or punitive
damages”).
300 If a jury were instructed to assume the award would be taxable and it grossed up the
award, inclusion of the recovery would be the theoretically right result. Absent jury instructions
on the matter, however, the typical juror would have no idea that an award might be taxed.
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surely there would be no doubt in an alienation-of-affections or
breach-of-promise-to-marry situation that some basis existed—some
nondeductible, out-of-pocket costs were being restored—and that at
least part of the recovery might be excludable.
The common argument against an analysis of that sort for many
tort recoveries is that we are talking about “human capital”—the
Murphy panel made specific reference to the concept301—and no one,
it is said, can have basis in human capital. Professor Dodge states that
[s]ome might argue that a person has a basis equal to the sum
of human-capital expenditures, which might include such
items as outlays for food, education, preventive health care,
vitamins, and minerals. Unfortunately, no one keeps track of
these outlays, nor would it be feasible to do so. Most (or all)
of the foregoing are nondeductible personal expenses and not
capital expenditures.302
Propositions like that are regularly and forcefully advanced, as if
there can be no doubt that human capital has a zero basis.303 In
Murphy I, the government argued that, “[b]ecause people do not pay
cash or its equivalent to acquire their well-being [sez who?], they
have no basis in it for purposes of measuring a gain (or loss) upon the
realization of compensatory damages.”304 And in Murphy II, the
government was more categorical: “The Code does not allow
individuals to claim a basis in their human capital.”305
I do not understand why that is so. Professor Geier has fleshed
out the “no basis in human capital” argument as it might apply to
301 See Murphy II, 493 F.3d 170, 177–78 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1004
(2008); Murphy I, 460 F.3d 79, 85–87 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, No. 05-5139, 2006 WL 4005276
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2006).
302 Dodge, Taxes and Torts, supra note 196, at 152 (footnote omitted).
303 See, e.g., 1 B ITTKER & LOKKEN , supra note 172, ¶ 5.6, at 5-40 (arguing for taxability
of various recoveries, unless Congress provides otherwise, “[s]ince defamation or alienation of
affections does not entail the loss of something for which the taxpayer paid cold cash”); Geier,
supra note 76, at 582 (“[A] tax-free return of capital necessarily entails basis—previously taxed
dollars—which no one can create in his own body or mind. Because Murphy had no basis in her
human capital, the entirety of the cash she received was gross income within the meaning of the
residual clause in section 61.”).
304 Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 87 (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
305 Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 178 (internal quotation marks omitted). When I see a statement
about what “the Code” does not allow, I expect to see a statutory citation. But the citation in
Murphy II was to a Ninth Circuit decision predating the amendment of section 104(a)(2). See id.
(citing Roemer v. Comm’r, 716 F.2d 693, 696 n.2 (9th Cir. 1983)). The Murphy II court pulled
the following quotation from Roemer: “Since there is no tax basis in a person’s health and other
personal interests, money received as compensation for an injury to those interests might be
considered a realized accession to wealth.” Id. (quoting Roemer, 716 F.2d at 696 n.2). The court
characterized the quoted language as “dictum.” Id.
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Murphy, but, as I will explain, it is not convincing:
[T]here are no previously taxed dollars to recover tax-free
here. [Murphy] made no nondeductible capital expenditure
that created her bodily integrity, emotional well-being, and
professional reputation. Any outlays that she incurred to keep
her body and mind in good operating condition are current
expenses (current net wealth decreases, as opposed to capital
expenditures). Most of those expenses would be “personal”
[and] nondeductible for that reason. Except in the case of a
personal expense that is refunded, nondeductible expenses
do not generally create basis, or else they could provide
a delayed tax benefit that is inconsistent with the
nondeductibility of the personal expense.306
We should have a skeptical attitude about basis claimed in human
capital,307 but Professors Dodge and Geier go too far. I do not know
how we can be sure that Murphy made no nondeductible (but
measurable) capital expenditures to create the human capital that was
converted. Could there not have been some nondeductible education
expenses, say—almost certainly “capital” in nature—that contributed
to her professional reputation, a reputation that was determined to
have been injured? Had the right questions been asked, perhaps
Murphy could have substantiated some costs. And even if this would
not have worked for Murphy, this would be a relevant inquiry in other
cases where conversion of human capital is claimed.
In fact, notwithstanding Professor Dodge’s certainty to the
contrary, people do keep track of expenditures that contribute to
human capital—not the amount spent on pencils in the first grade, of
course, but the costs of college are not difficult to track.308 That sort
of information is not being presented in tax litigation involving
nonphysical injuries because almost everyone is assuming the full
306 Geier,

supra note 76, at 580.
should therefore not assume that the amount of a personal injury recovery equals
basis. Professor Dodge has called recovery-equals-basis a “sentimentalist” position:
307 We

On the merits, human capital should not be treated as a conventional asset with
basis. Not only is it impossible to keep track of costs, but there are also conceptual
problems. By what coherent principle would one distinguish between the capital
expenditure and the expense portions of food, education, etc.? Is human capital used
in business to earn wages, or is it held for personal consumption to enjoy life?
Dodge, Taxes and Torts, supra note 196, at 153.
308 There can be other conceptual problems: if Mom and Dad paid for the educational
expenses of their injured child, should the child have “basis”? I would argue yes, that for these
purposes the transfer was a gift from parents to child, but I can understand that others would
disagree.
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recovery is taxable. If your lawyer tells you that (or tells you nothing
at all), or if a court says it does not matter what basis you might have,
why provide information?
But suppose a damages recovery by its terms reflects an effort on
the part of the judge, jury, or negotiating parties to determine the
amount of nondeductible dollars that had been spent developing
converted human capital.309 To say that basis is difficult to determine
is not to say that no basis exists. And there is no reason to ignore all
expenditures because some are difficult to track.310 Remember that we
are talking about converted capital: Murphy proceeded on the
assumption that Ms. Murphy had really lost something, and she was
being compensated for a loss, not being awarded a windfall.311
I am also unconvinced that the distinction between capital
expenditures and current expenses is relevant. In a business setting,
we distinguish between current expenses, which ought to be
deductible and therefore not create basis, and capital expenditures,
which are generally not currently deductible but will create basis if
there is an asset to which they can be attributed. But in the personal
setting, neither current expenses nor capital expenditures are usually
going to be deductible. Whether current or capital in nature, the costs
are after-tax costs.
If there is a recovery of previously taxed dollars—which is what
we are talking about with basis—why should we care whether the
nondeductible expenditures were ordinary or capital in nature? If the
connection between an expenditure and a later recovery can be
shown—not always impossible—the key question should be whether
that expenditure was deductible or not.
I have always understood Clark as a basis-recovery case, as have
others, even though no capital expenditure was involved: the tax

309 If the expenditures were deductible, then no basis would have been created. No
expenditure should be both deductible and reflected in basis—unless Congress provides for
double-counting to provide an incentive for particular activity.
310 Even though a taxpayer has the obligation to demonstrate basis that would reduce gain
on disposition of an asset—just as he must demonstrate entitlement to exclude something from
income or to take a deduction—the Service will ordinarily not require him to treat the basis as
zero in the absence of records. For example, if you sell an item that has been passed from
generation to generation in your family, and you do not have records necessary to apply sections
1014 and 1015, the Service will generally accept a reasonable figure. See I.R.C. § 1015(a)
(2006) (setting out rules for difficult situations). Why should the same rule of thumb not apply
with conversion of human capital?
311
Wages are different, as I discuss later. See infra Part VI.E. The arrangement is generally
voluntary. The performance of services does not necessarily use up human capital, and the
compensation does not purport to be for capital. In Murphy, the assumption was that human
capital had been converted. See Murphy II, 493 F.3d 170, 185 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
553 U.S. 1004 (2008).
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payment was for the current year’s tax liability.312 But if there is
reluctance to use the term “basis” for a nondeductible current
expenditure, then let us find a new word. Whatever term is used, the
recovery of previously taxed dollars, when the recovery is funded by
the person who caused the loss (or by an insurer), should be tax-free.
Professor Geier is worried about a deferred benefit from an
otherwise nondeductible, noncapital, personal expenditure—a benefit
inconsistent with the idea that personal expenditures are not
deductible.313 That is a concern in many contexts, but why here?314
Using a previously nondeductible cost to offset a recovery is a
benefit, certainly if the baseline for comparison is that a recovery
ought to be taxable. But, as was true in Clark, the benefit is
justified—offsetting a nondeductible loss or expenditure with an
untaxed recovery.315 Indeed, it is the point of this exercise—as in
Clark—to provide an offset.
Suppose, for example, you pay your gardener $10,000 to plant
annuals around your house—a nondeductible current expense. A
well-heeled thug trashes the yard, and you successfully sue the guy to
recover the $10,000. Can it be true that the full $10,000 is taxable
because you have no basis associated with your noncapital
expenditure, and no statutory provision provides for an exclusion?316
Assuming the connection between the loss and the recovery can be
demonstrated, of course the recovery should be tax-free.317
Is this example too easy and therefore unrepresentative of the
more typical case, where the relationship between a recovery and
previously nondeductible expenditures will not be obvious? Maybe
so, but the difficulties of demonstrating basis in many cases should
supra Part V.B.1.
supra text accompanying note 306.
314 Maybe what happens with recoveries for personal injuries cannot be governed by
“generally” applicable rules. The events are by their nature unusual.
315 Professor Geier says that treating a nondeductible current expenditure as creating basis
might be appropriate in determining the effect of a refund. See supra text accompanying note
306. The principle should not be so limited. Indeed, Clark has been characterized as a case
where the result should have been the same as if Uncle Sam had refunded the extra tax. See
supra note 213.
316 This is not a “personal” injury, but the example still makes my point. Although there is
physical damage, and the injury might be a tort, the injury is not to the person, and section
104(a)(2) should therefore be irrelevant. The term “personal” in the statute should have
reference both to “tort or tort type rights,” as set out in the regulations, and damage to the
person.
317 Make the expenditure capital. The gardener builds a greenhouse for you, cost $10,000.
Nothing associated with the creation of “horticultural capital” is deductible, however, because
no Code section provides authority to deduct this personal expenditure. The thug trashes the
greenhouse, and you recover $10,000. Income? No. The result is the same as in the first
variation. Tax-free dollars should compensate for the loss of already taxed dollars, whether the
initial expenditure was capital or not.
312 See
313 See
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not affect the analysis where basis can in fact be demonstrated.
Perhaps the conceptual problem in the personal-injury context is
exacerbated by the use of the term “human capital,” which covers a
mishmash of quite different attributes.318 For many commentators, the
term is used as a shorthand way of concluding that a recovery should
be taxable. Human capital? No basis. I question that position.
To be sure, with many of the expenditures that are often described
as enhancing human capital, we cannot expect people to have kept
records or otherwise to be able to reconstruct the amounts involved.
Furthermore, there are relatively few situations in which the idea of a
“recovery” of the typical expenditure for human capital would make
sense. We do not want to let expenditures made by Mom and Dad for
one’s baby food turn into a basis offset forty years later.
For some expenditures, however, keeping track is not a problem;
expenses for education are obviously different in that regard from
expenditures for “vitamins” and “minerals.”319 And viewing the
benefit of a nondeductible expenditure as having been lost is not out
of the realm of possibility. These situations might be unusual (and
might not include Murphy). But it makes no sense to have a
categorical no-basis rule. The question to ask is whether a taxpayer
received amounts from the person who caused a personal injury that
compensated for previously nondeductible outlays. If so, and if the
taxpayer can demonstrate the amount with an acceptable level of
precision, recovery of basis is inevitably implicated.
Suppose a would-be professional pianist pays tuition at a
conservatory building up “human capital.” He cannot deduct the
expenditures when incurred because he is not yet carrying on a trade
or business.320 At best, the expenditures are “start-up expenditures,” a
form of capital expenditure for which there might ultimately be an
effect under the Code, but for which there is none currently.321
Now suppose we are in a world without section 104(a)(2), and the
318 Professor Dodge defines recoveries for injuries to “human capital” as encompassing
“damages for lost wage-earning capacity, including recoveries for lost past wages,” Dodge,
Taxes and Torts, supra note 196, at 147, and a recovery of that sort should be taxable (unless
Congress provides otherwise). But the definition used by others is broader, and, in Murphy, the
panel had concluded that no lost-earning potential was involved.
319 But see supra text accompanying note 302.
320 The costs are therefore not ordinary and necessary business expenses. See I.R.C. § 162
(2006).
321 If the pianist later becomes a professional, he would be able to amortize the previously
nondeductible costs of creating a business over a fifteen-year period if he can demonstrate the
expenditures would have been deductible for someone already in the business. See I.R.C. § 195
(2006). The costs of conservatory instruction should be deductible by a professional pianist. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (as amended in 1967) (announcing that certain education expenses are
deductible as business expenses).
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musician is injured in an accident and loses a finger on his left hand.
He sues the tortfeasor and recovers an amount that can reasonably be
considered to include compensation for the tuition that, because of the
injury, cannot lead to its desired result. Would that portion of the
recovery be taxable in a world without section 104(a)(2)? Surely we
have the equivalent of basis here.322
Change the facts. Make the injury emotional distress so severe that
it becomes impossible to carry out the career for which the tuition
was spent. Section 104(a)(2) is inapplicable by its terms, but assume
the pianist can show a connection between injury and lost career.
(Yes, there are emotionally disturbed pianists, but let us assume
that mental distress might make a concert career impossible.) Any
recovery ought to be offset by the amount of nondeductible tuition.
Maybe other offsets can be found as well, but at least the wasted
tuition should be an offset.
An unlikely set of facts? Of course. Impossible? Not at all. And
here is another example, based on a real occurrence, of a basis offset
in a nonphysical personal injury situation. A couple, nervous about
messy personal problems, paid a law firm to keep their names out of
the newspapers. Although it did its best, the firm was unsuccessful,
and some embarrassing information became public.323 The couple
sued the privacy-invader and recovered. The couple should not be
taxed on any portion of the recovery that represents a recoupment of
the amount paid the law firm. That is a recovery of basis, with no
difficulty in measuring amount.
It might be that Ms. Murphy could have demonstrated no basis.
The amount of her award was based on “awards made in other
cases involving comparable degrees of injury,”324 rather than a
determination of actual expenditures made, and Murphy asked for
more compensation based on severity of the injury, not the amount of
out-of-pocket costs.325 But we do not know what Murphy would have
been able to demonstrate had the right questions been asked. And
there is no categorical reason why a recovery in such circumstances
should be taxable in the absence of a specific exclusion to that effect.

322 I am assuming the pianist would not be entitled to take a deduction when he is forced to
abandon creation of a business. In any event, the amount of any abandonment loss would be
limited to basis.
323 I cannot reveal further details without invading privacy.
324 Leveille v. N.Y. Air Nat’l Guard, No. 98-079, 1999 DOL Ad. Rev. Bd. LEXIS 105, at
*7 (Dep’t of Labor Admin. Rev. Bd. Oct. 25, 1999).
325 Id. at *7–8.
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4. Gotcher: “Gross Income” Is Not All-Encompassing
One might think commentators arguing for a broad conception of
income, which would pick up the recovery in Murphy, routinely take
the position that any receipt of value, outside the recovery-of-basis
context, is automatically taxable, unless Congress provides explicitly
to the contrary,326 or unless the Internal Revenue Service decides to
let certain accessions to wealth go.327 One might also think that the
income-tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code should be
interpreted on the assumption that, as a multitude of judicial opinions
have said, Congress meant to exercise its full taxing power.328
In fact there is widespread understanding that certain benefits are
not taxable, even though the Constitution would not require that
result, no Code provision justifies an exclusion, and enforcement
issues appear manageable.329
Begin a conversation with a tax professor about in-kind benefits
that arguably constitute a form of “forced” consumption,330 and the
prof is likely to respond: “Gotcher!” a reference to United States v.
Gotcher.331 The Fifth Circuit in 1968 held that an expense-paid trip to
Germany, paid partly by Mr. Gotcher’s employer, a Volkswagen
dealership, and partly by the larger Volkswagen organization, was not
taxable to Gotcher because the trip “primarily benefit[ed] the party
paying for the trip,”332 even though it had elements of pleasure.
Volkswagen was trying to convince U.S. dealers and investors about
the merits of its organization and products.333
While in Germany, Mr. Gotcher was forced to keep his nose to
the grindstone, visiting one VW facility after another rather than
going to Bayreuth: “[T]he personal benefit to Gotcher was clearly
subordinate to the concrete benefits to VW.”334 (The benefit provided

326 Congress has done that, for example, with gifts, municipal bond interest, and various
employer-provided fringe benefits. See I.R.C. §§ 102, 115, 132 (2006).
327 See supra note 262.
328 See, e.g., Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429 (1955) (“This Court has
frequently stated that this language [the definition of “gross income” in the 1939 Code] was
used by Congress to exert in this field ‘the full measure of its taxing power.’” (quoting
Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940)) (citing Helvering v. Midland Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 300 U.S. 216, 223 (1937); Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1, 9 (1935); Irwin v. Gavit, 268
U.S. 161, 166 (1925))).
329 I say “non-cash” benefits, although many of these cases involve cash reimbursements.
330 I have put “forced” in quotation marks because, although the adjective is often used, the
amount of force involved in these cases is typically minimal.
331 401 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1968).
332 Id. at 122.
333 See id. at 121.
334 Id. at 123.
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to Mrs. Gotcher was taxable, however. Her trip was a vacation.335)
For there to be income, concluded the Fifth Circuit, “[t]here must
be an economic gain, and this gain must primarily benefit the
taxpayer personally.”336
I am not sure how enthusiastic the Internal Revenue Service is
about the Gotcher doctrine—not very, I suspect337—but Gotcher has
been interpreted by academics to support not taxing in-kind benefits
in many different circumstances. For example, should a law student
have income associated with callback interview trips paid by law
firms? Because the student is not yet engaged in a trade or business,
the expenditures would not have been deductible if she had paid them
herself.338 As a result of the reimbursements, the student receives a
clear economic benefit—certainly if she winds up employed—from
someone else’s absorbing her nondeductible costs.339 I am not even
sure it is appropriate to say, under the circumstances, that “the
personal benefit to [the law student would be] clearly subordinate to
the concrete benefits to [the law firm].” But the understanding is that
there is no income in such a case.340
If we were drafting a statute from scratch, that might be the
position we would want to adopt, but where in the Code does that
principle come from? I have been assured by Gotcher fans that they
are not making a constitutional argument: nothing in the Constitution
335 Id. at 124. With regard to Mr. Gotcher, the facts could be distinguished from Rudolph v.
United States, 370 U.S. 269 (1962), where a trip to New York provided by an insurance
company to its most productive employees and their spouses was clearly nothing but a frolic.
The trip benefited the employees and not the employer, except in the sense that paying
compensation has benefits to the employer. Id. at 277.
336 Gotcher, 401 F.2d at 121.
337 In the only published ruling in which the Service has cited Gotcher, Rev. Rul. 81-277,
1981-2 C.B. 14, it explained that “[i]nherent in section 61 of the Code is the concept of
economic gain. For a taxpayer to have income under section 61, there must be an economic gain
that benefits the taxpayer personally.” Id. at 15. That unexceptionable proposition had little to
do with Gotcher, the point of which was that no income would be recognized even with a
personal benefit, if the primary benefit was to the payor. Gotcher, 401 F.2d at 122. In private
rulings citing Gotcher, the Service has simply restated language used in the published ruling,
see, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-04-065 (Oct. 30, 1985) (concluding that a benefit was taxable
when an employee was primarily benefitted); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-47-003 (Aug. 27, 1985);
or otherwise distinguished Gotcher’s situation, see, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 79-02-018 (Sept.
29, 1978).
338 See I.R.C. § 162(a) (2006) (permitting deduction for ordinary and necessary expenses
of carrying on a trade or business); cf. I.R.C. § 195 (2006) (treating start-up expenditures as not
deductible, but then permitting amortization in some circumstances). No gift is involved in such
circumstances.
339 In one respect, this is like Clark: the compensation replaces nondeductible dollars and
therefore has a basis-recovery aspect to it.
340 The Service agreed, in a pre-Gotcher ruling. See Rev. Rul. 63-77, 1963-1 C.B. 177
(treating reimbursed interview expenses as not includable in gross income); see also Rev. Rul.
80-99, 1980-1 C.B. 10 (holding that reimbursement of expenses in a non-employment context is
not gross income).

2/11/2010 11:19:39 PM

2010]

MURPHY V. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

813

would preclude Congress from taxing such “forced” consumption if
it wished. And nothing in the language of section 61, which reaches
“income from whatever source derived,” precludes treating forced
consumption as gross income to the extent the recipient receives a
benefit.
Administrative convenience inevitably plays a role in determining
what, as a matter of practice, will be included in the tax base, but
convenience is not an argument grounded in statute or theory. And
in Gotcher itself, the government had assessed the tax deficiency.341
No administrative inconvenience was involved there.
So where did the authority not to tax Gotcher come from?
Professor Geier attributes the doctrine to courts that have been
“convinced that Congress would not have intended taxation of
the receipt. That most often occurs when consumption received in
kind is not compensation, a dividend, or any other type of specifically
listed item of gross income.”342 The Fifth Circuit stated that “it has
been generally held that exclusions from gross income are not limited
to the enumerated exclusions” in the Code.343 That statement by itself
supports my thesis—that long-time understandings may trump a
modern economist’s conception of what ought to be treated as
income—and perhaps I should just leave it at that.
But the interesting thing about Gotcher is that the tax professoriate
generally embraces its result even though the Fifth Circuit’s analysis
provides no intellectual support. The only authority cited for the
proposition that “exclusions from gross income are not limited to the
enumerated exclusions”344 was the “convenience of the employer”
doctrine, developed judicially and administratively before enactment
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Under that doctrine, the value
of meals or lodging provided by an employer to an employee was not
taxed to the employee under certain circumstances—if the benefit was
for the “convenience of the employer” rather than the convenience of
the employee.345
It is true, as the Gotcher court emphasized, that the “convenience
of the employer” doctrine developed without Code language to
support it, but it is also the case that the 1954 Code included a
provision, section 119, codifying (with some modifications) the
Gotcher, 401 F.2d at 120.
supra note 76, at 577.
343 Gotcher, 401 F.2d at 120.
344 Id.
345 Id. at 120 n.3 (citing I.R.C. § 119 (1964)). Under this striking principle, the full value is
excludable, even though the employee would otherwise have had to pay for meals and lodging
with after-tax dollars.
341 See

342 Geier,
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judicially and administratively blessed doctrine.346 The existence
of section 119, which was on the books when Gotcher was decided,
is hardly support for the idea that Congress intended to preserve
extra-statutory exclusions from gross income when it recodified
revenue statutes in 1954. In fact, if I had been on the Gotcher panel,
I would have inferred the opposite: When a sympathetic case for
exclusion presents itself, Congress knows what to do.
In any event, the result in Gotcher cannot depend on the language
of the Code, and it cannot depend on Congress’s unstated intentions
in enacting section 61. There must be an “unless” at work here. At
bottom, the position supporting Gotcher has to be that some economic
benefits are just not income—in this case, receipts of value that
primarily benefit the transferor, rather than the recipient. That is my
point: just because an economic benefit is not explicitly excluded
from the tax base does not mean it will be taxed.
Yes, Gotcher is different from Ms. Murphy’s situation. She
received cash,347 and Gotcher received in-kind benefits.348 And if
we were to require Gotcher to recognize income, a discount might
be appropriate to reflect that the benefits were inalienable and the
trip was partly for business. Although Gotcher was not an employee
of the larger Volkswagen enterprise,349 what he received was
similar to what is today called a working condition fringe (a benefit
paid by an employer that, had it been paid by the employee, would
have been deductible to the employee).350 Given that Gotcher’s
trip was overwhelmingly business-related, he would have had a
plausible argument for deducting most of the cost of the trip had
see also I.R.C. § 119 (1954).
Murphy II, 493 F.3d 170, 172 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1004 (2008).
Professor Geier writes:
346 Id.;

347 See

Cash always qualifies as residual gross income [i.e., “income from whatever source
derived” under section 61] (and thus is includable absent a specific statutory
exclusion enacted by Congress to exempt this otherwise includable gross income)
unless (1) it has, in effect, been previously taxed to the recipient, that is, is a recovery
of basis, (2) it is borrowed money that must be repaid, or (3) it is a government
welfare payment or similar government payment.
Geier, supra note 76, at 577 (footnote omitted). As the discussion in Part V.B.2 indicated,
however, many cash recoveries have been deemed excludable over the years without fitting into
any of those three categories.
348 Gotcher, 401 F.2d at 119. But Mrs. Gotcher also received in-kind benefits, and she had
income. Id. at 124. And the benefits made it unnecessary for the Gotchers to expend the cash
themselves.
349 See id. at 118–19.
350 Part of the cost was paid for by Gotcher’s employer, and that part might have been
treated as a working condition fringe under today’s law. See I.R.C. § 132(a)(3), (d) (2006).
Regulations define “employee” broadly. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.132-1(b)(2) (as amended in
1993).
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he paid for it himself.351
That is not the way that Gotcher has been interpreted, however.
Indeed, if Gotcher had been interpreted in that way, we would pay no
attention to the case today: there is no reason to care about a technical
inclusion in income if an offsetting deduction would be available
anyway. Gotcher has been interpreted very differently: Certain
benefits, the cost of which would not be deductible to the recipient,
might nevertheless not be treated as gross income. We care about
Gotcher because it stands for the proposition that not every receipt of
a benefit is taxable, and that is so even if the Code includes no
specific exclusion to that effect.
C. Analyzing a Recovery for a Personal Injury: The “In Lieu of” Test
How should one analyze a recovery for a nonphysical personal
injury with amended section 104(a)(2) on the books? Apply first
principles. Ask questions like those raised in the first weeks of
the basic federal income tax course, many of which boil down to this:
Is there gross income? As noted and renoted above, the mere fact
that you receive cash does not mean that you have income. If, for
example, the cash merely offsets your basis in an asset disposed
of, you have no gain on disposition and therefore no income. And
remember that certain recoveries might be tax-free for other reasons
even if an economist or other tax theorist would disagree. Maybe we
think Congress would really not have intended to tax the benefit (one
interpretation of Gotcher), or maybe we think that imposing an
income tax on certain sorts of recoveries would be unseemly (one
way the revenue rulings dealing with recoveries for persecution might
be understood).
One way to help with the is-it-income? determination is to go back
to a test used in many cases and rulings, including Murphy I: ask
what the recovery was “in lieu of.” The case always cited for this
proposition is Raytheon Production Corp. v. Commissioner,352 which
was decided by the First Circuit in 1944. To the extent a recovery
substitutes for amounts that would have been taxable, like lost profits,
the recovery should be taxable if section 104(a)(2) does not apply.353
To the extent it does not take the place of an otherwise taxable item,
351 There would be other issues under today’s Code, if the benefit were not treated as
automatically excludable. Had these expenditures been made by Gotcher himself, they might
have been treated as start-up expenditures because he was investigating the creation of a trade
or business. If so, the expenditures might have been amortizable later even if not currently
deductible. See I.R.C. § 195 (2006).
352
144 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1944).
353 See id. at 113.
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however, it should not automatically be taxable—unless it is just a
windfall.354 In sum, if the amount received is not in lieu of anything,
and assuming no specific exclusion applies, it should be taxed.355
The “in lieu of” test has been disparaged in recent commentary.
For one thing, it has been characterized as arising in the commercial
damages context, and consequently lacking any obvious relevance to
personal injury recoveries. Professor Dodge has written:
The only respectable (if dangerously incorrect) basis for
excluding compensatory damages from gross income is the
“substitute for” theory, which may be loosely related to the
Raytheon case. That case (and its progeny) dealt with the
issue of whether commercial damages were “for” lost profits
or a destroyed asset with a basis. Not only were these cases
concerned with commercial damages, they ultimately hinged
on a finding (or nonfinding) of recoverable basis. They do not
stand for the proposition that a cash recovery for personal
injury is excludible apart from basis recovery or section
104(a)(2).356
Raytheon did involve commercial damages, but it is unclear why a
principle developed in one context cannot apply in another. Whatever
its origins, the “in lieu of” or “substitute for” test has been used
often in personal injury cases by courts oblivious to the “danger”
involved.357
Indeed, in O’Gilvie v. United States,358 decided in 1996, the
Supreme Court took application of the test for granted in determining
whether punitive damages associated with a personal injury were
excludable under the pre-1996 version of section 104(a)(2). In
describing that section, Justice Breyer noted that “the language
354 See

id.
Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
356 Dodge, Jensen’s Missiles, supra note 16, at 987; see also Geier, supra note 76, at 578
(discussing origins of the “in lieu of” test).
357 See, e.g., Delaney v. Comm’r, 99 F.3d 20, 23–24 (1st Cir. 1996) (applying test to
determine the consequences of a tort settlement); Robinson v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 116 (1994)
(same), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 70 F.3d 34 (5th Cir. 1995), superseded by statute, Small
Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605(a), 110 Stat. 1755, 1838, as
recognized in Moulton v. Comm’r, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1151 (2009); see also Moulton, 97
T.C.M. (CCH) 1151 (same); Gibson v. Comm’r, 94 T.C.M. (CCH) 164 (2007) (applying test
to determine the applicability of section 104(a)(2)); Connolly v. Comm’r, 93 T.C.M. (CCH)
1138 (2007) (same); Green v. Comm’r, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 436 (2005) (same); cf. Getty v.
Comm’r, 913 F.2d 1486 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying test to determine that a settlement payment
made by the Getty Museum to the Getty family heirs was excludable to the extent it was in lieu
of a gift by J. Paul Getty).
358 519 U.S. 79 (1996).
355 See
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excludes from taxation not only those damages that aim to substitute
for a victim’s physical or personal well-being”—the inference was
that that portion of the damages might not have been taxable
regardless of section 104(a)(2)—but also “those damages that
substitute . . . for lost wages, which would have been taxed had the
victim earned them.”359 In contrast, punitives substituted for nothing
and were therefore outside the scope of the exclusion.360 The
“substitute for” language was dictum, and the language might not
have resulted from careful deliberation. But the language resonated
with some Justices.
The test is not perfect, and it might need tweaking. But it at least
requires asking some questions we should be asking anyway. What is
the payment for?361 (Is it basis recovery, a windfall, effectively for
disposition of an asset with a zero basis?) Or, more generally—this is
what we ought to be figuring out—what is going on here? Judgment,
and sometimes guesswork, will be involved, but I cannot imagine
determining the tax consequences of any event or transaction without
making the effort to determine what really was going on.362
If Professor Dodge means only that the cases in which courts have
applied the “in lieu of” test have not used it as an independent ground
for exclusion, then of course I agree.363 The test does not lead to any
particular conclusion. We determine, as best we can, what a recovery
was for, and then we go from there. If the recovery replaced lost
profits, then it is taxable (assuming no other basis for exclusion
exists). If not, keep thinking.364
at 86 (emphasis added).
id.
361 See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2009-03-073 (Oct. 9, 2008) (applying test to determine
the portion of recovery excludable by section 104(a)(2) and the portion attributable to
punitives). In this ruling, the Service conflated the “in lieu of” and “origin of the claim” tests.
Cf. Phelps v. Comm’r, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1336, 1340 (2008) (“If the settlement agreement lacks
express language stating what the amount paid pursuant to that agreement was to settle, the
intent of the payor is critical to that determination.”).
362 Cf. Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188 (1938) (holding that an amount received under a
compromise about a contested will was received by “inheritance” for purposes of statutory
exclusion, when Lyeth was able to receive what he did only because he was an heir and he made
a claim in that capacity).
363 See Dodge, Jensen’s Missiles, supra note 16, at 131 (“The ‘in lieu of’ (or ‘substitute
for’) theory is thrown around as if the mere labels attached to the doctrine lead to obvious
conclusions.”).
364 Professor Dodge thinks an exclusion would be available only if section 104(a)(2)
applies or recovery of basis is involved. See supra text accompanying note 356. That is a
respectable point, but it does not speak to the value of the “in lieu of” test. And while Professor
Geier is right that “Raytheon does not stand for the proposition that a damage award made in
lieu of an item that would not, itself, be taxable is not gross income,” Geier, supra note 76, at
578, many hints in cases and rulings suggest we take that factor into account. See, e.g., O’Gilvie,
519 U.S. at 86.
359 Id.

360 See
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Just as Professor Dodge would like to limit the “in lieu of” test to
cases involving commercial damages, the district court in Murphy
restricted the scope of the test: “courts have applied the Raytheon
test in cases involving settlement, not in cases where damages are
awarded by an administrative body.”365
My response is the same as to Professor Dodge: So? The test can
be hard to apply, and it will often not lead to definitive answers, but
the distinction drawn by the district court is bizarre. The way the
administrative law judge broke down the award in Murphy made
characterization easier than would be true with a settlement
agreement. The total recovery was divided into two components—
$45,000 for “mental pain and anguish” and $25,000 for “damage to
her professional reputation”366—a helpful first step, particularly when
done by a disinterested party. It is hard to see why this situation
worsens the case for application of the “in lieu of” test.367
More generally, how might the characterization of a damages
recovery proceed? Professor Andrews raises a nice conceptual puzzle
in his income-tax casebook: Assume that a recovery for a physical
personal injury is broken into various components—lost income,
medical expenses, pain and suffering, punitives, and so on. Would
any of the recovery be excludable if there were no section
104(a)(2)?368
The issue does not come up in the real world with a physical injury
recovery because the full amount is generally excludable anyway—
except for the punitives and, if the medical expenses had previously
been deducted, the amount attributable to those expenses.369 But
suppose section 104(a)(2) were repealed. Would the repeal indicate a
congressional intention to tax the full amount of any recovery for a
physical injury recovery? Would, for example, a recovery of medical
expenses not previously deducted by the victim suddenly become
taxable in a world without section 104(a)(2)? Of course not.370 Would
365 Murphy v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 2d 206, 218 (D.D.C. 2005), aff’d, 493 F.3d 170, 172
(D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1004 (2008).
366 Id. at 215.
367 Ultimately the merits of the test did not matter to the district court, which concluded
that the default rule was “income” and a statutory exclusion did not apply. Moreover, exclusions
must be “narrowly construed.” Id. at 213 (quoting United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 248
(1992) (Souter, J., concurring in judgment)).
368 W ILLIAM D. ANDREWS, B ASIC FEDERAL INCOME T AXATION 105 (5th ed. 1999).
The question survives in the new edition. See WILLIAM D. ANDREWS & PETER J.
WIEDENBECK , B ASIC FEDERAL INCOME T AXATION 96 (6th ed. 2009).
369 See supra note 187.
370 If the recovery occurs in the same year as the expense, and the victim is able to deduct
the expense under section 213 of the Code, the effect is a wash: no net income. To the extent the
expense is not deductible (if, for example, the threshold under section 213 is not reached), we
have basis recovery.
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a pain-and-suffering component of the recovery be includable in
gross income? I am not sure, but I am sure that the answer is not so
obviously yes that the question should be ignored.
One traditional line of analysis concludes that a pain-and-suffering
recovery should be tax-free because it substitutes for the “right to
be free from pain and suffering,” which is not included in the income
tax base. (Justice Breyer hinted at the propriety of that treatment in
O’Gilvie,371 and the Murphy I panel applied that analysis in
connection with the emotional-distress recovery.372) If you lose
$1,000 worth of emotional well-being and are compensated with a
$1,000 recovery, you will not be made whole if you are taxed.373
Maybe it does not make sense to talk in these terms, but people do.374
And if you have really lost something, it does not seem appropriate to
automatically characterize any recovery as a windfall.375
However we analyze that part of a recovery, the ultimate question
is whether there is income; we would not assume that, simply because
no express exclusion applies, the recovery is taxable. Professor
Andrews included the alienation-of-affections ruling in his text,
apparently intending students to ponder whether there might be
justification for not taxing at least part of a personal injury recovery
on the ground that there is no income.376
In the cases and rulings that have applied the “in lieu of” test in
a personal physical injury setting, the question has usually been
whether a recovery is “on account of” a physical injury, not to break a
recovery into components (other than to determine any element of
371 See supra text accompanying note 359. Until Murphy, that argument seems not to have
been raised in post-1996 cases involving recoveries for nonphysical injuries with something like
a pain-and-suffering aspect. See, e.g., Venable v. Comm’r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 254 (2003), aff’d,
110 F. App’x 421 (5th Cir. 2004) (not considering exclusion of a mental-anguish portion of
malicious-prosecution recovery).
372 See Murphy I, 460 F.3d 79, 88 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, No. 05-5139, 2006 WL 4005276
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2006).
373 The relief provision available for involuntary conversions of property would be
unavailable in this situation. See I.R.C. § 1033 (2006); see also supra note 256.
374 Professor Dodge has argued that “pain-and-suffering damages compensate that
which cannot be purchased. Thus, it is fundamentally misleading to call these damages
‘compensation’; they ‘replace’ the irreplaceable.” Dodge, Taxes and Torts, supra note 196, at
183. That is a powerful rhetorical point. Nevertheless, we will continue talking about
“compensation” for irreplaceable losses. (Furthermore, Dodge’s flourish would not strike the
man on the street as support for imposing tax liability.)
375 But see infra note 414 and accompanying text (describing an early Treasury ruling
concluding that recovery for pain and suffering was taxable in the absence of a statutory
provision to the contrary).
376 That was true in the 1999 edition, see ANDREWS, supra note 368, and, in the new
edition, Andrews and Wiedenbeck again include Revenue Ruling 74–77, 1974-1 C.B. 33. See
ANDREWS & WIEDENBECK , supra note 368, at 99. Neither edition informs students that the
Service has pulled the ruling.
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punitive damages).377 A further breakdown is generally unnecessary
because, if it is applicable, section 104(a)(2) potentially makes the
entire recovery excludable.
With nonphysical personal injuries, however, the cases and rulings
after the 1996 amendment to section 104(a)(2) have not even
mentioned the possibility of breaking down a recovery into clearly
taxable and possibly nontaxable components. But exactly the same
analytical structure used with the Andrews hypothetical is appropriate
with a recovery for a nonphysical injury, where section 104(a)(2) has
no application.
One reason this has not happened is because of the pervasive idea
that a recovery for a nonphysical personal injury is taxable. In
unthinkingly accepting an all-or-nothing rule—if a recovery is on
account of a personal nonphysical injury, it is fully taxable; if it is on
account of a physical personal injury, it is generally nontaxable—
taxpayers, lawyers, and courts have not thought about the possibilities
that the “in lieu of” test suggests. Or if they have thought about the
possibilities, taxpayers’ lawyers have decided that fighting city hall is
pointless. When the facts are right, however, clients should be advised
to do exactly that.
One more set of points is worth making in defense of the “in lieu
of” test. Professor Geier has argued that the test, if taken literally,
leads to absurd results. Should the punitive damages or antitrust treble
damages in Glenshaw Glass have been tax-free because they were
“in lieu of being free from the defendant’s particularly egregious
behavior”?378 The taxpayers in Glenshaw Glass would not have been
taxed on the value of the right to be free from egregious conduct.
This imaginative criticism is unconvincing, for two reasons. First,
the damages in Glenshaw Glass did not substitute for anything. That
was the point,379 and it was emphasized in O’Gilvie as well.380 To the
extent that a “recovery” is a pure windfall, it ought to be taxable.
Second, if the “in lieu of” test leads to absurd results when taken too
377 See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2009-03-073 (Oct. 9, 2008) (mandating application of a
test to determine the portion of recovery excludable under section 104(a)(2) as “on account of
personal physical injuries” and the portion attributable to punitives).
378 Geier, supra note 76, at 578.
379 The Glenshaw Glass Court noted:

Respondents concede . . . that the recoveries are taxable to the extent that they
compensate for damages actually incurred [i.e., lost profits]. It would be an anomaly
that could not be justified in the absence of clear congressional intent to say that a
recovery for actual damages is taxable but not the additional amount extracted as
punishment for the same conduct which caused the injury.
Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
380 See supra notes 358–59 and accompanying text.
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literally, we should not take it so literally. As I suggested earlier,
“What is going on here?” works as well as we can expect. Phrased in
that inelegant way, the test leads to the proper result: if nothing has
been lost and cash has been received, the damages must be fully
taxable. We should not expect more linguistic precision, and more
predictability in result, than is possible in applying legal tests.
D. The Bottom Line: Not All “Nonphysical” Recoveries Are Taxable
The discussion in this part of the Article has gone in several
directions, but with a common theme: those who have assumed that
the receipt of value is, absent a specific statutory exception to the
contrary, automatically taxable under the Internal Revenue Code are
just wrong. And that has been true even in cases when the value
received was in the form of cash and no apparent basis offset was
involved.
There is no reason to assume that a recovery for a nonphysical
personal injury is automatically taxable. Full inclusion in the
recipient’s gross income is the likely result in most cases, to be sure,
but it should not be the result in all. At a minimum, authority—
doctrine!—has supported the propositions that no income arises in
cases of basis recovery; for recoveries where a personal right was
lost; perhaps in cases where many might think it unseemly to impose
an income tax; and who knows what else? When the Internal Revenue
Service recently pulled authority supporting those positions, it did so
without adequate justification, and, in some cases, it did so for a
questionable reason: to further its litigation posture in Murphy.
Theoreticians might not like all of that authority, but some of it is
unobjectionable (basis recovery) and all of it has (or had) been around
for a long time. Doctrine should not be ignored simply because a
commentator thinks it is theoretically unfounded.
VI. WHY THE RESULT IN MURPHY I WAS NOT CRAZY
One of the points I have been making is that the concept of income
historically was not as all-encompassing as modern commentators
think it should have been. The case can reasonably be made that Ms.
Murphy might not have had gross income as defined in section 61, at
least not to the extent of the full $70,000—a determination that the
D.C. Circuit did not make in Murphy I, except implicitly, by jumping
straight to the constitutional issues—and that her recovery was not
necessarily “incomes” under the Sixteenth Amendment.
In Murphy I, the panel said it was making two big points. First,
the recovery was not “in lieu of” anything that would have been
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taxable,381 and, although that point by itself might not have been
determinative, it was bolstered by point 2: Damage recoveries for
personal injuries would not have been understood as “income” by the
ratifiers of the Sixteenth Amendment, except insofar as the recoveries
were for lost wages or profits.382 Neither of these points is crazy. A
third point underlies much of the panel’s discussion: Although the
panel purported not to rely on any “return of capital” theory, that idea
clearly played a central role in its thinking about the meaning of
“income.”383 The point was expressed using howler-like language, but
it too was not baseless. I will discuss each of these three points.
In addition, I shall discuss other factors that might have helped
justify the result in Murphy I, even though the panel did not stress
(or even mention) them. First, the old cases and rulings in this area
have distinguished, or have been understood to have distinguished,
between recoveries associated with voluntary events and those
associated with involuntary ones—with recoveries for events that fall
on the involuntary side of the divide less likely to be taxable. The
voluntary-involuntary distinction has intuitive appeal today, as it
would have had in 1913. Second, contrary to the position taken by
several commentators, Murphy’s recovery for emotional distress was
not equivalent to wages. And I shall discuss the limits of logic in
understanding legal doctrine—that some see a logical connection
between wages and emotional-distress recoveries does not mean
the law must accept their equivalence—and the suspect idea that
“income” is a legal concept that can evolve on its own, with no
changes in the underlying statutory or constitutional scheme.
A. The “In Lieu of” Test Applied to Murphy
The Murphy I panel applied the “in lieu of” test to determine
whether Ms. Murphy’s recovery, none of which was for lost wages,
should have been included in the income-tax base.384 The answer was
no: the “emotional well-being and good reputation [Murphy] enjoyed
before they were diminished by her former employer were not taxable
as income. Under this analysis, . . . the compensation she received in
lieu of what she lost cannot be considered income.”385
381 See Murphy I, 460 F.3d 79, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated, No. 05-5139, 2006 WL
4005276 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2006).
382 Id.
383 “The question in this case is not . . . about a return of capital—except insofar as Murphy
analogizes human capital to physical or financial capital; the question is whether the
compensation she received for her injuries is income.” Id.
384 See id.
385 Id.
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The panel’s use of the test caused critics to go ballistic, but, as I
discussed in Part V.C, there was ample authority to support this sort
of analysis. Put “analysis” in quotation marks if you wish, but in
O’Gilvie the Supreme Court had implied that this was a relevant
consideration.386 And it certainly would have been relevant if the “in
lieu of” test had led to the conclusion that the recovery substituted
for lost profits and therefore should have been taxable. Had that
determination been made, no one would be complaining about use of
the test.
Judge Ginsburg wrote that, because of O’Gilvie, his panel had
been “instructed” by the Supreme Court to engage in this inquiry.387
He overstated the extent to which the Court had required use of
the test, or had mandated that a recovery should be tax-free if it
substituted for nontaxable attributes. On the other hand, Ginsburg did
not make this stuff up. Commentators might think the Supreme Court
had gotten the analysis bizarrely wrong, or that the D.C. Circuit panel
might have worked its way around an apparent directive. But the
panel does not deserve criticism—no howler here—for doing what it
reasonably thought it was supposed to do.
B. Return of Capital Ideas
The Murphy I panel characterized Murphy’s “return of capital”
argument as follows:
Murphy argues that, being neither a gain nor an accession to
wealth, her award is not income and § 104(a)(2) is therefore
unconstitutional insofar as it would make the award taxable
as income. Broad though the power granted in the Sixteenth
Amendment is, the Supreme Court, as Murphy points out, has
long recognized “the principle that a restoration of capital [i]s
not income; hence it [falls] outside the definition of ‘income’
upon which the law impose[s] a tax.”388
Murphy then argued that the same principles reflected in the language
quoted from O’Gilvie should apply to a conversion of human
capital.389
I have noted the panel’s unfortunate failure to distinguish between
O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 84, 86 (1996).
I, 460 F.3d at 88.
388 Id. at 85 (alterations in original) (quoting O'Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 84).
389 Id. (citing GARY S. B ECKER , H UMAN C APITAL (1st ed. 1964); Gary S. Becker, The
Economic Way of Looking at Life, in E CONOMIC S CIENCES 27, 43–45 (Nobel Lecture, Dec. 9,
1992)).
386 See

387 Murphy
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“returns of capital” and “returns of basis.”390 That is a howler of sorts,
but, as was true with use of the “in lieu of” test, the panel was doing
what it thought it was supposed to do. Murphy was able to quote
helpful language not only from O’Gilvie but also from Glenshaw
Glass:
The long history of . . . holding personal injury recoveries
nontaxable on the theory that they roughly correspond to a
return of capital cannot support exemption of punitive
damages following injury to property . . . . Damages for
personal injury are by definition compensatory only. Punitive
damages, on the other hand, cannot be considered a
restoration of capital for taxation purposes.391
Glenshaw Glass was a statutory interpretation case, not one arising
under the Sixteenth Amendment, but, given the historical
understanding that “gross income” under section 61 of the Code and
“incomes” in the Amendment should be interpreted in a consistent
way, it was hard not to make the jump from statutory analysis to
constitutional interpretation.392
Critics have ridiculed Murphy I, but the Supreme Court really had
said that about “returns of capital,” and as recently as 1996.393 Yes,
those passages were dicta—and, in Glenshaw Glass, dictum in a
footnote394—but they were Supreme Court dicta. In both cases, the
Court was making the point that punitive damages could not be
treated as compensatory and therefore could not be tax-exempt in the
way that compensatory damages might be (at least to the extent basis
recovery is involved). If the Court had been more focused, it might
have seen the important distinction between returns of basis and
“returns” of unrealized appreciation.395 Or the Court might have said
supra Part III.
Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 85 (omission in original) (quoting Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass
Co. 348 U.S. 426, 432 n.8 (1955)).
392 The Murphy panel stated:
390 See
391

Fortunately, we need not rely solely upon the wisdom and beneficence of the
Congress for, when the Sixteenth Amendment was drafted, the word “incomes” had
well understood limits. . . . [T]he power to tax income extends only to “gain[s]” or
“accessions to wealth.” That is why . . . the Supreme Court has held a “return of
capital” is not income.
Id. at 88 (alteration in original) (quoting Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 430–31) (citing Doyle v.
Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 187 (1918); S. Pac. Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330, 335 (1918)).
393 O’Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 84.
394 See Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 432 n.8.
395 See 1 BITTKER & LOKKEN , supra note 172, ¶ 5.6, at 5-39 (arguing that the Court’s
observation in Glenshaw Glass “was probably intended only to distinguish the rulings, not to
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that in the personal injury context we should care only about whether
there has been a return of “capital,” regardless of basis, because that
is how the law has been understood since the inception of the income
tax. The Court did none of that.
Those who assign Glenshaw Glass to the tax-cases hall of fame
need to realize that this confusing, if not embarrassing, material is in
that opinion396 and that, if closely read, Glenshaw Glass cannot be
interpreted as having advanced our understanding of “income” except
in the most trivial sense.397 The issue in Glenshaw Glass was so easy
that the case tells us little about difficult interpretive issues. In the
best tradition of judicial restraint, something he was not otherwise
known for, Chief Justice Warren challenged precedent only at
the margins. In getting to the right result,398 he took questionable
propositions at face value and muddied the waters.
Given what the Supreme Court had written in O’Gilvie and
Glenshaw Glass, the D.C. Circuit panel had justification for
making too much of Murphy’s return-of-capital argument. In
addition, the panel was reacting to the government’s dumb argument
that Murphy should have been taxed because she had received
cash.399 That “breathtakingly expansive claim” gave credibility to the
return-of-capital idea. A party that takes an extreme position risks
losing the high ground and endangers the more reasonable result for
which it might have advocated.
C. What Did “Income” Mean in 1913?
The Murphy I panel made a good-faith, although incomplete, effort
to understand the early history of the tax treatment of personal injury
recoveries. If we need to understand what “income” meant in 1913 or
thereabouts, we should use the best authority we can find.
Many commentators do not care what people thought in 1913, but

endorse them”).
396 It is embarrassing unless the rules are different in the personal injury context. Maybe
we should not have to worry about the application of generally applicable rules in unusual
situations. See supra Part V.B.
397 I find the reverence shown to Glenshaw Glass unfathomable. See, e.g., Joseph M.
Dodge, The Story of Glenshaw Glass: Towards a Modern Concept of Gross Income, in TAX
STORIES, supra note 8, at 17, 53 (“Glenshaw Glass . . . is now recognized as a classic for setting
tax jurisprudence firmly on a modern footing. ‘Modern’ means free of the clutter and
distractions inherited from the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century.”); see also
supra text accompanying note 14.
398 The result was right, but, as he often did in tax cases in which the government
prevailed, Justice Douglas dissented without opinion. See Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 433
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
399 See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text.
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Judge Ginsburg wrote that the Supreme Court—it does get in the
way!—had “instructed that, in defining ‘incomes,’ we should rely
upon ‘the commonly understood meaning of the term which must
have been in the minds of the people when they adopted the Sixteenth
Amendment.’”400 On this issue, the judge was right about the
directive from the higher Court. That quotation was from a 1921 case,
but it was not dictum and the Court has not repudiated it.401 Whether
or not the D.C. Circuit had really been “instructed” to apply the “in
lieu of test” or to use “return of capital” ideas, there was no doubt
that, on discerning the meaning of the Amendment, the Court had
issued “instructions.”
What is a lower court to do when presented with Supreme Court
statements that contradict propositions that are taken for granted in
the legal academy? A scholar might answer, “Look to my theory,”
and certainly a lower court can parse and distinguish Court language.
On the application of a “return-of-capital” doctrine, for example, a
Murphy I critic might conclude that the Court could not possibly have
meant to suggest that a recovery of capital, as distinguished from
basis, is always tax-free in the personal injury setting.
But when it comes to understanding the Sixteenth Amendment,
Supreme Court dictates leave no wiggle room.402 The Murphy I panel
was required to do what it did, if the term “incomes” was relevant to
resolution of the case.403 We might think today’s Court would require
a different analysis, but we cannot know that for sure. And the Court
has instructed lower courts not to reject its precedents. The Court
itself must inter suspect authority.404
400 Murphy I, 460 F.3d 79, 88–89 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Merchs’ Loan & Trust Co. v.
Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 519 (1921)), vacated, No. 05-5139, 2006 WL 4005276 (D.C. Cir.
Dec. 22, 2006).
401 Even Justice Holmes, dissenting in Macomber, agreed that the meaning of the
Amendment at ratification should be given effect. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189,
220 (1920) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating that “[t]he known purpose of [the Sixteenth]
Amendment was to get rid of nice questions as to what might be direct taxes”). Holmes
disagreed with his brethren about what that meaning was.
402 When the meaning of “direct tax” was at issue in Murphy II, the panel felt it was
required to follow Supreme Court precedent—difficult given the unprincipled character of the
cases—even though it seemed to think that precedent was inconsistent with original
understanding. See Murphy II, 493 F.3d 170, 184–86 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S.
1004 (2008); see also infra Part VII. Since the panel cited me, I know it had a good sense of
what the original understanding was. See Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 182, 183.
403 In Murphy II, the panel avoided this issue by determining that the Amendment was
irrelevant, but the Amendment was clearly relevant to the Murphy I analysis. See Murphy II,
493 F.3d at 185; Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 84–92.
404 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (reaffirming “that ‘[i]f a precedent of
this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other
line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to
this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions’” (alteration in original) (quoting
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It is impossible to be certain whether an emotional-distress
recovery with no lost-income component would have been thought
of as “income” in 1913. One can be sure, however, that taxing this
sort of thing was not what motivated proponents of the Sixteenth
Amendment: the goal was to overturn Pollock and make sure that
income from property of the rich could be taxed without regard to the
direct-tax apportionment rule.405 In fact, I am reasonably sure that,
if we could have asked an Amendment proponent about an
emotional-distress recovery, the response would have been “Huh?”
Because there was no direct evidence of 1913 thinking on this
issue, the Murphy I panel did the best it could, looking to nearly
contemporaneous authority. Encouraged by passages in O’Gilvie,
Murphy’s lawyers urged the panel to look at a 1918 Opinion of
the Attorney General, a 1918 Decision of the Department of the
Treasury, and a report issued by the House Ways and Means
Committee on the Revenue Act of 1918,406 all of which pointed
toward no taxation on statutory grounds, and maybe on constitutional
ones as well.407
The panel’s statutory analysis and constitutional analysis were
collapsed. That is hard to avoid, and, given the assumed relationship
between the statutory meaning of “gross income” and the Sixteenth
Amendment meaning of “incomes,” such consolidation was not a
mark of confusion. After all, it was not until Murphy II that a court
decided that no connection needed to exist.
In the first post-Amendment revenue statutes, Congress was silent
about taxing personal-injury recoveries. Not until the Revenue Act of
1918 did Congress speak, excluding from gross income “[a]mounts
received, through accident or health insurance or under workmen’s
compensation acts, as compensation for personal injuries or sickness,
plus the amount of any damages received whether by suit or
agreement on account of such injuries or sickness.”408
That provision is usually understood as having made no
physical-nonphysical distinction, and that is probably right, although

Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)).
405 See supra Part IV.A.
406 See Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 86.
407 Unfortunately, other, more negative authority that might have been relevant was not
brought to the panel’s attention until Murphy II. See infra notes 414–21 and accompanying text.
It is probably unfair to criticize the government for not having provided these citations to the
panel; the government could not predict the direction that the Murphy I panel’s deliberations
would take. Nevertheless, this is another instance in which the panel was flying blind, without
adequate guidance.
408 See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (1919).
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not clearly so. On the one hand, the language might be read as having
no application to most nonphysical personal injury recoveries: how
could accident or health insurance have anything to do with a
garden-variety recovery for libel? But some nonphysical injuries
could be covered by health insurance—those having to do with
psychiatric or psychological damage—and such a recovery should
have been nontaxable under the statute.
Why did Congress adopt such language? According to the House
report on the legislation, it was to clarify the law, not necessarily to
change it: “Under the present law it is doubtful whether amounts
received through accident or health insurance, or under workmen’s
compensation acts, as compensation for personal injury or sickness,
and damages received on account of such injuries or sickness, are
required to be included in gross income.”409
The Murphy I panel pointed to two other contemporaneous
documents—a 1918 opinion of the Attorney General and a 1918
Treasury Decision—that it said led to the same conclusion, “that the
term ‘incomes’ as used in the Sixteenth Amendment does not extend
to monies received solely in compensation for a personal injury and
unrelated to lost wages or earnings.”410
The Secretary of the Treasury had asked the Attorney General
whether proceeds under an accident insurance policy were income
prior to the 1918 Act. It is here that the restoration-of-capital idea had
its origins:
Without affirming that the human body is in a technical sense
the “capital” invested in an accident policy, in a broad,
natural sense the proceeds of the policy do but substitute,
so far as they go, capital which is the source of future
periodical income. They merely take the place of capital
in human ability which was destroyed by the accident.
They are therefore “capital” as distinguished from “income”
receipts.411
The Treasury extended that position in its 1918 decision: “upon
similar principles . . . an amount received by an individual as the
result of a suit or compromise for personal injuries sustained . . .
409 H.R.

R EP. NO . 65-767, at 9–10 (1918).
I, 460 F.3d at 89.
411 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 304, 308 (1918). Professor Dodge cites one of the fathers of the
modern income tax, Edwin Seligman, for the proposition that the “notion of income around the
time of the 16th Amendment and the 1913 enactment of an income tax law excluded
nonrecurring receipts.” Dodge, Taxes and Torts, supra note 196, at 150 n.43 (citing SELIGMAN,
supra note 180, at 19–22, 677–85).
410 Murphy
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through accident is not income taxable [under the Revenue Acts of
1916 and 1917].”412
The result of all of this, concluded the Murphy I panel, is that
codification of the no-income rule should not be understood to mean
that the prior understanding was “income.”413 The 1918 statute was
for purposes of clarification.
Things were not as straightforward as the Murphy I panel
suggested, however. In fact, the Treasury’s position before 1918 was
that such recoveries were taxable. That position was reflected in two
decisions that the Murphy I panel must not have been aware of. A
1915 Treasury decision had provided that, under the Revenue Act of
1913, which included no provision for personal injury recoveries,
[a]n amount received as the result of a suit or compromise for
“pain and suffering” is held to be such income as would be
taxable under the provision of law that includes “gains or
profits and income derived from any source whatever.” An
amount thus received would be, in its nature, similar to an
amount paid to a person insured by an accident insurance
policy on account of an accident sustained.414
If a pain-and-suffering component is taxable, then a fortiori any
lost-income component would be as well.415 Similarly, in 1917
Treasury announced that, under the War Revenue Act of October 3,
1917, “[p]ayments made to an injured employee by a corporation
under the accident compensation laws of the several States constitute
taxable income of the employee.”416
One would expect Treasury to be aggressive in defining “income,”
and its views should not automatically be controlling. In any event, it
was only with the 1918 decision extending the Attorney General’s
analysis that Treasury changed direction. The change came about
because of judicial decisions that, by today’s standards, reflect an
unsophisticated view of basis. The Attorney General quoted from the
Sixth Circuit opinion in Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Co.,417 concluding
that sale of capital assets cannot generate income because a sale is
value for value.418 The Attorney General ruled such recoveries were
412 T.D.

2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457, 457 (1918).
I, 460 F.3d at 88.
414 T.D. 2135, 17 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 39, 42 (1915).
415 Did Treasury mean to imply that the portion of a recovery relating to medical expenses
would be taxable? Surely not, unless the recovery was for amounts previously deducted.
416 T.D. 2570, 19 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 321, 323 (1917).
417 235 F. 686 (6th Cir. 1916), aff’d, 247 U.S. 179 (1918).
418 See 31 Op. Att’y Gen. at 307–08.
413 Murphy
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effectively returns of capital and not taxable.419
Even then, however, the Bureau of Internal Revenue mounted a
rearguard action. In 1919 it concluded—this is the full text of a
memorandum—that “[m]oney recovered as damages in libel
proceedings is subject to income tax,”420 with no indication that it
might matter whether a libel action was personal in nature. And in a
1920 memorandum, noted earlier, the Bureau concluded that the
statutory exclusion for recoveries for “personal injuries” ought to
be interpreted to apply only to physical injuries, and that an
alienation-of-affections recovery was therefore probably taxable
because nothing like a “conversion of the capital” had occurred.421
It was only after 1920 that administrative understanding moved
clearly to the “no income” position reflected in rulings, described
earlier, dealing with recoveries for alienation of affections and similar
torts.422 The motivating factor for reversal was Eisner v. Macomber423
and a new focus on the constitutional meaning of “incomes.” Once
the Supreme Court had sensitized Treasury officials to constitutional
issues, Treasury fell into line.
Because the history is not clear—even as described by the Murphy
I panel, it was murky—we need to think about how lack of clarity
should be treated. One possibility is the one commonly advanced by
commentators: if there is doubt, the taxing power triumphs, and no
limitation should be inferred. Or one can imagine the other extreme:
if there is doubt about whether a levy should be exempted from a
constitutional limitation like the apportionment rule, the limitation
should be deemed to apply.
In this case, a middle ground has appeal. The Murphy I panel
concluded that a lost profits or wages component of a personal injury
would fit within the Sixteenth Amendment’s meaning of “incomes”—
not Murphy’s situation424—but the distinction between lost profits
and other possible components of a personal injury recovery was not
explicit in any of the authorities discussed above. Nor does it seem
419 Id.
420 Sol.

Mem. 957, 1 C.B. 65, 65 (1919).
Mem. 1384, 2 C.B. 71, 72 (1920); see also supra notes 234–35 and accompanying
text. The Bureau did note, however, that, to the extent the award was attributable to “sickness”
resulting from alienation of affections, the statutory exclusion would apply. Sol. Mem. 1384, 2
C.B. at 72.
422 See supra Part V.B.2.a.
423 252 U.S. 189 (1920); see also supra notes 129–36 and accompanying text.
424 See Murphy I, 460 F.3d 79, 91 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“Because, as we have seen, the term
‘incomes,’ as understood in 1913, clearly did not include damages received in compensation for
a physical personal injury, we infer that it likewise did not include damages received for a
nonphysical injury and unrelated to lost wages or earning capacity.”), vacated, No. 05-5139,
2006 WL 4005276 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2006).
421 Sol.
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to have motivated the legislation or discussions in the early
post-Amendment period. But might we not assume that, had the
ratifiers of the Amendment thought about the issue, they would have
agreed that a lost-profits recovery could be taxed, even if a recovery
for, say, pain and suffering, could not be?425 This distinction may
have constitutional implications, with Congress left to decide whether
to impose a tax on the lost-profits component.
The goal of the tort system was to make the victim of a personal
injury as close to whole as possible. In the post-Macomber decisions,
like Solicitor’s Opinion 132, the government was trying to reflect
the constitutional understanding of Macomber, and concluded that
someone who recovers for loss of a purely personal right cannot be
held to “derive[] any gain or profit.”426 With no accession to wealth
deemed to have taken place, taxing a recovery would therefore have
not left the victim whole. Similarly, the Hawkins case, concluding
that a recovery for libel and slander was tax-free when the damage
was only to personal reputation, stressed the goal as “attempt[ing] to
make the plaintiff whole as before the injury.”427
If that is the goal, treating a lost-profits component of a recovery
as taxable makes sense: tax a recovery of what would have been taxed
anyway. That would have been understood in 1913, if Amendment
proponents had been thinking about the issue. Go beyond lost profits
(and punitives), however, and, reading the authorities informed by
what the Amendment was intended to accomplish, I am skeptical that
most folks would have thought of a recovery as income.
One float in the parade of horribles that started after Murphy I was
the fear that locking the income-tax system into a 1913 conception
of income could require removing many items from the modern
income-tax base.428 We have come to take the taxability of many
items for granted, whatever the understanding was in 1913.429
Time has passed some arguments by. But the constitutional issues
associated with personal injury recoveries have arisen only recently,
after the 1996 amendment of section 104(a)(2). We do not need to
worry about other hypothetical horribles, or to tear the income tax up
by its roots, to get the treatment of this particular item right.
425
Treasury had initially treated a recovery for pain and suffering as taxable, see supra
note 414 and accompanying text, but we would expect Treasury to be aggressive in defining
income.
426 Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C.B. 92, 93 (1922); see also supra notes 233–37 and accompanying
text.
427 Hawkins v. Comm’r, 6 B.T.A. 1023, 1025 (1927), acq., 7-1 C.B. 14 (1928).
428 See supra text accompanying notes 12–15.
429
See Caron, supra note 8, at 87–88.
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D. Involuntariness and “Personal” Rights
Many of the factual situations in the old cases and rulings
discussed in Part V, especially those for victims of persecution, are
unlikely to recur, or so one hopes. And most, if not all, of those cases
and rulings presented sympathetic sets of facts. Terrible things had
happened to people, and it would have been unseemly to sic revenue
officials on someone who had suffered from Nazi oppression and was
belatedly receiving some “compensation.”
One might argue that sympathy should have little role to play in
interpreting taxing statutes. Ms. Murphy, after all, has received no
sympathy from commentators, even though she was harmed for
exercising protected rights.430 But many cases involve factual
situations that evoke sympathy for a reason that has historically been
deemed important in characterizing recoveries: the harms were not
attributable to voluntary arrangements. The losses being compensated
for—of “personal” rights—were arguably unlike those from a
business or investment transaction.
Many reasonable folks, including judges, have seen an important
difference between a recovery for invasion of privacy, say, and
amounts received for selling one’s life story—a difference that might
justify different results under Code section 61 and that might have
been accepted by drafters of the Sixteenth Amendment. If one
voluntarily relinquishes one’s right to privacy for cash, one has
income. In contrast, if privacy is involuntarily invaded and the victim
is compensated, the result is not so clear, except for any lost-income
component of the recovery—which is what the 1996 amendments to
section 104(a)(2) were directed at.
Professor Germain refers to Ms. Murphy’s “transaction,”431 but
that terminology would strike people who are not tax professionals as
odd. And it is terminology that is result-driven: we are going to treat
this event like Joe and Bob signing a contract—just another tax
happening.
Professor Dodge has argued that “[i]nvoluntariness may be a
legitimate rationale for deferral of income or perhaps deductibility
of outlay, but not for total and permanent exclusion of a clearly
realized accession to wealth.”432 Not everyone would agree, however,
430 Ms.

Murphy had engaged in protected whistleblower activity. See Murphy I, 460 F.3d

at 81.
431 Germain, supra note 29, at 192 (“Ms. Murphy engaged in a transaction when she
exchanged her emotional distress damages for cash.”); see also Murphy II, 493 F.3d 170, 185
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (rejecting Ms. Murphy’s formulation that the receipt of an award in lieu of lost
mental health or reputation is not a “transaction”), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1004 (2008).
432 Dodge, Murphy and the Sixteenth Amendment, supra note 6, at 183–84.
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certainly not when a personal right has been converted. (Indeed, many
would question whether there has been “a clearly realized accession
to wealth” in a personal injury case with no recovery of lost profits.)
In some circumstances, the technical language of taxation does not do
an adequate job.
We are talking doctrine here, not grand theory. I think grand
theory can distinguish between voluntary and involuntary situations,
but, even if grand theory suggests otherwise, the distinction has
an intuitive appeal that can shape doctrine. The rulings directed at
losses from persecution are right on point.433 Whatever academic
commentators think of the importance of voluntariness or the lack
thereof—ridicule is a common reaction434—many people on the street
would think you crazy if you suggested taxing a recovery of this
sort.435
The position set out in Solicitor’s Opinion 132, issued in 1922 and
quoted earlier in the discussion of recoveries for alienation of
affections, makes eminently good sense:
If an individual is possessed of a personal right that is not
assignable and not susceptible of any appraisal in relation to
market values, and thereafter receives either damages or
payment in compromise for an invasion of that right, it can
not be held that he thereby derives any gain or profit. It is
clear, therefore, that the Government can not tax him on any
portion of the sum received.436
One thing we can say for sure: that sort of recovery was not what
ratifiers of the Sixteenth Amendment had in mind in permitting an
unapportioned tax on incomes. The income tax was intended to be
directed at the wealthy, not those who “profited” from being victims
of personal injuries. In my research on the Amendment, I found
nothing that would indicate an intention to reach personal injury
recoveries. And this sort of recovery, with no element of lost profits,
is not what Congressmen were thinking about when section 104(a)(2)
was amended.
supra Part V.B.2.b.i.
responding to an article of mine, Professor Dodge wrote, “Jensen indignantly
disclaims any sympathy with tax protesters, but does not explain how wages are distinguishable
from cash recoveries for personal rights, except on the basis of involuntariness.” Dodge,
Jensen’s Missiles, supra note 16, at 132. In short, I made no distinction other than the
distinction I made.
435 The Supreme Court had said that “incomes” generally ought to be interpreted in a
nontechnical way, “as the word is known in the common speech of men.” See United States v.
Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co., 297 U.S. 88, 99 (1936).
436 Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C.B. 92, 93 (1922).
433 See
434 In
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The involuntary-voluntary distinction is recognized in many
settings throughout tax law,437 but one argument made to counter
the significance of the distinction is that Congress has provided a
specific relief provision for involuntary conversions of property. The
existence of section 1033, it is argued, implies that involuntary
events are no less likely than voluntary ones to lead to unhappy
tax consequences.438 At best, section 1033 permits deferral, not
forgiveness, of gain on involuntary conversion,439 and section 1033
shows, as does section 104(a)(2), that Congress knows how to
provide relief when it wants to.
This argument gives more weight to section 1033 than it can bear.
We think of section 1033 as a relief provision, and it is that. But the
“general rule” of section 1033 is that, if property is converted into
money in an amount greater than basis, gain will be recognized.440
The relief part of section 1033—applicable if a taxpayer acquires
property “similar or related in service or use” within an appropriate
period and makes an election441—is the exception to the general rule.
If it were so clear that an involuntary conversion is a taxable event,
why was it necessary for Congress to state this in section 1033?
Perhaps because, without section 1033, it might not be clear that gain
from an involuntary conversion is a “gain[] derived from dealings in
property,”442 like a “sale or other disposition of property.”443 In any
event, the fact that one provision in the Code deals with involuntary
transactions of a particular sort cannot mean the distinction between
voluntary and involuntary is never to be taken into account otherwise.
437 For example, United States v. Gotcher, 401 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1968), is often
interpreted as a forced-consumption case. See supra Part V.B.4. Not a lot of “force” was
involved, but the case is different from one in which taxpayer’s behavior is totally voluntary.
That factor is also used as a justification for the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine. Another
example: I noted Professor Geier’s discussion of the significance of Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S.
470 (1929), in developing the concept of basis. See supra note 76. One reason the Taft Court
rejected the donee’s argument that she could not be taxed on appreciation that had occurred
while the property was held by the donor was that she “accepted the gift with knowledge of the
statute and, as to the property received, voluntarily assumed the position of her donor.” Taft, 278
U.S. at 482.
438 Cf. Dodge, Jensen’s Missiles, supra note 16, at 132 (arguing that no doctrine supports
the notion that cash received as result of an involuntary occurrence is excludable apart from
statutory exclusions and deferral provisions).
439 Given the way the basis rules have worked at death, see I.R.C. § 1014 (2006), gain can
disappear without being taxed. But in theory, gain not recognized under section 1033 is deferred
only. See I.R.C. § 1033 (2006).
440 See I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2). Indeed, the panel in Murphy II cited section 1033 for its
general rule. See Murphy II, 493 F.3d 170, 185 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (finding Ms. Murphy’s
situation akin to an involuntary conversion of assets), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1004 (2008).
441 I.R.C. § 1033(a)(1).
442 I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (2006).
443 I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2006).
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E. Wages and Recoveries for Emotional Distress
Ms. Murphy’s recovery was likened by many critics of Murphy I
as theoretically indistinguishable from wages, and that is how the
sky-is-falling commentary got rolling: If an emotional-distress
recovery (even one that included no lost-income component) is not
income, then wages are not income either. And, if an unapportioned
income tax could not reach wages, the tax base would be gutted.
Taken seriously, it was argued, Murphy I would have led to the death
of the income tax. Our livelihoods depend on the income tax, so
Murphy I must be wrong.
Professor Dodge, for example, has characterized the emotionaldistress recovery in Murphy as “compensation for having undergone
an unpleasant experience, just as wages are compensation for the loss
of the psychic benefits of not working.”444 And elsewhere, in
disputing the legitimacy of the “in lieu of” test, he wrote that
“[d]amages received for pain and suffering are no different from
wages received for [a] dangerous and miserable job.”445
I do not accept the logical equivalence. I understand that Chicken
Little ruffled feathers, but the sky remained in place after she raised
her alarm. So too after Murphy I. I can distinguish easily between
voluntary arrangements, which lead to the payment of wages, and
involuntary ones, which lead to the payment of something else.
Yes, as Professor Dodge argues, some employment arrangements
that are in form voluntary are hardly that. Someone who is desperate
for work might take any job, and the compensation might seem, as a
conceptual matter, to fall on the involuntary side of the divide. But
form can matter, and, in any event, more than form is involved. Ask
the guy going to the lousy job whether he would prefer to be injured
and compensated. Maybe you will find an occasional person who will
volunteer for an injury, but the prevailing view in our society remains
that work is valued—indeed, that work is a central part of being. Most
people are satisfied with their jobs, and we should not fashion a
generally applicable legal rule on the basis of the unusual case where
employment is truly involuntary.
Remember, too, that Ms. Murphy was characterized as really
having lost something. Human capital, whatever it is, does not
necessarily get used up by working. Professor Germain argues that
human capital is “depleted,”446 but education does not wear out during
444 Dodge,

Murphy and the Sixteenth Amendment, supra note 6, at 417.
Recoveries for Nonphysical Injuries, supra note 28, at 987.
446 See Germain, supra note 29, at 192–93 (“The court of appeals in Murphy did not
provide a theoretical distinction that would allow Congress to tax wages but not emotional
445 Dodge,

2/11/2010 11:19:39 PM

836

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:3

employment. It might become obsolete as time goes by, but that will
be true whether a person is employed or not.
1. The Limits of Logic
Even if, at some level, there is logical equivalence between wages
and recoveries for emotional distress—something I will concede
arguendo—it does not follow that the two need to be treated
identically for income-tax purposes. No matter how similar the two
categories, drafters of the Sixteenth Amendment could have thought
the categories had different statuses, and Congress can decide to
treat the two differently. We know, without doubt, that wages were
considered income for purposes of the Amendment, and we know
also that compensation is includable in gross income under section
61 (unless Congress provides otherwise).447 That some see logical
equivalence does not mean that Congress is required to see that
equivalence.
Of course we should try to interpret the Constitution and any
statute in as logical a way as possible. If there are uncertainties,
we should try to resolve them logically. We should seek to make
the pieces fit together coherently, if we possibly can. And in
recommending changes in the law, we should roll out logic’s full
artillery.
But the law need not be logical. I have heard more than one law
professor complain about the illogical basis of one statute or another,
and the complaints are often valid. A legal provision nevertheless
does not lose its force simply because it is klunkier than we would
like. As smart as they were, the Founders acted illogically on
occasion.448 And, as a general matter, Congress has the constitutional
power to act illogically.
Sometimes ignoring a statutory provision is necessary because
two provisions are so inconsistent that they cannot be simultaneously
enforced: one has to prevail (or perhaps one might decide in such a
situation that neither should). That sort of situation is not the norm,
but it does happen.449

distress damages, even though both are recoveries on account of human capital that has been
depleted.”).
447 See I.R.C. § 61(a)(1); see also supra note 27.
448 Apportionment is a bizarre way to constrain taxation, but it is part of the Constitution.
A critic of the rule can argue that application of the rule should be limited, but not ignored.
449 See, e.g., Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84 (2001) (addressing a conflict
in the statutory language of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, as codified in 25 U.S.C. §
2719(d)(1) (2006)); see also Erik M. Jensen, Taxation and Doing Business in Indian Country,
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This sort of statutory disconnect does not exist with emotionaldistress recoveries and wages. It is not at all inconceivable that those
contemplating the Sixteenth Amendment and those drafting the
statutory definition of “gross income” might have concluded that
wages should be taxed and emotional-distress recoveries should
not.450 The views of theoreticians are not necessarily codified in the
Internal Revenue Code or reflected in the Constitution.
The critics get the starting point wrong. They argue that, because
the two are logically identical in their minds, if we conclude that an
emotional-distress recovery is not taxable, we would have to conclude
that wages are also not taxable.
I would start the analysis at the other end. We know that wages
are taxable, and no analysis, logical or mystical, can change that
treatment. If we think wages are logically indistinguishable from
emotional-distress recoveries (even though the Murphy court
concluded that no lost-income component existed451), we might
conclude that such recoveries should be taxed.
But no logic would require that we come to that result. Our
conclusion might depend on what the draftsmen thought they were
doing. And in making that determination, we might very well take
into account that a lot of people now, as was true historically, think
taxing an emotional-distress recovery is unjustified, particularly if the
recovery has no lost-income component.452
2. Evolving Conceptions of “Income”
Whatever the merits of logic, it should not be used, without
constitutional amendment or action by Congress, to expand the
conception of income beyond what has been accepted in the past. It is
one thing to determine that an item is logically indistinguishable
from another item that has historically fallen outside the definition
of income. In that case, no American taxpayer is hurt by the effects
of logic.
The original understanding of emotional-distress recoveries is

60 M E. L. R EV . 1, 30–41 (2008) (discussing the canons of interpretation as applied by the
Supreme Court in Chickasaw Nation); Erik M. Jensen, Chickasaw Nation: Interpreting a
Broken Statute, 97 TAX NOTES 1195 (2002).
450 The amendments to section 104(a)(2) clearly meant that a recovery for emotional
distress is not automatically excludable. But that need not mean that the recovery is
automatically taxable.
451 Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 79, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated, No. 05-5139, 2006 WL
4005276 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2006).
452 Some think taxing wages is unfair, too, but they are a smaller part of the population.
And we know that wages were intended to be taxed.
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unclear, if such an understanding existed at all. And we know that the
history used in Murphy I was less than pristine. But we also know
there is reason to doubt whether the Sixteenth Amendment was
intended to cover such a recovery, and there is reason to wonder
whether Congress, in amending section 104(a)(2), intended to make
every such recovery taxable if something other than replacing lost
income was involved.
If we are unsure, how do we proceed? The critics of Murphy I
have no doubts on that score. I have many. At a minimum, it is clear
to me that young lawyers—old ones too—are being taught by the
Murphy events to read a statute in a back-asswards way. Find in a
change to an exclusion from gross income, section 104(a)(2), an
expansion of the basic idea of what constitutes gross income. That is a
crazy way to interpret section 61, and we should not encourage
anyone to read the Code in that way. Ultimately the taxation of
emotional-distress recoveries does not matter very much, except to
affected victims and payors of damages, but how Congress writes and
how we read the Internal Revenue Code matter a great deal.
As I noted earlier, Professor Dodge has criticized application of
the “in lieu of” test:
[O]ne has to enter the realm of theory to claim that a cash
receipt should be excluded on the ground that it is a
“substitute for” some kind of nonincome, such as the pleasure
of normal existence. That kind of argument might be made
with respect to pain-and-suffering damages. But it won’t fly
in either the positive-law realm or the tax-theory realm.
Wages are taxable precisely because the pleasure of leisure
(which has no basis) is converted to cash by the exercise of
one’s labor.453
No, wages are not “taxable precisely because the pleasure of leisure
(which has no basis) is converted to cash by the exercise of one’s
labor.” Wages are taxable because Congress has provided specifically
for that result and has done so in a way that is consistent with
constitutional requirements. Wages are taxable not because of theory;
they are taxable because of the law.
It is often argued that conceptions of “income” in place when
the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified should have no effect in
understanding constitutional doctrine. Professor Caron does not want
to look at the “entrails” of constitutional debates in the late eighteenth
453 Dodge,

Recoveries for Nonphysical Injuries, supra note 28, at 987 (footnote omitted).
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century,454 and I suspect he is no more enthusiastic about studying
1913 events. We become more sophisticated as time passes—hearing
popular radio (involuntarily), I do not believe this, but I will pretend
to—and increasing sophistication in our conceptions of income
should be reveled in. Should it matter that something we now want
to treat as income might not have been understood as such in
1913?455 Should we not take economists’ increasing sophistication
into account?
Yes and no. Of course, we should take new learning into account
in presenting new policy proposals. But when it comes to interpreting
existing law, I am a skeptic.
It is weird (and maybe unconstitutional?) to permit an “improved”
conception of income to expand congressional power. We properly
interpret the Fourth Amendment as applicable to modern forms of
electronic surveillance, although (obviously) unknown in 1789, but
we do so to limit governmental power. It is fundamentally different
to use our sophisticated understanding of taxation to contract a
constitutional limitation and thus to expand congressional power.
It is particularly perverse to delegate constitutional interpretation
to academic theorists. The Constitution should not be amended
in faculty lounges. “Income within the meaning of the Sixteenth
Amendment,” wrote the Supreme Court in 1936, is “[w]ith few
exceptions, if any, . . . income as the word is known in the common
speech of men.”456 Academics in Hyde Park or Cambridge might
understand “income” better than their predecessors did fifty years
ago, but improved understanding does not translate into law.
Within constitutional boundaries, Congress can define income as it
wishes, but it should do so explicitly. Despite the omnipresent
language to the effect that Congress in section 61 meant to exercise
the full complement of its taxing power, that has never been the
case—Congress has provided many exclusions457—and it has never
been understood to be the case, as cases like Gotcher illustrate.458
454

See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
in 1913 had not thought of all issues that occupy us today, but they were not
stupid. Might imputed income be taxable? Instructions for the first modern tax return say a
homeowner shall not be “required to include . . . estimated rental [value] of his home as
income.” INTERNAL R EVENUE SERVICE, FORM 1040: R ETURN OF ANNUAL NET INCOME OF
INDIVIDUALS 4, at Instruction 10 (1913), available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/1913.pdf; see
also id. at Instruction 17 (“Estimated advance in value of real estate is not required to be
reported as income, unless the increased value is taken up on the books of the individual as an
increase of assets.”).
456 United States v. Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co., 297 U.S. 88, 99 (1936).
457 See I.R.C. §§ 101–39A (2006) (identifying items specifically excluded from gross
income).
458 See supra Part V.B.4.
455 Folks
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Congress did not expand the potential scope of section 61 by
narrowing the exclusion in section 104(a)(2),459 and we should not
interpret the congressional act as doing more than it was intended to
do: to make taxable recoveries for lost profits or wages.
Academic theorists might respond that the full amount of a
recovery for alienation of affections, or some other nonphysical
injury, ought to be taxed, for reasons A and B, and those reasons
might be respectable. Maybe the recovery is arguably a windfall, or
conceptually the conversion of a zero-basis asset. Or maybe it is in
theory indistinguishable from wages. The theorists might even be able
to convince me that, on the merits—if we were building a tax system
from scratch—there would be no justification for excluding a
particular recovery.
But that is not the way a practitioner ought to be thinking (and
academics ought not to be teaching their students to look only for
conceptually pure results). Congress sometimes intends to adopt a
position that is conceptually impure, and nothing in the Constitution
requires Congress to conform to currently prevailing norms in the
academy.
VII. MURPHY II: THE DO-OVER
The original D.C. Circuit panel, after a petition for rehearing en
banc had been filed, but before it had been acted upon, vacated the
decision in Murphy I and scheduled the case for reargument.460 When
it reconsidered Murphy, the panel—with institutional face blushing—
decided several important issues differently and came to a diametric
result.461
The panel might very well have been “prodded by the tax
blogosphere,”462 as Professor Caron suggested, but the result is not a
strong endorsement for blogging. In fact, the state of the law might be
worse after Murphy II than if Murphy I had been left untouched.
Indeed, because of the way the panel pretended it was responding
only to new arguments, the untouched parts of Murphy I are still
relevant, even if not authoritative.
Because Murphy I had been withdrawn, the opinion in Murphy II
generally reads as if the court were hearing the case for the first time.
The panel did note the result in Murphy I, but then acted as if it were
proceeding anew because the government raised a new argument
see infra Part VII (discussing the decision in Murphy II).
Murphy v. IRS, No. 05-5139, 2006 WL 4005276 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2006).
461 Murphy II, 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1004 (2008).
462 Caron, supra note 8, at 91.
459 But

460 See
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“belatedly”: that the Sixteenth Amendment was irrelevant if the tax
on the recovery was not a direct tax.463
The panel dealt with three questions in Murphy II. First, was the
tax imposed on Ms. Murphy within the power granted to Congress
under the Taxing Clause?464 Despite what the panel had said in
Murphy I, the answer was yes465—and quite appropriately so. It does
not matter if the emotional-distress recovery was not “income” as
traditionally understood. Congress can call an excise an “income tax”
if it wishes, so long as it has authority to impose the excise. On that
point, the panel quoted from the Third Circuit’s 1960 decision in
Penn Mutual Indemnity Co. v. Commissioner466: “Congress has the
power to impose taxes generally, and if the particular imposition does
not run afoul of any constitutional restrictions then the tax is lawful,
call it what you will.”467 The real constitutional questions in Murphy
had to do with application of the apportionment rule, not whether
an emotional-distress recovery could be taxed at all.
Question 2: If the levy was permitted under the Taxing Clause,
was it nevertheless a direct tax required to be apportioned?468 Here
the panel concluded that the tax was not direct, no apportionment
was required, and the meaning of “incomes” in the Sixteenth
Amendment—the key issue in Murphy I—was irrelevant.469 I am
sympathetic to the constraints the panel was under, given the mass of
unprincipled authority, but I question that conclusion in Part VII.A.
The panel concluded in Murphy I that the tax on the
emotional-distress recovery was not a “tax on incomes.”470 The
panel in Murphy II said it was dealing with “new” arguments, but no
new argument called that determination into question.471 Murphy I
has technically disappeared, but we might assume that the panel
continued to believe the levy was not on “incomes” within the
meaning of the Amendment.472 That brings us to question 3: Could
the levy, incorporated in the income-tax provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code, reach the recovery if it was not “income” in a
constitutional sense? Or, to put the question another way, could the
Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 173.
id. at 180–86.
465 Id. at 186.
466 277 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1960).
467 Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 179 (quoting Penn Mutual, 277 F.2d at 20).
468 See id. at 181.
469 Id. at 181–86.
470 See Murphy I, 460 F.3d 79, 88 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, No. 05-5139, 2006 WL 4005276
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 22).
471 See Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 173.
472 If the tax was on “incomes,” the rest of the discussion in Murphy II was unnecessary.
463 See

464 See
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concept of “income” in section 61’s definition of “gross income”
be broader than the meaning of “incomes” in the Sixteenth
Amendment?473 The panel answered that question affirmatively.474
I question that conclusion in Part VII.B.
A. Was the Tax Direct?
The Murphy II panel could ignore the meaning of the Sixteenth
Amendment, the decisive issue in Murphy I, because it concluded that
the levy on an emotional-distress recovery was not a direct tax.475 For
an indirect tax, the apportionment rule and the Amendment are
irrelevant.
Looking at case law over the decades, and noting the obvious
(“cases have not definitively marked the boundary between taxes that
must be apportioned and taxes that need not be”476), the panel stated,
“[o]nly three taxes are definitely known to be direct: (1) a capitation,
(2) a tax upon real property, and (3) a tax upon personal property.”477
Even though the Supreme Court had concluded in Pollock that a tax
on income from property is direct, the panel questioned “[w]hether
that portion of Pollock remains good law.”478 “That portion” of
Pollock is the core of the case, and one wonders why a panel that felt
“instructed” to follow Supreme Court precedent on many other points
was doubtful about this one.479
On drawing the line between direct and indirect taxes, the panel
properly rejected the government’s argument that only “‘taxes that are
capable of apportionment in the first instance, specifically, capitation

493 F.3d at 176.
at 181.
475 Id. at 186.
476 Id. at 181.
477 Id. (citation omitted).
478 Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 181 n.**.
479 See supra notes 387–404 and accompanying text (discussing issues the panel was
“instructed” on). Some cases have been overruled without a definitive statement. The Court in
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), did not expressly overrule Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); it “rejected” statements contrary to “modern [psychological]
authority,” Brown, 347 U.S. at 494–95, and “conclude[d] that in the field of public education the
doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.” Id. at 495. But many cases have said Brown
overruled Plessy. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992)
(plurality opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.); id. at 960 (Rehnquist, C.J., White,
Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). Nothing like that
has happened with Pollock. One part of the case was explicitly rejected, with no implication the
entire case had to fall. See supra note 124 (discussing South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505
(1988)). The government argued in Murphy II that, “although [Pollock] has never been
overruled, ‘every aspect of its reasoning has been eroded,’” Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 183 (citing
Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103, 112–13 (1916)), but the panel cited post-Stanton
cases in a way that made it impossible to accept Pollock’s complete demise.
473 See
474 Id.

2/11/2010 11:19:39 PM

2010]

MURPHY V. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

843

taxes and taxes on land,’ are direct taxes.”480 That interpretation
would make the direct-tax apportionment rule, at least “[i]n the
abstract, . . . no constraint at all.”481
But the panel was also unwilling to adopt the principled distinction
between direct and indirect taxes outlined earlier in this Article,
and instead looked primarily to whether the incidence of the tax
can be shifted to someone else and whether, as a result, the typical
taxpayer is able to avoid the tax if he wishes.482 Murphy had
made this argument about original understanding, and the panel
seemed sympathetic.483 But, faced with Supreme Court authority
characterizing a multitude of levies as indirect, the panel—again
deferring to Court precedent484—was inevitably going to conclude
that the tax on the emotional-distress recovery was indirect.
The case law on direct taxation from the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries had developed with Hylton as controlling
authority, and, except for the income tax at issue in Pollock,485
the Court had characterized no levy as direct. The Murphy II panel
wrote that
Murphy makes no attempt to reconcile her definition with the
long line of cases identifying various taxes as excise taxes,
although several of them seem to refute her position directly.
In particular, we do not see how a known excise, such as the
estate tax, or a tax upon income from employment [citing
Pollock], can be shifted to another person, absent which they
seem to be in irreconcilable conflict with her position that a
tax that cannot be shifted to someone else is a direct tax.
Though it could be argued that the incidence of an estate tax
is inevitably shifted to the beneficiaries, we see at work none
of the restraint upon excessive taxation that Murphy claims
such shifting is supposed to provide; the tax is triggered by an
event, death, that cannot be shifted or avoided. In any event,
[Knowlton v. Moore] addressed the argument that Pollock I
and II made ability to shift the hallmark of a direct tax, and
rejected it.486

480 Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 182 (citing Johnson, Constitutional Absurdity, supra note 92, at
314 (2004)).
481 Id. at 184.
482 Id. at 182–84.
483 See id. at 184.
484 Cf. supra notes 387–404 and accompanying text.
485 Later cases like Macomber assumed that an income tax is direct.
486 Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 184 (citations omitted) (citing Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41,
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Unable to rely on first principles, the panel thought it was required
to determine “whether the tax laid upon Murphy’s award is more
akin, on the one hand, to a capitation or a tax upon one’s ownership
of property, or, on the other hand, more like a tax upon a use of
property, a privilege, an activity, or a transaction.”487 With the field
tilted in this way, the result was foreordained: “Regardless what the
original understanding may have been, . . . we are bound to follow the
Supreme Court, which has strongly intimated that Murphy’s position
is not the law.”488
A tax on ownership? No, the levy was not on Murphy’s ownership
of human capital.489 On a transaction? Yes. Murphy said no
transaction had taken place, but this was like an involuntary
conversion of human capital, and involuntary conversions are
generally taxable events.490 No profit may have been involved—that
was determined in Murphy I—but whether there has been an
“accession to wealth” matters only in determining if a tax is on
“incomes.”491 Like a tax on a privilege? Yes, Murphy used the legal
system to secure her recovery, and the tax was like an excise
permitting access to a commodities exchange.492
Say what? This levy was an excise on the use of the legal system? I
can refute none of these points directly because there is no principle
underlying any of them, except that the apportionment rule should
apply to little or nothing. I understand why the panel thought it had to
proceed as it did, given an incoherent body of case law, but the result
is crazy.
What in fact was Murphy taxed on? If we ignore the question as to
whether the $70,000 was income or not, she was not taxed because
81–82 (1900)). The Knowlton Court said only that the Pollock Court had not relied on whether
the tax could be shifted. Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 82. But it is true the Court did not view ability
to shift as a defining characteristic of an indirect tax.
487 Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 184.
488 Id.
489 Id. (“Even if we assume one’s human capital should be treated as personal property, it
does not appear that this tax is upon ownership; rather, as the Government points out, Murphy is
taxed only after she receives a compensatory award, which makes the tax seem to be laid upon a
transaction.”).
490
See I.R.C. § 1033 (2006).
491 “Whether she profited is irrelevant . . . to whether a tax upon an award of damages is a
direct tax requiring apportionment; profit is relevant only to whether, if it is a direct tax, it
nevertheless need not be apportioned because the object of the tax is income . . . .” Murphy II,
493 F.3d at 185.
492 Id. at 186 (“[T]he facility used in [Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509 (1899)] was a
commodities exchange whereas the facility used by Murphy was the legal system, but that
hardly seems a significant distinction. The tax may be laid upon the proceeds received when one
vindicates a statutory right, but the right is nonetheless a ‘creature of law,’ which [Knowlton v.
Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900)] identifies as a ‘privilege’ taxable by excise.”).
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she had participated in a transaction, engaged in an activity, or had
been afforded the “privilege” of being able to participate in the legal
system. She was being taxed because she had $70,000 in cash. Is that
not a tax on ownership?
B. Was Murphy’s Recovery Includable in Gross Income?
The constitutional issues matter only if the $70,000 would have
been reached statutorily. In Murphy II, the panel concluded that,
whether or not the recovery was “income” within the meaning of
the Sixteenth Amendment, Congress intended to include an
emotional-distress recovery in “gross income,” as defined in Code
section 61, when it amended section 104(a)(2).493 Whether the
recovery was also “incomes” under the Amendment disappeared as an
issue because the D.C. Circuit panel concluded the levy was an excise
exempt from apportionment.494
Although the Murphy I panel had noted the long-time
understanding that the term “income” should be interpreted similarly
for statutory and constitutional purposes, in Murphy II the panel
reversed direction: “‘Gross income’ in § 61(a) is at least as broad
as the meaning of ‘incomes’ in the Sixteenth Amendment,”495 and
therefore potentially broader. It did not matter that in Murphy I the
panel had concluded the recovery was not “incomes” within the
meaning of the Amendment, and that nothing—no “new” argument—
had changed that result.
That was an astonishing conclusion, backed by astonishing
reasoning. Step one was the statutory argument. Although it was
unclear whether the recovery would have been covered by section 61
before 1996—is there an “accession to wealth” with only a return of
capital?496—the amendments to section 104(a)(2) effectively amended
section 61. Judge Ginsburg admitted that, “[l]ooking at § 61(a) by
itself, one sees no indication that it covers Murphy’s award unless the
award is ‘income’ as defined by Glenshaw Glass and later cases.”497
But the boundaries of section 61 had to be understood as changed by
the amendment to section 104(a)(2).498 Congress intended to tax a
at 176.
id. at 185.
495 Id. at 176 (emphasis added).
496 The “return of capital” material from Murphy I was not rejected in Murphy II. See id. at
493 Id.

494 See

185.
at 179.
the 1996 amendment . . . to ‘make sense,’ gross income . . . must . . . include an
award for nonphysical damages such as Murphy received, regardless whether the award is an
accession to wealth.” Id. at 180.
497 Id.

498 “For
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recovery like Murphy’s, and, even though it did not take the
appropriate steps to amend section 61, Congress’s intentions should
be effectuated. Read section 61 in conjunction with section 104(a)(2)
and, voile!, we have gross income.
Much is wrong here. For one thing, Judge Ginsburg wrote that
this reading—Congress broadened section 61’s application without
amending section 61—is necessary because the 1996 amendment,
“which narrows the exclusion, would have no effect whatsoever if
such damages were not included within the ambit of § 61.”499 Some
commentators have made this argument as well,500 but it is wrong.
The amendment was intended to make taxable a recovery for lost
profits, and it did that for nonphysical personal injuries—a significant
effect by itself. It does not follow that a recovery for something other
than lost profits was picked up.
It is probably true that congressmen thought they were broadening
the definition of gross income to include any recovery for a
nonphysical personal injury. But, as I discussed earlier, that could
not possibly have been the result of the statutory change unless
Congress meant to gut many preexisting understandings, including
the ability to recover basis tax-free.501
C. Can “Gross Income” Be Broader Than “Incomes”?
Step two is the constitutional component of the argument.
Although this addition to “gross income” might not be “incomes”
within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment, that does not matter
if the levy is an excise. And the panel had determined that no direct
tax was involved.502 If Congress defines “gross income” to impose a
permissible excise—an indirect tax not subject to apportionment—no
harm is done by calling the taxed item income. Furthermore, if the
tax on this enlarged conception of gross income is indirect,
no apportionment is required even if this is not income within the
meaning of the Amendment—even, that is, if there is no accession to
wealth.503 In fact, the result was “so clear,” wrote Ginsburg, “that we
at 179.
e.g., Germain, supra note 29, at 208; see also supra note 186.
See supra Part V.B.1.
502 See supra Part VII.B.
503 In a footnote, the panel noted the heading in the legislative history that read, “Include in
income damage recoveries for nonphysical injuries.” Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 179–80 n.*
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-586, at 143–44 (1996), reprinted in 1996-3 C.B. 331, 481–82); see
also supra notes 188–91 and accompanying text. The panel concluded: “For the 1996
amendment of § 104(a) to ‘make sense,’ gross income in § 61(a) must, and we therefore hold it
does, include an award for nonphysical damages such as Murphy received, regardless whether
the award is an accession to wealth.” Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 179 n.*.
499 Id.

500 See,
501
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have no occasion to apply the canon favoring the interpretation of
ambiguous revenue-raising statutes in favor of the taxpayer.”504
Well. Does it make sense to think that Congress meant to tear apart
the connection between the meaning of “income” in the Internal
Revenue Code and the Constitution? If Congress did not mean to do
that, does it make sense to interpret a statute in a way that leads to
a counterintuitive result? Are we now to assume that what is called
an “income tax” in the Code need bear no relationship to what is
considered an income tax for other purposes?
Professor Dodge is persuasive on these points. He agrees that, if
the levy in Murphy was indirect, then Congress could have reached
the emotional-distress recovery as part of an unapportioned tax.505
But the issue of constitutional validity arises only if the levy is
authorized by the Code. The statutory definition of gross income
includes fifteen enumerated items, none of which includes a personal
injury recovery.506 The statutory authority to reach this recovery
therefore must be the catch-all provision “income from whatever
source derived.”507 The recovery must be “income” if it is to be
reached by section 61.508
As Dodge argues, “If ‘income’ in the catch-all clause of section 61
were construed to include anything that Congress could tax as an
indirect tax, then it would no longer mean ‘income,’ but something
broader and perhaps indeterminate.”509 And interpreting the statutory
change in this way would treat Congress as having legislated
something it did not legislate.
To be sure, Judge Ginsburg provided a partial answer to this
conundrum:
Principles of statutory interpretation could show § 61(a)
includes Murphy’s award in her gross income regardless
whether it was an “accession to wealth” . . . . For example,
if § 61(a) were amended specifically to include in gross
income “$100,000 in addition to all other gross income,”
then that additional sum would be a part of gross income
under § 61 even though no actual gain was associated with it.
In other words, although the “Congress cannot make a thing
income which is not so in fact,” it can label a thing income
504

Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 179.
Murphy and the Sixteenth Amendment, supra note 6.
506 See I.R.C. § 61(a) (2006).
507
Id.
508 See Dodge, Murphy and the Sixteenth Amendment, supra note 6, at 375.
509 Id.
505 Dodge,

2/11/2010 11:19:39 PM

848

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:3

and tax it, so long as it acts within its constitutional authority
. . . . [R]ather than ask whether Murphy’s award was an
accession to her wealth, we go to the heart of the matter,
which is whether her award is properly included within the
definition of gross income in § 61(a), to wit, “all income from
whatever source derived.”510
I will concede arguendo that Judge Ginsburg’s example could
expand the definition of “gross income” beyond the boundaries of the
Sixteenth Amendment. If Congress amends section 61 in such a way
that it clearly intends to pick up items that are not accessions to
wealth, so be it (although it would be a bad idea), as long as Congress
has other authority for the tax.
But Judge Ginsburg’s example is nothing like what happened in
1996. Congress did not amend section 61 to include something that
previously had not been within the catch-all provision, “income
from whatever source derived.” Congress left section 61 intact, and
the careful statute-reader would have no reason to know that the
boundaries of section 61 had been expanded. We should not
encourage congressional sloppiness by reading more into statutory
language than it can encompass, particularly when the effect is to
expand the scope of taxation.
The example was flawed for an even more fundamental reason:
Ginsburg was making the case that Congress could impose an
unapportioned tax on an emotional-distress recovery whether or not it
was on “incomes.” But Congress has no obvious authority to impose
an unapportioned tax on the hypothesized $100,000. If not an
accession to wealth, the $100,000 is not income as traditionally
understood. And if the tax is not on income, it is hard to see the tax
as anything but on ownership of property. The time-honored
understanding is that a tax on property is direct,511 and, if the levy is
direct and has not been properly apportioned, it is unconstitutional.
The Murphy panel likened a tax on an emotional-distress recovery
to one on a privilege. I am unconvinced—characterizing the levy as
on the privilege of using the legal system is absurd—but at least an
effort was made. With his hypothetical, however, Judge Ginsburg did
not explain how a levy on $100,000 is like any judicially blessed
510 Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 179 (citation omitted) (quoting Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass’n v.
Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110, 114 (1925)).
511 Taxes on real estate, the main component of wealth in the eighteenth century, were
clearly understood to be direct, and a wealth tax today should be treated similarly. See Jensen,
Meaning of Incomes, supra note 19, at 1128–29. But see Ackerman, supra note 139, at 58
(arguing for the constitutionality of an unapportioned wealth tax); Johnson, Purging Out
Pollock, supra note 138 (ditto).
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indirect tax. Judge Ginsburg gave an example of an unapportioned
direct tax to illustrate the constitutionality of taxing Murphy’s
recovery!
I come to the same conclusion with Murphy’s situation. If the levy
was not on gross income, as traditionally understood, and Congress
did not structure the levy in a way similar to accepted excises,
Congress must have been imposing a tax on the $70,000. If that
was not an accession to wealth, or something similar—if, that is, it
was not “incomes”—the levy was a tax on property, and, because
unapportioned, an invalid direct tax.
As bad as the howlers in Murphy I were, Murphy II was in some
respects worse. It seemed to validate the idea of an unapportioned tax
on wealth—something that had not been accepted before.
VIII. CONCLUSION
I have an admission: I do not care whether emotional-distress
recoveries are reached by the income tax. In the vast majority of
cases, there will be little to argue in support of exclusion anyway.
Recovery of lost profits? Clearly taxable. I am convinced that such a
levy would be treated as “on incomes” for constitutional purposes,
and I have no doubt that every important court would come to the
same conclusion. And maybe, when push comes to shove, I could be
convinced that Ms. Murphy, even though she was deemed to have
recovered nothing for lost wages, still had no strong arguments in
support of excluding most or all of her recovery.
But we should still care how we think about these matters in
general, and a lot of overkill has been used in condemning Murphy I.
Whatever the merits of the result in that case, we should not be
proceeding on the assumption that a recovery for a nonphysical
personal injury is automatically taxable. It is not. Generally yes,
always no.
Whatever an economist might think, distinctions between
voluntary and involuntary events, and between market transactions
and undesired damage to personal rights, are reasonable factors to
take into account in distinguishing between taxable and nontaxable
events. And, whether they are reasonable or not in the minds of
modern theorists, constitutional and statutory draftsmen could have
had them in mind. Life would have gone on quite well—the income
tax would not have imploded—if Murphy I had remained on the
books.
Finally, we should question the extraordinary expansion of the
taxing power that Murphy II, if taken seriously, seems to permit. The
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D.C. Circuit panel did not mean to do this (and we should read the
opinion with that understanding), but Murphy II can be read as
support for an unapportioned tax on wealth. There are those in the
academy who have argued for such a tax,512 and the world would not
come to an end if it were permitted. But we should not fool ourselves
that an unapportioned wealth tax was understood, outside academic
quarters, to be permissible under the Constitution as ratified, or as
amended by the Sixteenth Amendment—until now.

512 See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 139, at 58; BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE
STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999).

